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Abstract
This research is a continuation of a series of projects done at the Electronic Systems Laboratory
(ESL) that deal with the design and development of Fault Tolerant Control Systems. The focus of
this research is the design and development of a fault diagnostic system that allows an autonomous
aircraft to automatically diagnose faults and reconfigure itself to maintain stable flight conditions.
The motivation behind this research is to have the developed system be easily reconfigurable making
it possible to use it in other UAVs at the ESL.
The Meraka Modular UAV, developed at the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR),
was chosen as a test-bed for the Fault Detection, Isolation and Reconfiguration (FDIR) System.
A nonlinear mathematical model of the flight dynamics of the Meraka Modular UAV is derived,
linearised and discretised for control and FDIR system purposes. A Failure Mode and Effects
Analysis is performed in order to characterise and identify critical subsystem components as a
means of guiding the fault modelling and identification process. The Hybrid Diagnosis Engine
(HyDE), developed at NASA’s Ames Research Center, and an Approximate Input Reconstruction
Algorithm are used together to give the Meraka Modular UAV fault diagnostic capabilities. An
expandable FDIR architecture is developed to facilitate the addition of more FDIR methods in an
effort to allow the fault diagnostic system’s functionality to be enhanced easily. The architecture
was integrated based on the design of a simplified Integrated Vehicle Health Management (IVHM)
System. This system consists of a Diagnostic Agent built into the ESL’s custom Ground Station,
the Meraka Modular UAV, and a Diagnostic System that runs on a Model B+ Raspberry Pi. A
high fidelity software in the loop simulation environment was used to test the integrated fault
diagnostic system to ensure that it will function as expected in the field when used by the Meraka
Modular UAV and Ground Station Operator to perform diagnoses.
The fault diagnostic system is tested extensively by deliberately failing the UAV’s actuators during
simulated flight. The performance of the system was then verified by using flight test data collected
by the Meraka Modular UAV during flight missions. When compared with the associated FDIR
research, the FDI performance of the fault diagnostic system is found to be sensitive to the use of
filters and relatively agnostic to actuator excitation. For the Meraka Modular UAV in particular,
it is found that the fault diagnostic system performs as expected in the presence of disturbances
and noise and improvements can be made by incorporating additional points of observation.
ii
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Uittreksel
Hierdie navorsing is deel van ’n reeks projekte wat by die Elektroniese Stelsels Labrotorium (ESL)
onderneem is en wat te make het met die ontwerp en ontwikkeling van Fout Tolerante Beheersisteme,
Die fokus van hierdie navorsing is die ontwerp en ontwikkeling van ’n fout diagnostiese sisteem wat
dit moontlik maak vir ’n outomatiese vliegtuig om outomaties foute te diagnoseer en homself weer
in te stel om stabiel te vlieg. Die motivering vir hierdie navorsing is om ’n sisteem te ontwikkel wat
maklik heringestel kan word en in ander projekte onbemande vliegtuie (OV) by die Elektroniese
Stelsel Labrotorium gebruik kan word.
Die Meraka Modulêre OV wat deur die Wetenskaplike en Nywerheidnavorsingsraad (WNNR) on-
twikkel is, is gebruik vir die toets van die fout opspoor en herinstel sisteem. ’n Nie-liniêre wiskundige
model van die vlug dinamiek van die Meraka Modulêre OV is afgelei en gelineariseer vir die beheer
van Fout-deteksie, Isolasie en Herkonfigurasie (FDIH) sisteme. ’n Failure Mode and Effects Analise
is gedoen om die kritiese subsisteem komponente se kenmerke te identifiseer om sodoende riglyne
te bekom vir die fout modellering en identifikasie proses. Die Hibriede Diagnostiese Enjin (HyDE)
wat by NASA se Ames Research Center, en ’n Approximate Input Reconstruction Algorithme word
saam gebruik op die Meraka Modular UAV se fout diagnostiese vermoë te verskerp. Uitgebreide
FDIH agitektuur is ontwikkel om die byvoeging van nog FDIH metodes te vergemaklik. Dit is
gedoen om dit moontlik te maak om maklik die fout diagnostiese sisteem se werking te verbeter.
Die argitektuur is geïntegreer baseer op die ontwikkeling van ’n vereenvoudigde Integrated Vehicle
Health Management (IVHM) Sisteem. Hierdie sisteem bestaan uit n Diagnostiese Agent wat in-
gebou is in die ESL se custom grondstasie, die Meraka Modulêre OV, en ’n Diagnostiese Sisteem
wat gebruik maak van ’n Model B+ Raspberry Pi. Hoëtrou sagteware in die simulasie omgewing
is gebruik om die integreerde fout diagnostiese disteem te toets om sodoende seker te maak of dit
soos verwag sal werk as die deur die Meraka Modulêre OV en Grondstasie Operateur gebruik word
om ontledings te doen.
Die fout diagnostiese sisteem is deeglik toets deur om aspris die OV se aandrywers tydens die
simuleerde vlug te laat faal. Hoe die sisteem presteer het is toe deur middel van die vlugdata
wat deur die Meraka Modulêre OV gedurende die vlug versamel is, geverifeer. In vergeleke met
die betrokke FDIH navorsing, is die FDI prestasie sensitief vir die gebruik van filters en beteklik
agnosties teenoor die opwekking van die aandrywers. Veral in die geval van die Meraka Modular
OV word daar gevind dat die fout diagnostiese sisteem soos verwag presteer as daar steurnisse en
geraas is, en dat dit verbeter kan word as addisionele observasie punte inkorporeer word.
iii
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Autonomous Aircraft
The technological development over the past century has seen the increased use of automated and
autonomous systems. UAVs (Unmanned aerial vehicles) are increasingly being used for economic
benefit in civil and military operations [39]. Flight safety and reliability for these UAVs are vital
and a IVHM (Integrated Vehicle Health Management) System is one of the measures available that
can be used to ensure the optimal performance and safety of aerospace systems. This is achieved
by observing the state or health of the vehicle and applying diagnostic and prognostic procedures
to minimise the impact of faults when they occur and to help prevent critical system failure before
it occurs through the use of FDIR (Fault Detection, Isolation and Reconfiguration) and related
technology.
1.1.1 Problem Statement
The Electronic Systems Laboratory (ESL) in Stellenbosch University requires an FDIR System
for the UAV technology currently being developed. The Meraka Modular UAV (Unmanned Aerial
Vehicle) was chosen as a test-bed for the required FDIR system. The developed FDIR system
must be capable of performing hybrid diagnosis using model based reasoning techniques. The
motivation behind this work is to have the developed system serve as a platform for investigating
hybrid diagnosis research within the ESL and for it to be easily reconfigurable making it possible
to use it in other UAVs in the ESL.
The principal work required for this research is the practical implementation of a fault diagnosis and
reconfiguration system that allows the Meraka Modular UAV to automatically detect significant
changes in system behaviour and reconfigure the aircraft to maintain stable flight conditions in
the presence of various faults detected in on-board sub-systems. The work includes the integration
and expansion of associated FDI (Fault Detection and Isolation) and R (Re-allocation) research
completed at the ESL. The objective here is to expand and improve upon the implemented systems
using more current methods and technology. Once complete, system testing will be performed
initially through a SIL (software in the loop) simulation followed by a HIL (hardware in the loop)
simulation and a final flight test using the Meraka Modular UAV to demonstrate the developed
system.
1.1.2 Research Scope
This research is a continuation of work done in the ESL towards the development of a fault tolerant
and self-reconfiguring system. In these projects the aim was to develop controllers that would be
robust to modelling errors and faults within the system model. The aim of this research is to
develop a generalised fault diagnosis system that is housed in an expandable architecture. The
majority of the focus in this research will be directed towards the development of this system and
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the integration of developed FDIR technologies where possible. To this end, the Meraka Modular
UAV will be able to autonomously diagnose faults in onboard subsystems and reconfigure itself to
use fault-free subsystems given the level of the technology implemented.
1.1.3 Fault Tolerant Control Group
The Fault Tolerant Control Group within the ESL was created with the aim of developing FTC
(Fault Tolerant Control) System technology that would allow UAVs to maintain stable flight in the
presence of undesirable flight conditions and component failures.
This began with work done by Willem Basson [8] in 2011 focusing on the development and imple-
mentation of a Fault Tolerant Adaptive Control System for an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle on the
Variable Stability UAV built at Stellenbosch University. He was able to show that adaptive control
is effective as part of an integrated FTC System by demonstrating that the control system can
re-stabilise a unstable aircraft due to damage-induced longitudinal shifts in the centre of gravity of
the aircraft.
This was followed by work done by Lionel Basson [7] whose aim was the development of a control
re-allocation (R) system to be used as part of the FTC architecture used in UAVs. The objective
was to minimise the impact of faults that would necessitate the reconfiguration of the higher-level
(control, guidance and navigation) systems on an aircraft. This was accomplished using a control
allocation algorithm / system that solves a multi-optimisation problem. The developed system was
implemented on the Meraka Modular UAV and was found to be applicable to a number of different
conventional aircraft configurations.
In 2012, Hendrik Odendaal [38] developed an architecture capable of performing Fault Detection
and Isolation (FDI) as part of the FTC System developed at the ESL. He implemented this system
based on the Meraka Modular UAV and analysed the multiple model adaptive estimator (MMAE)
and parity space passive fault detection and isolation methods. This resulted in the appropriate
use cases for the different methods where the MMAE method was found to be more accurate in
isolating faults and the parity space method was found to be more sensitive to the occurrence of
faults.
1.1.4 Fault Detection, Isolation and Reconfiguration
Flight 
Mission
Perform Fault
Detection
Perform Fault
Isolation
Reconfigure
Aircraft
Maintain 
Stable Flight
Fault Diagnosis
Figure 1.1: FDIR System, showing the different FDIR stages.
The following stages, as shown in Figure 1.1 above, describe the operation of the an FDIR System.
Stage 1 - Flight mission: At this stage the aircraft’s guidance system maintains control of the
aircraft and guides it along a specified flight trajectory. This represents normal aircraft behaviour
at trim and allows for the simulation of the occurrence of faults by injecting faults into the system.
Stage 2 - Monitor aircraft behaviour: The aircraft’s behaviour is continuously monitored at this
stage in order to detect any simulated faults. This is done while the aircraft continues normal
operation and any faults detected will need to be diagnosed.
Stage 3 - Perform fault isolation: After the detection of a fault, the FDIR system will attempt to
determine what has caused the fault by isolating the root cause using the available sensor data and
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system model. This information is then packaged in a form that can be used to reconfigure the
aircraft.
Stage 4 - Reconfigure aircraft: The packaged information determined during the fault diagnosis
stage is used to reconfigure the system. The reconfiguration of the aircraft is based on the fault
and the available fault mitigation procedures needed in order to restore nominal flight operation
using the existing fault free subsystems.
Stage 5 - Maintain stable flight: At this stage the FDIR system uses the new system configuration
as the new model for the aircraft in order to maintain stable flight. The flight mission proceeds
until such a time that there is a significant change in the aircraft’s behaviour.
1.2 Fault Management
Figure 1.2: IVHM Fault Life Cycle Model, showing the 4 different phases, sourced from [6].
FDIR (Fault Detection, Isolation and Reconfiguration) Technology lies at the core of the IVHM
Fault Life Cycle, which consists of Monitoring, Detection and Diagnosis, Mitigation, Repair and
Verification as shown in Figure 1.2. Each quadrant in the Fault Management Model represents
a different phase in the development of the IVHM System. Noteworthy elements here are the
Target Vehicle, Onboard and Ground Based Diagnostics which inform decision processes used in
the selection of the systems and FDIR technologies for this research project. It is from this model
that the conceptual framework for IVHM Technology is developed.
1.2.1 Conceptual Framework
Figure 1.3 shows the conceptual framework for an IVHM System, here the various components
interact to perform the function of Problem Management. The architecture can be grouped into
three high level systems, on-board systems (left), operations support (top right) and maintenance
and logistics support (bottom right).
The components in the on-board system serve different functions and of note is the diagnostic sys-
tem which performs fault diagnosis using information retrieved from on-board subsystems. Within
operations support, of note is the diagnostic agent and the fault history repository. These two
components complement the function of the on-board diagnostic system at the ground station by
3
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Figure 1.3: Integrated Vehicle Health Management Blueprint, showing the onboard and ground based
systems, adapted from [6].
providing fault history and further diagnostic capability. This applies in cases where more process-
ing is required or when dealing with systems and data that aren’t time sensitive relative to the
on-board operations. It is from this framework that further work for the project is based.
1.2.2 Fault Diagnostics Research
Error
Recovery
Fault
Response
Fault
Diagnosis
Fault
Isolation
Error
Detection
Data
Provisioning
Error
Containment
Fault
Containment
Anonoius
Behaviour
Degraded
Behaviour
System
Optimization
Nominal
Behaviour
Fault
Prevention
Fault
Prognosis
DiagnosticsFDIR
Monitoring
Maintainability
Prognostics
Figure 1.4: IVHM Function Flow, showing the overlap between IVHM research, adapted from [28].
The diagnostic system to be developed is described as shown in Figure 1.4 above as an overview of
the overlap between the various Health Management Technologies and Fault Management Phases.
This figure creates a clear distinction between the different fields of research which make it relatively
easier to identify the pertinent fields of research according to the desired functionality. In this case
Fault Diagnosis which is relatively isolated and FDIR which is comprised of Error Detection, Fault
Isolation, Fault Response and Error Recovery.
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The following selection criteria, based on the problem statement, is used to identify the applicable
fault detection and diagnosis approach before selecting the appropriate FDIR technology:
• supports the integration of various FDIR technologies
• detects significant changes in system behaviour
• detects various faults in onboard subsystems
• uses models or is based on models
• does not require data initially
There are different approaches to fault detection and diagnosis and these include: model based
reasoning; causal models; fault signatures, pattern recognition, and classifiers; neural networks,
procedural/workflow approaches; event-oriented FDI; passive system monitoring; rule-based ap-
proaches and implementations and hybrid approaches [1].
Model based reasoning is characterised by the use of models of the observed system to perform
fault detection [18]. Models are able to capture the behaviour evolution of a system and enable the
diagnosis of multiple faults. The model-based reasoning method is able to predict system behaviour
and compare it with observations to perform fault detection. Causal models are an extension or
special case of the model-based reasoning fault detection method. They are used to capture the
cause and effect relationship about a system in a qualitative manner versus the quantitative manner
employed in model based reasoning [49]. This is done by using bond graphs where the model is
trained using measurements or human input with expert knowledge.
FDD methods based on fault signatures, pattern recognition, and classifiers identify faults by
comparing patterns or fault signatures, which represent the known symptoms for enumerated faults,
with observed symptoms [37]. This is done by using a classifier which is an algorithm that gets
trained with data that enables it to learn what the best match is for solving a classification problem.
This method is preferable when knowledge about the underlying dynamics of the system is not
available and may be implemented with the use of neural networks.
Neural networks aka. Artificial Neural Nets (ANNs) are nonlinear, multivariable models that are
trained by using input / output data [5]. They are particularly important in cases where knowledge
about the functional relationships between the inputs and outputs is known. A major drawback is
the danger that the network may extrapolate or generalise as a consequence of insufficient training
data. However when combined with other FDD methods, fault detection performance may be
enhanced to encompass nonlinearities commonly encountered in practical systems.
In procedural/workflow approaches to fault detection and diagnosis, the decision process for making
decisions using observed data is modelled using decision trees [16]. These methods require expert
knowledge acquired from years of experience and a major drawback is that they require human
input and might not handle unexpected situations well. This fault diagnosis method is particularly
well suited for guiding human operators and may be used for situations that are particularly well
understood.
In event oriented fault detection and diagnosis an event represents the change of state of a monitored
object [48]. Fault detection is based on using for instance alarms as events instead of conventionally
a fixed set of variables and drawing conclusions for multiple events. Event oriented systems find
uses in the control rooms in process plants and are used mainly with the goal of supporting business
processes and increasing safety by analysing logs to optimise thresholds.
Passive system monitoring is a fault detection and diagnosis method where events suggesting the
presence of faults are reported to the diagnostic system by subsystems such as agents. In this case,
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the agents routinely scan every variable of interest while the System Under Test (SUT) is observed
during its normal operation [52]. This method finds use particularly in cases where the correctness
of the system’s behaviour must be ensured such as in network management systems.
Rule-based approaches and implementations function more as an interface or as a program control
mechanism [12]. They are also known as expert systems and incorporate other fault detection
methods rather than being a standalone fault detection and diagnosis technique. Rules are entered
into the system and executed along with observed data using an inference engine which may request
input from an operator. A difficulty inherent in using rule based systems is the encapsulation of
changes over time which makes it difficult to see the bigger picture making maintenance and changes
to the system difficult.
Hybrid approaches combine elements from distinct fault detection and diagnoses techniques to
achieve the fault detection task [44]. One such example is the hybrid mode estimation system
that uses a modelling formalism called concurrent probabilistic hybrid automata to combine a
system’s continuous dynamic models with hidden markov models to describe discrete changes in
its behavioural modes [29].
Of the many different approaches mentioned, model based reasoning and hybrid diagnosis stand out
as suitable methods for implementation. Based on the project statement, one can immediately see
the applicability of the hybrid based approach since it is able to deal with systems with both discrete
and continuous behaviour. In addition, sufficient data to train a data-centric FDD method is not
readily available, and if used may lead to relatively poor diagnostic performance if the aircraft’s
dynamics change.
1.2.3 FDIR Technologies
Figure 1.5: Fault Diagnostics Research, highlighting functional groupings between FDD technology,
adapted from [27].
Research into FDIR for aerospace applications has resulted in a vast amount of methods and tech-
nologies which can be used [53]. In cognisance of this, the search for applicable technologies has been
constrained to readily available methods and technologies as shown in Figure 1.5. Implementing a
practical system will require selecting the appropriate FDIR technology needed to accomplish the
fault detection and diagnosis task. A diagnosis engine and quantitative method suited to modelling
system behaviour and performing actuator FDI respectively will now be selected.
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Diagnosis Engine
In his thesis, R Mohammadi [34] describes the use of a hybrid diagnoser, a framework to perform
diagnosis in complex systems modelled using hybrid automata based on discrete event systems
(DESs) that model banks of residual generators. In contrast to this, the work done in [43] also
describes the development of a similar hybrid diagnosis system with the added capability of control
reconfiguration. It is an object-based modelling framework which captures the time and event
based dynamics of a system.
RODON is a commercial model based diagnosis engine used in the avionics and automotive indus-
tries. It was entered into the 20th International Workshop on Principles of Diagnosis (DX-09), a
diagnostics competition defined by the NASA Ames Research Center, and tested on the ADAPT
system [35]. LYDIA is another model based reasoning engine packaged as a software suite and
designed for automated diagnosis [51]. It can be used in operator rooms in conjunction with a
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) System to visualise a computed Root-cause-
of-failure (RCoF).
The Livingstone2 is a open-source Model-Based Diagnostic System [41] that was used onboard the
X-37 spacecraft (an autonomous aircraft) to demonstrate the benefits of having an IVHM system
onboard [10]. Livingstone2 is also a predecessor to HyDE (Hybrid Diagnosis Engine). HyDE is
a diagnostic engine that combines control theory and stochastic diagnosis approaches to provide
a general framework for diagnosing hybrid systems [11] and has been used in the FalconSAT-5
Sciencecraft [4]. HyDE was also used in the Drilling Automation for Mars Environment (DAME)
Project [18] and formed part of the core diagnosis engine along with vibration classification and
rule based diagnosis modules for enhanced fault diagnostics performance.
Diagnosis	Engines	Criteria	 LYDIA	 RODON	 HyDE	Scalable	Architecture	 √	 √	 √	Hybrid	Systems	 √	 √	 √	Stochastic	Reasoning	 √	 √	 √	Multiple	Faults	 √	 √	 √	Licensing	 √	 x	 √	FMEA	 +	 √	 *	Embeddable	 *	 √	 √	MATLAB	Integration	 +	 √	 +	Operating	System	 Windows,Linux	 Windows	 Windows,Linux,	Solaris,	VxWorks	√ favourable,	*	less	favourable,	x	not	favourable,	+	applicable,	-	not	applicable	Comparison	between	different	fault	detection	methods	\cite{stanley2012,	feldman2006,	bunus2009,	hyde2000}		 	
Table 1.1: A comparison between diagnosis e gines [1, 51, 35, 11]. Key: X favourable, * less favourable, x
not favourable, + applicable, - not applicable.
Following a more thorough investigation of the diagnosis engines [15], the notable diagnosis engines
discussed were evaluated to determine their suitability for the project. Table 1.1 lists the selected
diagnosis engines along with the relevant selection criteria derived from the project statement and
scope. Licensing (freely available), Embeddable and MATLAB Integration are the mostly highly
ranked (critical) selection criteria that informed the decision process to determine suitability.
Overall RODON ranks as the most functionally capable diagnosis engine according to the selection
criteria and HyDE ranks as the most suitable diagnosis engine for this project according to the
critical selection criteria. In addition to the system evaluation criteria in Appendix A.10.4, HyDE
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(Hybrid Diagnosis Engine) was selected as the engine of choice to achieve the desired system
functionality based on the results shown in Table 1.1.
Quantitative Method
Fault Tolerant Control Systems (FTCS) can be classified into active and passive fault tolerant
control systems [27]. In passive fault detection the system’s response is monitored and in active fault
detection the system is excited by injecting external excitation signals [42]. In this research project,
a passive fault tolerant control system is developed. State estimation, parameter estimation, parity
space and a mixture of these are the four most commonly used FDD technologies or methods as
highlighted in Figure 1.5 [27].
State estimation techniques are based on observers and Kalman Filters. A Kalman filter is an
algorithm that makes it possible to estimate the states of the system as the system evolves in time
and new measurements are taken [56]. The Kalman Filter is used in fields such as GPS, robotics,
and even computer vision. Banks of Kalman Filters are used to perform fault detection by tuning
each to identify a particular fault [55]. Parameter estimation fault detection and diagnosis methods
are comprised of the least squares or recursive least squares and regression analysis methods. Least
squares techniques are used to calculate estimates of system parameters through data fitting in order
to create an input-output relationship based on a mathematical model [36]. This mathematical
model is then associated with states to enable sensor and actuator detection.
The parity space method can be classified as being either input-output based or state space based.
It is used to compute a residual vector that is nonzero in the presence of faults and can be highly
sensitive to noise [30]. The residual used relies on analytical redundancies between the input and
output and an unknown initial state, properties extracted from this signal are then used to perform
fault detection.
Fault	Detection	and	Diagnosis	Methods	Criteria	 Kalman	Filter	 Parity	Space	 Least	Squares	Actuator	Fault	Detection	 √	 +	 √	Computational	Complexity	 *	 √	 √	Multiple	Faults	Identifiable	 √	 *	 √	Nonlinear	Systems	 √	 √	 +	Robustness	 +	 √	 +	√	favourable,	*	less	favourable,	x	not	favourable,	+	applicable,	-	not	applicable	Comparison	between	different	fault	detection	methods	\cite{jiang2008}	Table 1.2: A comparison between fa lt detection methods [27]. Key: X favourable, * less favourable, x notfavourable, + applicable, - not applicable.
Table 1.2 contains a list of all the relevant FDD methods implemented by the FTC Group in the
ESL toward this research in addition to the Least Squares FDD Method most recently identified.
Selecting an appropriate FDD method is a trade-off between functionality and practical feasibility.
Given that the aim of this project is to develop a generalised diagnosis engine housed in an ex-
pandable architecture (in an embedded system), the appropriate FDD method(s) can be selected
and combined if and when needed for the particular diagnosis task. However, currently this project
serves to suggest the practical feasibility of this system and computational complexity and multiple
faults identifiable are the critical selection criteria (and constraints) used to select the most suited
FDD method based on the project statement and scope.
Functionally the Kalman Filter is the most highly ranked FDD method according to Table 1.2
and [27] however it is relatively more computationally intensive and would be unsuitable for a
generalised diagnosis engine that is yet to be fully developed and understood. Given that the
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Kalman Filter and Parity Space FDD methods are relatively well understood within the FTC
Group in the ESL and that the Least Squares Method satisfies the critical selection criteria for
computational complexity and multiple identifiable faults, the Least Square Method was selected
for use within this research project. A discussion with results is given in Section 5.4.2 to contrast
the performance of the Parity Space Method with that of the Least Squares Method.
1.3 Proposed System
On-board Communication Systems
Subsystem Subsystem· · · 
Diagnostic
System
Ground Communication Systems
Diagnostic
Agent
Fault History
Repository
Wireless Comms Link
Figure 1.6: A simplified Integrated Vehicle Health Management System, adapted from [6].
The developed system is based on HyDE and the simplified IVHM System shown in Figure 1.6
where the Diagnostic System performs diagnoses onboard and is complemented by the Diagnostic
Agent in the Ground Station. This research is a generalisation of the work done by Hendrik
Odendaal and incorporates the fault decision from the FDI System component shown in Figure
1.7 into a system level reasoning engine. Focus was initially directed towards performing FDIR
functionality based on the work done by Hendrik Odendaal and later shifted toward incorporating
this work within HyDE to enable the diagnosis of on-board sub-systems. We use HyDE along with
AIRA in order to perform actuator FDI through input reconstruction since the control surfaces
don’t have position sensors.
Figure 1.7: FTC architecture with a FDI and control re-allocation module, sourced from [38].
1.3.1 System Development
The System Architecture shown in Figure 1.8 depicts the UAV at the systems level. The Control
System represents the FTC architecture shown in Figure 1.7 and is merely one of several of the
UAV’s sub-systems. The Diagnostics block represents the Diagnostic System that is the subject of
this research. Its main function is to aggregate the fault diagnostics data that it collects from the
various onboard sub-systems to inform decisions on how it reasons about the current state of the
aircraft before reporting to the Guidance System.
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Figure 1.8: System Architecture, showing the UAV’s major subsystems along with the Diagnostic System.
Fault	Diagnostic	System	
Function	 Kalman,	Bayes	 Parity,	CUSUM	Multiple	Simultaneous	Faults	 -	 -	Actuator	Isolation	(Left/Right)	 √	 √	Aileron	Control	Surfaces	 √	 √	Elevator	Control	Surfaces	 √	 √	Flaperon	Control	Surfaces	 √	 √	Rudder	Control	Surfaces	 √	 √	Actuator	Nominal	Mode	 √	 x	Actuator	Stuck	Faults	 √	 √	Implemented	features	of	the	FTC	Group’s	relevant	Fault	Diagnostic	Systems\cite{odendaal2012},	key	√	implemented,	x	implemented,	-	notinvestigated.	Table 1.3: I le ented features of the FTC ro ’s relevant ault iag ostic Systems [38], key X imple-mented, x not implemented, - not investigated.
The Fault Diagnostics Systems listed in Table 1.3 were implemented in the previous research project
[38]. The MMAE method (Kalman) was combined with a Gaussian Bayes Classifier to create a
Fault Diagnostic System. Similarly, the Parity Space method was combined with the CUSUM
method to create another Fault Diagnostic System. In each case, the Gaussian Bayes Classifier and
CUSUM methods were used to make fault decisions using observed data from the applicable FDD
methods. Focus here was directed toward comparing the FDI performance of the two systems that
detect single actuator stuck faults in order to gain a deeper understanding of the applicable use
cases for each system.
The objective for this research project is to expand and improve upon these implemented fault
diagnostic systems in order to allow the UAV to detect significant changes in system behaviour.
The end goal is to enable the UAV to automatically diagnose faults in onboard subsystems and
automatically reconfigure itself to maintain stable flight.
The Project Aim and Research Objectives Sections in Appendix A.1 and A.2 respectively encompass
some of the major aspects of the vision for this line of research. Provisions are made for additional
fault detection and reconfiguration technology during the design and development of the generalised
fault diagnosis system however actual implementation of these technologies is beyond the scope of
this research project.
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This research project is the first step towards developing a generalised fault diagnostics system that
will enable the integration and expansion of associated FDI [38], R [7] and active FTC [42] research
already done by the FTC Group in the ESL at Stellenbosch University. This is achieved through
the use of a diagnosis engine that is capable of performing system level reasoning by incorporating
the fault decisions from the integrated FDIR and FTC technologies to create a Supervised FTC.
The iterative System Development Approach to be adopted in developing refined versions of this
system is detailed in Appendix A and is outlined as follows:
• Model the aircraft and system faults - once the relevant FDIR methods have been selected,
the aircraft and relevant subsystems along with their fault modes need to be modelled. This
is done in Chapters 2 and 3.
• Implement FDIR methods selected - AIRA is investigated and implemented for each of the
identified actuators in Chapter 3.
• Develop an expandable IVHM System architecture - the Fault Diagnostic System with HyDE
at its core and that run’s off the Model B+ Raspberry Pi is developed at this stage as outlined
in Chapter 4.
• Integrate the FDIR technology - the complete IVHM System comprised of the Diagnostic
Agent, Diagnostic System and Simulation Environment is integrated along with the applicable
FDIR methods, namely AIRA, as detailed in Chapter 4.
• Get the existing aircraft system working - restore all associated hardware required for the
experiments to working order, it is assumed that this is done as part of the System imple-
mentation step.
• System implementation - migrate the developed system from the development hardware into
the test-bed system and integrate it with the relevant systems where necessary, this is done
in Chapter 4.
• Simulate the integrated FDIR technology - the functionality of the developed systems is
verified using a combination of SIL and HIL where applicable as outlined in Chapter 5.
• Perform a flight test - verify practical system performance by reusing collected flight data or
performing a flight test as outlined in Chapter 5.
In developing this research project’s diagnostic system which is based on HyDE, the following major
developmental steps were taken:
• Perform a Reliability Analysis.
• Examine the existing systems and implement the required FDIR methods (AIRA).
• Develop models for the relevant systems.
• Model the relevant systems using the GME Tool with the HyDE Interpreter on Windows.
• Develop the Diagnostic Program on Windows using Microsoft Visual C++ 2010 Express.
• Simulate the applicable system using the developed models and a simulation environment
(MATLAB).
• Migrate the Diagnostic Program to Linux and verify the Diagnostic Program’s functionality.
• Migrate the Diagnostic Program to the Raspberry PI using the Netbeans IDE.
• Simulate and test the assembled embedded system in the target system.
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1.3.2 Practical FDI
The interrelated concepts of states, behaviour, faults and failures within the context of System
Health Management (SHM) are shown in Figure 1.9. According to [40] failure is the unacceptable
performance of the intended function and a fault is defined as a physical or logical cause internal
to the system, which explains a failure. A discrete fault is an abrupt and persistent change in a
continuous system’s behaviour. Actuators have several modes of operation, which include differ-
ent kinds of faults, that give rise to several potential combinations of component configurations
representing the different states of the system.
Figure 1.9: Concept diagram for major SHM terms adapted from [40]
In this research a passive FDI system is used to perform diagnosis and focus is limited to the actu-
ators and critical sub-system components such as the avionics battery to reduce the computational
complexity of tracking the system to be analysed. Practical FDI schemes are normally run online
and are constrained to operating environments with limited computational capacity. An accurate
mathematical model of the Meraka Modular UAV is available and is used to create a high fidelity
simulation of the aircraft. It was also the deciding factor in selecting the model based reasoning
approach adopted in this research to create a fault diagnostic system with improved fault detection
capabilities.
1.3.3 Simulation Environment
Simulations were performed using MATLAB R2008b on an Intel Core i5 3.2 GHz computer with
4GB RAM by modelling the nonlinear dynamics of the UAV using Simulink. The Generic Mod-
elling Environment (GME) Tool with HyDE interpreter was used to generate the system level
representation (models) of the aircraft for use within the diagnostic system’s program. MATLAB
was interfaced with HyDE via an embedded function that communicates over a TCP connection
with the diagnostic program in order to both simulate the dynamics of the aircraft and test the di-
agnostic engine during hypothesis testing. The control input history was recorded and reproduced
during repeated hypothesis testing. The aircraft is put into trim when simulating straight and level
flight. To simulate flight tests, actual flight test data is fed into the testbed system. A 700 MHz
Model B+ Raspberry Pi with 512MB RAM is used during flight tests.
1.3.4 Available Sensors
The following sensors where used onboard the Meraka Modular UAV to collect data generated
during practical flight testing:
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• GPS - a differential GPS from Novatel
• accelerometers - a tri-axis inertial sensor from Analog Devices
• magnetometers - a three-axis high sensitivity magnetic sensor from Honeywell
• angle-of-attack and side slip sensor - a Mini Air data boom from Space Age Control
• static-pitot tube - a UAV airspeed and static pressure sensor from Freescale.
1.3.5 Practical Flight Testing
Practical flight tests are necessary in order to examine the performance of a fault diagnostics system
under real world conditions. These flight tests were performed using the Meraka Modular UAV and
faults were injected into the system to simulate actual actuator faults during normal flight. The
data generated during these practical flight tests is used to simulate the actual flight dynamics of
the UAV and to perform hypothesis testing equivalent to that done in [38].
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1.4 Overview
There are six chapters in this thesis, following is an outline of each chapter.
Chapter 1 Introduction: This chapter gives an introduction to autonomous aircraft and puts into
context the research topic of this thesis. It further highlights the fault management conceptual
framework that forms the basis of the methodology followed in this research to develop and test
the proposed system.
Chapter 2 Aircraft Model: The mathematical model used to simulate the dynamics of the Meraka
Modular UAV is derived in this chapter. This begins with a description of the aircraft axis system
used and the various frame transformations that can be done. This is followed by a derivation of
the kinetic and kinematic equations used to describe the dynamics of the aircraft.
Chapter 3 System Modelling: In this chapter, the Hybrid Diagnosis Engine and the Approximate
Input Reconstruction Algorithm is described. This is followed by a Fault Modelling and Effects
Analysis (FMEA) and a description of the mathematical and declarative system models representing
the Meraka Modular UAV and its sub-system components. These models along with the selected
FDIR methods are used to model the different fault types that enable the FDIR System to perform
fault diagnostics.
Chapter 4 System Integration: A description is given of the expandable FDIR architecture, based
on HyDE, that is used in this research along with the implementation of the integrated FDIR
System. This is followed by the methodology used to prepare and enable the integrated FDIR
methods to perform diagnoses during aircraft simulation and flight tests. This chapter also outlines
how the fault diagnostics system is utilised in the Meraka Modular UAV and by the ground station
operator to perform autonomous fault diagnostics. A description is given to highlight how the
Meraka Modular UAV maintains stable flight control and automated aircraft reconfiguration using
fault-free subsystems.
Chapter 5 System Tests: The characteristics of the physical aircraft used and the system test
conditions are given in this chapter. This is followed by the scenarios constructed in order to
perform hypothesis testing during simulation and actual flight, and a comparison of the Fault
Diagnostic System’s performance as compared with associated FDIR research done in [38].
Chapter 6 Conclusion: A high-level summary of the work done in this research along with the
results, conclusions drawn and recommendations for future work or possible improvements is given
in this chapter.
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Chapter 2
Aircraft Model
The theory behind the Meraka Modular UAV’s aircraft model is based on the postgraduate module
Advanced Automation 833 taught at Stellenbosch University. This aircraft model is based on
an axis system that is used to adequately describe an aircraft and its behaviour. Modelling an
aircraft’s behaviour and subsequently its mechanics also requires kinematic and kinetic models.
These models are then used to create a linearised model of the aircraft which is then discretised
for Control and FDIR system purposes.
2.1 Axis System
Following is a definition of the aircraft’s axis system in the form of inertial, body and wind reference
frames. These reference frames or axes are the basis upon which the standard aircraft notation is
defined in order to model the dynamics of the aircraft.
2.1.1 Inertial Axes
The standard north-east-down (NED) axis system adequately approximates an inertial reference
frame. The inertial reference frame is required to apply Newton’s equations of motion and it
assumes a flat non-rotating earth. The origin of the inertial reference frame I is chosen to coincide
with a point on the surface of the earth i.e. the lift off point on a runway. Looking at Figure
2.1, the x-axis points north, the y-axis points east and the z-axis points down to complete the
orthogonal right handed axis system. The coordinates of the position vector are in the north, east,
down inertial axis system.
Figure 2.1: Inertial Axis System, shown with a runway reference point.
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2.1.2 Body Axes
The body reference frame is fixed to the aircraft with its origin chosen to coincide with the aircraft’s
centre of mass as shown in Figure 2.2. The y-axis lies perpendicular to the plane of symmetry in
the direction of the right wing. The x-axis lies in the plane of symmetry in the direction of the
rotors. The z-axis points downward and completes the orthogonal right handed system.
Figure 2.2: Body Axis System, shown corresponding with the UAV’s centre of mass.
2.1.3 Wind Axes
Like the body axes, the origin of the wind axes is chosen to coincide with the centre of mass and
moves with the aircraft. The x-axis points in the direction of the velocity vector V and in looking
at β in Figure 2.3, the difference between the body axes and rotated wind axes becomes visible.
The y-axis points in the direction of the starboard (right wing). The z-axis lies in the aircraft’s
plane of symmetry and points in the downward direction to complete the orthogonal right handed
axis system.
Figure 2.3: Body Axis System, shown with the velocity vector as a reference for the Wind Axis System.
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2.1.4 Aircraft Notation
Figure 2.4 shows the aircraft’s standard notation system, in body axes, used to describe the aircraft’s
kinematic and kinetic mechanics as follows:
• coordinates of force vector are in body axes: X axial, Y lateral, Z normal force
• coordinates of moment vector are in body axes: L roll, M pitch, N yaw moment
• coordinates of linear velocity vector are in body axes: U axial, V lateral, W normal velocity
• coordinates of angular velocity are in body axes: P roll rate, Q pitch rate, R yaw rate
• the left l and right r control surface deflections, keeping in line with the notation in [38], are
two ailerons δAlδAr , two flaperons δFlδFr , two elevators δElδEr , two rudders δRlδRr , and a
positive deflection is defined as one that produces a negative moment.
Figure 2.4: Standard Aircraft Notation, for the Meraka Modular UAV’s reference system.
2.2 Aircraft Kinematics
Kinematics is the field of mechanics that relates various kinds of motion such as linear and angular
velocity over time based on the aircraft’s position and attitude. The aircraft’s position is defined
within the NED inertial reference frame and angular position, also known as attitude, is based on
Euler angles which are defined in the body reference frame. Rotation matrices are used to translate
vectors between the inertial and body reference frames.
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2.2.1 Euler Angles
(a) Yaw Rotation (b) Pitch Rotation
(c) Roll Rotation
Figure 2.5: Attitude Parameters - showing the Euler 3-2-1 Sequence.
Euler attitude parameters use three angles in a predefined order of rotation to describe the aircraft’s
attitude in the body axis system B with respect to the inertial axis system I. The axis system, as
shown in Figure 2.2, begins with the inertial and body axis systems aligned. The body axis system
then undergoes the following rotation sequence as shown in Figures 2.5a to 2.5c:
• positive yaw rotation through the heading angle ψ
• positive pitch rotation through the pitch angle θ
• positive roll rotation through the roll angle φ.
Euler angles are commonly used to parameterise the aircraft’s attitude because of simplicity. They
also always result in a singularity at a +/ − 90◦ pitch angle for the Euler 3-2-1 sequence where
changes in yaw and roll constitute the same motion. However in normal flight this singularity hardly
comes into play as it is assumed aircraft stays within |θ| << pi
2
. Other means of parameterisation
include DCM parameters and quaternions which are more mathematically complex, for more info
see [26].
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2.2.2 Rotation Matrices
In the derivations that follow, the following applies:
cx = cosx (2.1)
sx = sinx (2.2)
tx = tanx (2.3)
Given the coordinates of a vector V in the original axis system shown in Figure 2.4, where the
inertial and body axes overlap:
V 0 =

x0
y0
z0
 (2.4)
The vector V undergoes the following rotations as shown in Figures 2.5a to 2.5c:

x1
y1
z1
 =

cψ sψ 0
−sψ cψ 0
0 0 1


x0
y0
z0
 (2.5)

x2
y2
z2
 =

cθ 0 −sθ
0 1 0
sθ 0 cθ


x1
y1
z1
 (2.6)

x3
y3
z3
 =

1 0 0
0 cφ sφ
0 −sφ cφ


x2
y2
z2
 (2.7)
Multiplying equations 2.5 to 2.7 relates the vector V in the original axis system to the rotated axis
system and gives:

x3
y3
z3
 =

1 0 0
0 cφ sφ
0 −sφ cφ


cθ 0 −sθ
0 1 0
sθ 0 cθ


cψ sψ 0
−sψ cψ 0
0 0 1


x0
y0
z0
 (2.8)

x3
y3
z3
 =

cθcψ cθsψ −sθ
sφsθcψ − cφsψ sφsθsψ + cφcψ cθsφ
cφsθcψ + sφsψ cψsθsψ − sφcψ cθcφ


x0
y0
z0
 (2.9)
Following is the Direction Cosine Matrix (DCM) and its inverse which is its transpose since it can
be shown that the DCM is orthogonal [26]. Both transformation matrices can be used to translate
the coordinates of a vector in the body axis system B to the inertial axis system I and vice versa.

xB
yB
zB
 =

cθcψ cθsψ −sθ
sφsθcψ − cφsψ sφsθsψ + cφcψ cθsφ
cφsθcψ + sφsψ cψsθsψ − sφcψ cθcφ


xI
yI
zI
 (2.10)

xI
yI
zI
 =

cψcθ cψsθsφ − sψcφ cψsθcφ + sψsφ
sψcθ sψsθsφ + cψcφ sψsθcφ − cψsφ
−sθ cθcφ c0cφ


xB
yB
zB
 (2.11)
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2.2.3 Position and Attitude Dynamics
The position dynamics describe how the north, east, down states change over time as a function
of the aircraft’s velocity. The following equation describes the kinematic relation between the
aircraft’s position and velocity when both vectors are defined in inertial axes.
N˙
E˙
D˙
 =

VN
VE
VD
 (2.12)
Where VN , VE , VD are the north, east, down velocities. The position dynamics are defined as a
function of U , V , W which are in body axes. A transformation matrix is required to relate the
vector defined in body axes to the coordinates of the same vector in the inertial axis system, so
substituting the DCM yields:
N˙
E˙
D˙
 =

cψcθ cψsθsφ − sψcφ cψsθcφ + sψsφ
sψcθ sψsθsφ + cψcφ sψsθcφ − cψsφ
−sθ cθsφ c0cφ


U
V
W
 (2.13)
It can be shown that the aircraft’s attitude parameters can be related to its kinematic states (i.e.
P,Q,R) using Euler 3-2-1 dynamics. The following equation relates the roll, pitch and yaw rates
with the rate of change in attitude where |θ| 6= pi
2
for θ = npi +
pi
2
, n ∈ Z. During conventional
flight, the pitch angle is far from the +/− 90◦ angle so the singularity doesn’t become a problem.
φ˙
θ˙
ψ˙
 =

1 sinφ tan θ cosφ tan θ
0 cosφ − sinφ
0 sinφ sec θ cosφ sec θ


P
Q
R
 (2.14)
2.2.4 Velocity Transformations
Referring to Figure 2.3, the velocity vector can be expressed in cartesian and in polar form where
|V | is the magnitude of the velocity vector, α is the angle of attack and β is the angle of sideslip:
U
V
W
 =

cosβ cosα
cosβ sinα
sinβ
 ∣∣∣V ∣∣∣ (2.15)
α = arctan
W
U
β = arctan
V
U
cosα
}
U 6= 0 (2.16)
2.2.5 Quaternions
Quaternions are also used to deal with the singularity that exists when using Euler angles since
they don’t exhibit this quality. It can be shown that Euler angles and quaternions can be used
interchangeably when needed using rotation matrices. A quaternion transformation between two
reference frames is described using four parameters instead of three which increases mathematical
complexity. Quaternions are not used according to the design standards of systems developed for
the Meraka Modular UAV in the ESL and associated FDIR research done thus far.
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2.3 Aircraft Kinetics
Kinetics is the branch of mechanics that relates the forces and moments acting on a body to its
kinematic state. In order to formulate these relationships, a few assumptions need to be made.
Following this, the equations of the forces and moments can be defined using Newton’s Laws of
Motion and generalised for an aircraft whose variables are defined according to the axis system
described.
2.3.1 Assumptions
The following simplifying assumptions were made with respect to the aircraft’s dynamics:
• the earth is an inertial reference
• an aircraft is symmetrical about the XZ plane which implies that cross products of inertia
Ixy, Ixz and Iyz are zero
• the aircraft is a rigid body i.e. the positions of each mass element remain fixed relative to
the body’s reference system
• the aircraft’s mass remains constant, item the perturbations from equilibrium are small.
2.3.2 Equations of Forces
The translation of a rigid body can be described by momentum and Newton’s second law relates
the change in momentum to the external forces acting on the body and is written as [31]:
∑
F =
(
dpB
dt
)
I
(2.17)
=
d
dt
(mV B)B + ΩB × pB (2.18)
=
d
dt
(mV B)B + ΩB × (mV B) (2.19)
Where Σ represents all the forces F acting on aircraft in inertial axes I, ( )I and( )B are terms in
the inertial and body axes, pB is the momentum, m is the aircraft’s mass, V B is the linear velocity
and ΩB is angular velocity of an aircraft in body axes B.
2.3.3 Equations of Moments
The rotation of a rigid body can be described by angular velocity and Newton’s second law relates
the change in angular velocity to the sum of external moments acting on a body and is written as
[31]:
∑
M =
d
dt
(HB)I (2.20)
=
d
dt
(ΩIB)I (2.21)
=
d
dt
(HB)B + ΩB × (HB) (2.22)
=
d
dt
(ΩIB)B + ΩB × (ΩBIB) (2.23)
Where HB is angular momentum and the angular rate vector ΩB is:
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ΩB =

P
Q
R
 (2.24)
and IB is mass moment of inertia tensor, written and simplified as according to the assumptions
in Section 2.3.1:
IB =

Ixx −Ixy −Ixz
−Ixz Iyy −Iyz
−Izx −Izy Izz
 (2.25)
=

Ixx 0 0
0 Iyy 0
0 0 Izz
 (2.26)
2.3.4 Equations of Motion
The kinematic state of an object i.e. position, velocity and acceleration is related to the forces
and moments acting on that object through kinetics. The equations describing these forces and
moments were derived previously and will be used in their classic form to model this relation.
X = m
(
U˙ +WQ− V R
)
(2.27)
Y = m
(
V˙ + V R−WP
)
(2.28)
Z = m
(
W˙ + V P − V Q
)
(2.29)
L = P˙ Ixx +QR (Izz − Iyy) (2.30)
M = Q˙Iyy + PR (Ixx − Izz) (2.31)
N = R˙Izz + PQ (Iyy − Ixx) (2.32)
Where m is the aircraft’s mass and Ixx, Iyy and Izz are the principle moments of inertia about the
respective body axes.
2.4 Forces and Moments
With the general 6 DOF EOM model formulated, we now define the forces and moments that act
on an aircraft as a function of its current state according to the following models:
• aerodynamic
• engine
• gravitational.
The equations of motion formulated in equations 2.27 to 2.32 are composed of the aerodynamic,
thrust and gravitational forces and moments such that:
X = Xa +Xt +Xg (2.33)
Y = Ya + Yt + Yg (2.34)
Z = Za + Zt + Zg (2.35)
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L = La + Lt + Lg (2.36)
M = Ma +Mt +Mg (2.37)
N = Na +Nt +Ng (2.38)
Where subscripts a, t, g denote aerodynamic, thrust and gravitational force and moment compo-
nents respectively.
2.4.1 Aerodynamic
According to the aerodynamic model derived in [38], the aerodynamic forces and moments can
be described using Bernoulli’s equation Pstatic +
1
2
P |V |2 = c where Pstatic is static pressure
and q =
1
2
P |V |2 is the dynamic pressure where |V | is the translational velocity. The resultant
aerodynamic force and moment is proportional to the product of dynamic pressure and airfoil area
(S) and written as F ∝ 1
2
p |V |2 S. Expanding the aerodynamic force and moment components
gives:
Xa = CX
(
1
2
p |V |2 S
)
(2.39)
Ya = CY
(
1
2
p |V |2 S
)
(2.40)
Za = CZ
(
1
2
p |V |2 S
)
(2.41)
La = CL
(
1
2
p |V |2 S
)
b (2.42)
Ma = CM
(
1
2
p |V |2 S
)
c (2.43)
Na = CN
(
1
2
p |V |2 S
)
b (2.44)
where C are the dimensionless aerodynamic coefficients of proportionality , b wingspan and mean
aerodynamic chord c. The Athena Vortex Lattice (AVL) codes, developed at MIT and which
are used in the ESL, produced results that are comparable to wind tunnel data obtained from
the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) [38]. The dimensionless aerodynamic
coefficients of proportionality are expanded as follows [38]:
Cd = Cd0 +
C2l
piAe
(2.45)
Cl = Cl0 + Clαα+
c
2 |V |ClQQ+C lδδ (2.46)
CX = −Cd cosα+ Cl sinα (2.47)
CY = CYββ +
b
2 |V |CYPP +
b
2 |V |CYRR+CYδδ (2.48)
CZ = −Cd sinα− Cl cosα (2.49)
CL = CLββ +
b
2 |V |CLPP +
b
2 |V |CLRR+CLδδ (2.50)
CM = CM0 + CMαα+
2
2 |V |CMQQ+CMδδ (2.51)
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CN = CNββ +
b
2 |V |CNPP +
b
2 |V |CNRR+CNgδ (2.52)
Where the actuator commands δ are:
δ =
[
δAr δAl δEr δEl δFr δFl δRr δRl
]T
(2.53)
and l and r are the left and right actuators, A and e are the aspect ratio and Oswald effi-
ciency factor control derivatives that relate the actuator commands to the forces and moments
C lδ ,CYδ ,CLδ ,CMδ ,CNδ .
2.4.2 Engine
A first order lag model is used to capture the band limited nature of the propulsion sources on the
Meraka Modular UAV and is defined in the Advanced Automation 833 Course Notes as:
T˙ = −1
τ
T +
1
τ
Tc (2.54)
Where T is the thrust magnitude, Tc is the thrust command and τ is the engine lag time constant.
The Meraka Modular UAV has two engines positioned symmetrically to one another, the Onboard
Computer (OBC) in conjunction with the Servo Board mixes the control inputs to generate equal
levels of thrust in each motor. It is assumed that the thrust vector is close enough to the centre
of gravity (CG) such that moments from the rotors are negligible. The following applies when the
thrust vector is parallel with the xB (body) axis:
Xt = T (2.55)
Yt = Zt = 0 (2.56)
Lt = Mt = Nt = 0 (2.57)
2.4.3 Gravitational
In a flat earth NED axis system, the gravitational acceleration vector is modelled as providing the
force that is equivalent to the aircraft’s mass in the down direction, in inertial axes the gravitational
force vector becomes:
F I =

0
0
mg
 (2.58)
Transforming this coordinate vector to body axes coordinates using the DCM transformation matrix
gives:

Xg
Yg
Zg
 =

cθcψ cθsψ −sθ
sφsθcψ − cφsψ sφsθsψ + cφcψ cθsφ
cφsθcψ + sφsψ cψsθsψ − sφcψ cθcφ


0
0
mg
 (2.59)
=

− sin θ
cos θ sinφ
cos θ cosφ
mg (2.60)
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Lastly, because the centre of gravity coincides with the centre of mass in a uniform gravitational
field, the gravitation force doesn’t produce any moments so:
Lg = Mg = Mg = 0 (2.61)
2.5 Aircraft Model
An aircraft is well modelled as a six degree of freedom rigid body using the kinematic and kinetic
equations defined. The aircraft model developed thus far is nonlinear and must be linearised and
discretised for control and FDIR system design purposes. Following is a description of the three
mathematical models of the Meraka Modular UAV in their various forms namely: nonlinear, linear
and discretised state space representation.
2.5.1 Nonlinear Differential Equations
Force and Moment Model
Aerodynamic Model
Engine Model
Gravitational Model
6 DOF Equations of Motion Model
Kinetics Kinematics
forces and
moments
states
controls
Figure 2.6: 6 DOF EOM Model, showing the relation between the different sub-models.
Together the six degree of freedom equations of motion (6 DOF EOM) can be related in order
to construct the aircraft model shown in Figure 2.6 based on the individually derived models.
The kinematic equations relate the linear and angular velocity rates of change in attitude and
position. The kinetic equations relate the forces and moments to the rate of change of the linear and
angular velocities. Lastly, the forces and moments model the aircraft’s specific aerodynamic, engine
and gravitational dynamics. Following is the final set of the Meraka Modular UAV’s nonlinear
differential equations in their classic form:
U˙ =
X
m
+ V R−WQ (2.62)
V˙ =
Y
m
− UR+WP (2.63)
W˙ =
Z
m
+ UQ− V P (2.64)
P˙ =
1
Ixx
(L−QR (Izz − Iyy)) (2.65)
Q˙ =
1
Iyy
(M − PR (Ixx − Izz)) (2.66)
R˙ =
1
Izz
(N − PQ (Iyy − Ixx)) (2.67)
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φ˙ = P +Q (sφtθ) +R (sφtθ) (2.68)
θ˙ = Q (cθ)−R (sφ) (2.69)
ψ˙ = Q (sφ sec θ) +R (cφsecθ) (2.70)
N˙ = U (cψ cθ) + V (cψsθsφ − sψcφ) +W (cψsθcθ + sψsφ) (2.71)
E˙ = U (sψ cθ) + V (cψsθsφ + sψcφ) +W (cψsθcθ − cψsφ) (2.72)
D˙ = −U (sθ) + V (cθsφ) +W (cθcφ) (2.73)
2.5.2 Linearised Mathematical Model
The process of linearising (removing nonlinear terms from the equation) the aircraft’s dynamics
about trim results in the ψ˙, N˙ , E˙, D˙ differential equations being omitted. The dynamics governing
the ψ,N,E and D states don’t affect the aircraft’s fundamental dynamics which are subsequently
given as:
U˙ =
X
m
+ V R−WQ (2.74)
V˙ =
Y
m
− UR+WP (2.75)
W˙ =
Z
m
+ UQ− V P (2.76)
P˙ =
1
Ixx
(L−QR (Izz − Iyy)) (2.77)
Q˙ =
1
Iyy
(M − PR (Ixx − Izz)) (2.78)
R˙ =
1
Izz
(N − PQ (Iyy − Ixx)) (2.79)
φ˙ = P +Q (sinφ tan θ) +R (sinφ tan θ) (2.80)
θ˙ = Q (cos θ)−R (sinφ) (2.81)
These dynamics can be written concisely in the form x˙ = f(x,u) where:
x =
[
U V W P Q R φ θ
]T
(2.82)
u =
[
δ T
]T
(2.83)
where x and u are the aircraft’s states and control inputs respectively. In describing the aircraft
as a system with smooth non-linearities that is continuously differentiable x˙ = Ax +Bu and for
linearisation the states and inputs are expanded as the sum of a trim value and a perturbation
about trim which yields:
x = xT + ∆x (2.84)
u = uT + ∆u (2.85)
where perturbations from trim are written as lowercase letters and greek symbols:
∆x =
[
u v w p q r φ θ
]T
(2.86)
∆u =
[
∆δ ∆T
]T
(2.87)
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Expanding x˙ = f(x,u) about trim condition yields a Taylor Series of the form:
x˙+ ∆x˙ = f (xT + ∆x,uT + ∆u) (2.88)
= f (xT ,uT ) +
∂f
∂x
∣∣∣∣
T
∆x+
∂f
∂u
∣∣∣∣
T
∆u+ higher order terms (2.89)
where T means an evaluation about the trim working point where:
AT =
∂f
∂x
∣∣∣∣
T
(2.90)
BT =
∂f
∂u
∣∣∣∣
T
(2.91)
Assuming that the perturbations about trim are small, the dynamics can be approximated as
x˙ = f (x,u) ≈ Ax+Bu by ignoring higher order terms that are negligible. In noting that at trim
condition x˙T = f (xT ,uT ) = 0 the dynamics of the system can be described by ∆x˙ = AT∆x +
BT∆u which is a continuous state space approximation of a set of nonlinear equations about trim.
The linearisation problem then becomes that of determining the vector partial derivatives that
constitute AT and BT .
The linearised mathematical model used in this research has been revised to represent the aircraft’s
fundamental dynamics so ∆x becomes:
∆x =
[
u v w p q r φ θ
]T
(2.92)
and since w and v are not used in aerodynamic equations the solution becomes:
α = arctan
(w
u
)
= arctan
(
w
|V |T cos(β)cos(α)
)
≈ w|V |T (2.93)
β = arctan
(v
u
cos(α)
)
= arctan
(
w
|V |T cos(β)cos(α) cos(α)
)
≈ v|V |T (2.94)
and since α, β are measurable using sensors, the state vector becomes ∆x =
[
v α q θ β p r φ
]T
and the AT and BT matrices are derived and expanded as shown in Appendix C based on the
parameters and coefficients in Appendix B.
2.5.3 Discrete State Space Representation
In following the modelling methodology used in [38], discretising the continuous state space repre-
sentation derived in the previous section (for state perturbations) gives:
xk+1 = Fxk +Guk (2.95)
yk = Huk (2.96)
where uk is the input vector, yk is the measurement vector, H is the measurement matrix and
k denotes the time step. Assuming a zero-order hold process, the discrete space matrices become
[21]:
F = eAT = I +AT +
A2T 2
2!
+
A3T 3
3!
+ ... ≈ I +AT (2.97)
G =
(∫ T
0
eAηdη
)
B =
(
I +
AT
2!
+
A2T 2
3!
+ ...
)
TB ≈ TB
H = C (2.98)
where C is the continuous state space measurement matrix and T is the time step length. In the
approximation for the state space representation above, the higher order terms were ignored as
they become increasingly smaller as the power of T increases.
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2.5.4 Flight Envelope
In order to generate the linearised state space matrices representing the decoupled lateral and
longitudinal dynamics of the system, the aircraft’s behaviour must be evaluated at a working
point.
The dimensionless aerodynamic coefficients were derived using AVL and a simulation of an aircraft
flown at trim condition with a positive angle of attack [38]. In following the convention used in the
research done thus far, an airspeed of 22m/s was selected and the lateral and longitudinal state
space matrices were calculated as:[
αT
δET
]
=
[
CLα CLδE
Cmα CmδE
]−1  mgqTS − CL0
−Cm0
 (2.99)
TT = qTSCDT cosαT − qTSCLT sinαT +mg sinαT (2.100)
where:
CDT = CD0 +
C2LT
piAe
(2.101)
results in the following linearised state space matrices:
Along =

−0.1312 −2.3293 0 −9.8086
−0.0263 −5.0906 0.9509 0.0062
0 −21.3720 −6.8251 0
0 0 1 0
 (2.102)
Blong =

0 0 0.0385 0.0385
−0.1612 −0.1616 0 0
−12.3041 −12.3041 0 0
0 0 0 0
 (2.103)
Alat =

−0.3567 0.0033 −0.7765 0.3633
−11.1230 −7.1656 2.2419 0
19.2281 −0.8859 −1.1888 0
0 1 −0.0169 0
 (2.104)
Blat =

−3.3197e− 04 −3.3197e− 04 3.4598e− 04 −3.4598e− 04 . . .
−25.4541 −25.4541 −17.9489 17.9489 . . .
1.0778 1.0778 −0.6575 0.6575 . . .
0 0 0 0 . . .
. . . 0.0037 0.0037
. . . −6.7148 −6.7148
. . . −6.7148 −6.7148
. . . 0 0
 (2.105)
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The longitudinal xlong and lateral xlat states are, as stated in Appendix C:
xlong =
[
v α q θ
]T
(2.106)
xlat =
[
β p r φ
]T
(2.107)
where v is the airspeed, α is the angle of attack, q is the pitch rate, θ is the pitch angle, β is the
angle of side slip, p is the roll rate, r is the yaw rate and φ is the roll angle.
In the next chapter we use the Along, Blong, Alat, Blat state space matrices to construct transfer
functions between the inputs and outputs of the decoupled aircraft model. This makes it possible
to for instance, to determine the input-output relationship between the elevator control surface
input and the measurable state output, the pitch rate q. Using the pitch rate, we will be able to
for instance determine what the elevator control surface deflections are based on the behaviour of
the aircraft during flight. Thereby making it possible to perform actuator FDI by comparing the
commanded control surface inputs and the estimated actuator deflections. It is important to note
that having decoupled the longitudinal and lateral dynamics of the aircraft, we are now able to
perform calculations using a relatively smaller state space matrix which will add to the increased
computational efficiency of the implemented algorithm.
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2.6 Overview
In this Chapter the aircraft model for the Meraka Modular UAV is derived based on an axis system
in the form of inertial, body and wind reference frames. These frames or axes are the basis upon
which the standard notation is defined in order to model the dynamics of the aircraft.
The aircraft’s kinematic relationships are derived in order to relate the aircraft’s linear and angular
velocity over time based on the aircraft’s position and attitude. The aircraft’s position is defined in
terms of the inertial reference frame and angular position is defined in terms of Euler angles defined
in the body reference frame. Rotation matrices used to translate vectors between the inertial and
body reference frames are also derived.
The aircraft’s kinematic relationships are used to relate the forces and moments acting on a body
to its kinematic state. A few simplification assumptions are made in order to define the forces and
moments acting on the aircraft using Newton’s Laws of Motion. This is done in order to formulate
the 6 DOF EOM model of the aircraft.
Models describing aerodynamic, engine and gravitational forces and moments specific to aircraft
are also derived. The nonlinear aircraft model derived is linearised and discretised for control and
FDIR purposes. The state space matrices are calculated for the aircraft’s anticipated flight envelope
at trim condition so that they can be used in the design and development of the fault diagnostic
system’s input observers in the next chapter.
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Chapter 3
System Modelling
The Hybrid Diagnosis Engine (HyDE) and the Approximate Input Reconstruction Algorithm
(AIRA) are used together to give the Meraka Modular UAV fault diagnostic capabilities. A Failure
Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) is performed in order to characterise the subsystem compo-
nents as a means of guiding the fault modelling and identification process that follows. We use
HyDE along with AIRA in order to perform actuator FDI through input reconstruction since the
control surfaces don’t have position sensors.
3.1 Hybrid Diagnosis Engine
HyDE was developed by researchers at the University of California Santa Cruz in close collaboration
with colleagues at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA) Ames Research
Center and several other organisations [11]. In this research, HyDE is used to give the Meraka
Modular UAV the ability to diagnose faults and detect changes in its subsystem components. It
does this through a system of declarative models and reasoning paradigms that it uses to simulate
and predict system behaviour and reason about the state of the UAV. We begin investigating HyDE
by examining the theory behind how HyDE works and by highlighting the processes encapsulated
within HyDE using an example.
3.1.1 Overview
Model based diagnosis is based on general purpose models that describe the behaviour and or
internal structure of a system. A hybrid system is a physical system whose behaviour is comprised
of discrete and continuous changes. A stochastic hybrid system is a system with inherent elements
of uncertainty due in part to a combination of: sensor noise from reported observations; incomplete
system knowledge which results in approximate models and prior probabilities on the occurrence
of faults; and uncertainty about the conditions that give rise to changes in discrete and continuous
behaviour.
HyDE is a model based diagnosis or reasoning engine that uses candidate generation and consistency
checking to diagnose discrete faults in stochastic hybrid systems [11]. It uses continuous and discrete
(hybrid) models built by users and sensor data (observations) from the system to deduce the state
of the system both forwards and backwards in time. The core functionality of HyDE lies in its
ability to diagnose multiple discrete faults and handle hybrid system behaviour using qualitative
and quantitative model based methods, and stochastic reasoning and it works on Windows, Solaris,
Linux and VxWorks platforms. The key issues that make the diagnosis task difficult in addition
to the complexity induced by the stochastic and hybrid nature of the system are: a) limited
observability - the number of sensors that allow the system to be observed are limited and as a
consequence faults are often not directly observable and must be isolated by reasoning about the
system using information from available sensors; and b) time-delayed symptoms - the effects of
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faults typically don’t manifest immediately, consequently processes used to isolate faults have to
reason both backwards and forwards in time to take into account the time delay. The time delay
may be a result of integrating effects due to the presence of components with state and observable
properties might only be affected by faults in certain discrete mode configurations and lastly the
stochastic nature of hybrid systems make it impractical to use single points of comparison to make
decisions. We now briefly examine the processes encapsulated within HyDE, for a detailed overview
please see [11].
HyDE Models
HyDE models are the essential building blocks that enable the diagnosis engine to reason about the
system. The most basic model is the component model which is used to generate the system model.
The system model is then used to generate a candidate model which HyDE uses to reason about
the system when diagnoses are requested. HyDE has support for multiple modelling paradigms and
uses these to define how systems are described [11]. HyDE has support for the modelling paradigm
used in the GME Tool which enables the model designer to graphically create models that can be
exported to HyDE in XML format or simulated using the HyDE interpreter.
Component Model
Component Model
Behaviour
Model
Transition
Model
Figure 3.1: HyDE Component Model
The component model, shown in Figure 3.1, is comprised of a Behaviour Model and a Transition
Model. Together, these inner component models describe the transition behaviour and behaviour
evolution of the component.
Behaviour Model
Dependency
Model
Integration
Model
Propagation
Model
Figure 3.2: HyDE Behaviour Model
The Behaviour Model (M), shown in Figure 3.2, describes the behaviour evolution of the component
and is specific to each modelling paradigm. It is comprised of a dependency model, integration
model and a propagation model. Depending on the modelling paradigm, the same model could be
used alone or separately to describe all three of these inner models.
The Dependency Model (DM) describes the dependencies between variables, models and compo-
nents and is used to optimise candidate generation during the reasoning process. The dependencies
described are between the variables V , the constraints (relations) Rt defined in the Integration
Model and constraints Rg, Rli defined in the Propagation Model.
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The Integration Model (IM) specifies how each variable’s value is propagated across time steps
during candidate testing. The Integration Model for a variable vi whose first derivative has been de-
fined would be described as IM(vi) = Rt[vi(tk), δvi(tk), vi(tk−1), δvi(tk−1), ...] where δvi represents
the first derivative of variable vi and tk represents the current time step.
The Propagation Model (PM) enables HyDE to estimate the values of unknown variables from
known variables for the global model (system level) and local model (component level) within time
steps during candidate testing. The Propagation Model would be defined as PMg = Rg(V ) and as
PM(li) = Rli(V ) for a global model g and local model l respectively where i is the ith location.
lj lk
lh li
Guard
Guard
Figure 3.3: HyDE Transition Model
The Transition Model (T ), shown in Figure 3.3, describes the transition behaviour for a system and
is common to all modelling paradigms supported by HyDE. It is comprised of locations li which are
the modes of operation (shown as circles) and transitions ti which are transitions between modes of
operation (shown as dotted lines) where i represents the ith location or transition and ti = lj → lk
represents the transition from location lj to lk. Transition guards (shown with the word Guard
in Figure 3.3) describe the conditions in which the transition between two locations occurs and
represents an observable change in a component’s location i.e. from the on to off location of a
lamp based on the state of a switch. Since the conditions in which a component transitions into
a fault are not observed directly, HyDE must reason about the occurrence of faults from their
symptom effects on the system. These are described as locations that have transitions without
guards and constraints are used when the symptom effects are known i.e. low voltage and not used
when the fault and its symptom effects are unknown or the behaviour is not expected.
System Model
Component Model
System Model
Behaviour
Model
Transition
Model
ComposeComposeCompose
Behaviour
Model
Transition
Model
Figure 3.4: HyDE System Model, adapted from [11].
33
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
The System Model, shown in Figure 3.4, is composed from (in parallel for the transition model) the
Component Model and describes the transition behaviour and behaviour evolution of the system.
The System Model is used to create the candidate generated during the reasoning process. In the
same way as the component model, the System Model is also specific to each modelling paradigm
and can also be transformed between modelling paradigms when needed. It’s properties include
the variables V of the system, the domains D for the variables in the system and the guards G for
transitions between locations.
The composition process for the Behaviour Model results in the composition of the system variables
Vs defined as Vs = Vg ∪ V1 ∪ V2...∪ Vn where Vg represents the global variables which don’t belong
to any component and V1, ...Vn represent the component variables where 1, 2, ..., n represents each
component. The transition guards G don’t change for each transition between the relevant com-
ponent locations. The locations from each component in the system, defined as ls = {l1i l2j ... lnk}
where i, j, ..., k are the locations in the respective components, are used to compose the system be-
haviour model Ms = Mg ∪Mconnection∪M1i∪M2j ...∪Mnk where ∪ is the union operation specific
to the modelling paradigm used for the component and system model. Mg is the behaviour model
for the global model and Mconnection is the model that describes how subsystem level component
models interact. The Transition Model resulting from the composition process consists of locations
SL = L1×L2×Ln to give a system location sl1 = (l1i, ... , lnk) that is a synchronous composition of
each component 1, 2 ... n in the system and i, ..., k represents the respective component’s location.
Synchronous implies that the system location is specific to the state of the system at that point
in time. In addition, the transitions in the system are composed by defining transitions between
the locations in each component in SL = L1 × L2 × Ln to give a synchronous system transition
Trans→t for system location sl1 = (l1i, ... , lnk) where t is an instance in time.
Candidate Model
Candidate Model
Weight Histories
Transition Hybrid State
Figure 3.5: HyDE Candidate Model
The Candidate Model, shown in Figure 3.5, represents the trajectory of the system’s behaviour
evolution and consists of a weight w, hybrid stateHS and transition Trans→t histories. A candidate
model is inferred from the system models, the initial locations and the values of each variable and
the reported observations. The candidate’s weight w is used to rank the candidate based on the
degree of fit between the predicted value and reported observation, and the prior probabilities of
the system transitions assumed to be taken.
The hybrid state history is a snapshot of the system’s state and is defined as HS = (SL, V V )
where SL are the locations in the system and V V are the variables and their corresponding values.
The hybrid state history defines the current locations of each component SL = {(compi → li) | 1 ≤
i ≤ m} and the current values for each of the variables V V = {(valuei → vi) | 1 ≤ i ≤ n}. The
hybrid and transition histories for a candidate after HyDE has been run for a couple time steps
{1 ≤ i ≤ o} would be in the form {(Trans→ti, hsti−, hsti+) | 1 ≤ i ≤ o} where ti is the ith time
step, and −/+ represent the beginning and end of the current time step respectively.
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HyDE Reasoning
HyDE Reasoning, shown in Figure 3.6, is the maintenance of a set C of weighted candidates (wi, ci)
generated using a candidate model. Upon initialisation of HyDE, the candidate set is initialised
with a candidate with the system’s known initial hybrid state or a randomly sampled candidate.
The initial candidate is of the form {(Trans→t, hst0−, hst?)} where ? represents an unknown hybrid
state. The reasoning process for each requested diagnosis consists of three main steps, which will be
discussed further, and begins with 1) Candidate Set Management which is followed by 2) Candidate
Testing and lastly ends with 3) Candidate Generation. Candidate Set Management maintains
the candidate set by adding and removing candidates. Candidate Testing operates on the highest
ranked candidate and reports inconsistencies resulting from estimating the candidate’s hybrid state
and updating the candidate’s weight. Candidate Generation creates candidate generators from
reported inconsistencies and supplies the next untested potential candidate to the Candidate Set
Management.
Candidate Set
Management
Candidate
Testing
InconsistencyCandidate
Generation
Candidate
Candidate Set
Potential
Candidate
Candidate
Figure 3.6: HyDE Reasoning Process, adapted from [11].
Candidate Set Management
Candidate Set Management, shown in Figure 3.7, consists of the following steps:
1. Update candidate weights by Candidate Testing each candidate in the candidate set describing
the alternate trajectories of the system’s behaviour evolution.
2. Prune candidates after updating candidate weights by removing all candidates with weights
that are below a certain threshold.
3. Add candidates by requesting a new potential candidate from the candidates generated during
Candidate Generation after Candidate Testing. If the number of candidates in the set is above
a specified minimum resample the weights or proceed with refilling the candidate set.
4. Re-sample weights by normalising the candidate weights and resampling candidates based on
the distribution of weights and adding the sampled candidates to the normalised candidate
set.
A diagnosis is made available after the steps within Candidate Set Management are complete and
this in turn results in an updated or new candidate set based on the reported inputs, predicted
values and reported observations.
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Candidate SetCurrent Candidate Candidate SetNext Candidate
Figure 3.7: HyDE Candidate Set Management, adapted from [11].
Candidate Testing
The validity of the candidate that most accurately describes the current state and trajectory of the
system must be tested each time a diagnosis is requested. This is done by simulating the system
and comparing predicted values with reported observations. The Candidate Testing process, shown
in Figure 3.8, consists of the following steps:
1. Find enabled transitions by collecting transitions from the system location associated with
hsti−1 from the given candidate and estimate the beginning hybrid state’s system location
SL(hsti−) using Trans→ti created for each of the enabled locations from the previous time
step ti.
2. Propagate across time steps by estimating the new variable values V V (hsti−) using sensed
inputs and the Integration Model IMti that is applied to V V (hsti−1).
3. Propagate within time step by loading the Propagation Model (PM) for SL(hsti−) which
needs to be composed should it not have been cached.
4. Estimate the end hybrid state hsti+ by loading the Propagation Model (PM) and simulating
the system or by using a propagation algorithm, and prepare to report the inconsistency Iti
to Candidate Generation System if the execution fails.
5. Compare the predicted values with the observed values using a comparison function CF which
is used to create residuals that indicate the degree of fit between the predicted and observed
values when taking into account the defined noise model for each variable.
6. Update weight of candidate by multiplying the candidate’s weight with roverall, the overall
degree of fit determined during the previous step.
7. Report inconsistency Iti to the Candidate Generation System if roverall is less than the spec-
ified minimum threshold.
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Figure 3.8: HyDE Candidate Testing, adapted from [11].
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Figure 3.9: HyDE Candidate Generation adapted from [11]
Candidate Generation, shown in Figure 3.9, includes a set of Candidate Generators created from
candidates or reported inconsistencies. When a candidate is requested, each generator reports
its best candidate. The next best candidate is selected amongst the best of the best candidates
reported before reporting it to the Candidate Set Management.
Conflict
Generator
Figure 3.10: HyDE Conflict Generator
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A conflict is a list of timed transitions that give rise to an inconsistency when taken by the sys-
tem. The Conflict Generator, shown in Figure 3.10, generates a set of unguarded transitions
Transunguarded that resolve conflicts using sibling transitions for the entire set of conflicts. The
conflicts are generated directly using HyDE’s proprietary conflict directed search algorithm. A
conflict is created for each inconsistent variable by retrieving the Dependency Model DMti cor-
responding to SL(hsti). For each component, the matching transitions from Trans→ti with time
stamp ti are added to the conflict set. To begin the backward transversal, the same process is
repeated for the previous n user specified steps for each of the Dependency Models DMti−n for all
the variables that depend on the inconsistency Iti.
Candidate
Generator
Figure 3.11: HyDE Candidate Generator
The Candidate Generator, shown Figure 3.11, is based on either a candidate or a conflict. The
generator based on a candidate always reports the same candidate and is created as a consequence
of Candidate Testing. The conflict based generator is created with initial hybrid state hsti−n, initial
weight equivalent to the weight of the candidate that generated the inconsistency, and the conflict
set generated from the inconsistency. The resulting candidate from either generator type is created
with an initial hybrid state and preloaded with transitions that go back in time.
One of the most important consequences of knowing how HyDE works at a fundamental level is
being able to ’think’ in terms of how HyDE models and reasons about systems. Knowledge about
the fundamentals behind how AIRA works made it possible to optimise the real time version of the
algorithm. In the same way, optimising the model development and reasoning process in HyDE
requires knowledge about how HyDE works.
The most critical aspect of the modelling process is knowing what to model and deciding what level
of abstraction is needed in order to create declarative HyDE models that will result in meaningful
diagnoses that are performed within a reasonable amount of time. The Reliability Analysis de-
scribed in Section 3.3 fulfilled the purpose of guiding the fault modelling and identification process.
It also made it possible to define the transition probabilities for guarded and unguarded transitions
(faults) that influence the ranking of locations and subsequently the weights of the candidates in
the candidate set. By adjusting the parameters contained in the Harness file, a considerable amount
of influence can be exerted on the reasoning process to such an extent that the time HyDE takes
to perform diagnoses can be reduced significantly - if we know for instance that HyDE is spending
a lot of CPU time pruning candidates from the candidate set because the candidate weights are
below an unreasonable threshold.
HyDE has its limitations and to overcome these, the model designer needs to be able to augment
HyDE’s functionality by incorporating fault decisions or additional processing logic (i.e. complex
matrix calculations or algorithms) performed outside HyDE using representative components in-
ternally, as is the case in this research project with the Smart Adapters and in [4]. Doing this
properly will require an understanding of how to get data into and out of HyDE and how often
by configuring state variables and their associated noise models using the Harness parameters or
by adjusting the rate at which observations are reported. This was the case in the thermostat
example where the integration model HyDE was using was erroneously causing guarded transitions
to occur because of an unreasonably large sample time for the reported observations. This func-
tionality (Harness) is used extensively in this research project to configure the 10% ’Percentage’
and 0.007 rad Constant sensor noise threshold harness parameters used to account for varying
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observations in addition to the backtracking functionality configured using the ’n user specified
steps’ that determine the amount of telemetry HyDE needs to store in order to perform actuator
FDI. Another important aspect that needs to be understood is inter-component communication
within HyDE using local and global variables modified by constraints within the relevant locations
and creating state machines using transition guards that allow components to exhibit autonomous
behaviour. As you will see in Section 3.5, these are some of the issues that had to be addressed in
order to accurately model the functional relationships described by the Characterised Subsystem
Model in Section 3.3.5. Understanding how HyDE works is required in order to develop HyDE
models that maximise the advantages of having an expandable FDIR architecture. In the following
subsections we investigate HyDE using a concrete example of a simplified heating system.
3.1.2 Model
HyDE models describe the expected system behaviour during nominal and fault conditions. They
are similar in nature to the simulation models created in MATLAB which makes it easy to trans-
late them into HyDE by modifying them to represent hybrid automata (finite state automata with
equations in each state) [29]. They are constructed in a hierarchical and modular fashion by build-
ing component and subsystem models. Within the system model the components are connected
together using shared variables.
The component models represent behaviour using locations or modes of operation (which include
faulty modes) and transitions which represent the conditions under which the system changes lo-
cations. Faults are modelled as transitions that occur under unknown conditions and therefore
must be inferred through reasoning about the system. The behaviour of the components is de-
scribed using a set of variables or parameters and relations governing the interactions between
these variables.
The hybrid nature of the system is captured using a combination of the behavioural and tran-
sitional models. The stochastic nature of the system is described using probabilities associated
with transitions as well as noise on sensed variables or output observations. This mathematical
and declarative model of the system is the key input to HyDE and determines the quality of the
diagnostic analyses that are performed.
HyDE accepts models in three file formats: the non-XML ASCII file with the *. ham file extension
and the nested or flat XML model file with the *. hxm file extension. The advantage of the XML
file format is that it comes with automatic validation. The Generic Modelling Environment (GME)
is a GUI based tool, built at Vanderbilt University, that allows application developers or users to
graphically create models and check these for various validity conditions before they are exported
as XML or ASCII files. These files can then be accepted as input when accessing the HyDE
Application Programming Interface (API) programmatically using C++.
Model Example
As an example, we now investigative how a furnace connected to a thermostat is modelled in
HyDE, please see the HyDE Reference Manual for more information. The furnace has two nominal
locations off and on and a fault location unknown. The transitions between the locations depend
on the temperature and the thermostat’s setting. The indoor temperature partly depends on the
furnace’s activity. The furnace may turn on arbitrarily once the thermostat is set and not in direct
response to the commanded setting. The unguarded transitions that respond to commands are
declared as:
1 <Transition from="off" to="unknown" probability="0.001"/>
2 <Transition from="on" to="unknown" probability="0.001"/>
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and the guarded transitions that respond to the indoor temperature are:
1 <Transition from="off" to="on" guard="indoorTemperature = setting - 5"/>
2 <Transition from="on" to="off" guard="indoorTemperature = setting + 5"/>
The first transition causes the furnace to switch from off to on when the indoor temperature
is 5◦ below the thermostat’s setting. The second transition causes the furnace to switch from
on to off when the indoor temperature is 5◦ above the thermostat’s setting. From the guarded
transitions above we can see that the indoor temperature is a state variable and is being used to
characterise the state of the system. HyDE automatically updates the value of a state variable if
its derivative can be described using an ordinary differential equation. For all real state variables,
HyDE implicitly creates a variable for the first derivative of the state variable with respect to time.
The derivative’s variable name has the same name as the state variable with D appended e.g.
indoorTemperature and indoorTemperatureD. If the furnace is off, the indoor temperature will
tend to reach equilibrium with the outdoor temperature. We therefore need to define a variable
outdoorTemperature as follows:
1 <Variable name="outdoorTemperature" type="Real"/>
Practical experience suggests that when the furnace is off, the rate of change of the indoor tempera-
ture is proportional to the difference between the indoor temperature and the outdoor temperature
and this relationship can be characterised using a constant of proportionality:
1 <Constant name="diffusionRate" type="Real" value="0.1"/>
We can then use this constant to define the differential equation that describes the change in indoor
temperature when the furnace is off:
1 <Constraint expression= "indoorTemperatureD = (outdoorTemperature - indoorTemperature)
* diffusionRate"/>
An indoor temperature that exceeds the outdoor temperature results in a negative derivative be-
cause the diffusion rate is positive which causes the the indoor temperature to decrease and visa
versa. When the indoor temperature and the outdoor temperature are equal no change results.
The outdoor temperature is assumed to be independent of the system so it’s not a state variable
and can be represented as a constant or as an input variable. The heating rate is used to quantify
the effect that the furnace has on the indoor temperature when it is on and is defined as:
1 <Constant name="heatingRate" type="Real" value="0.1"/>
which makes the differential equation describing the change in indoor temperature:
1 <Constraint expression="indoorTemperatureD = heatingRate"/>
The complete model for this basic heating system can therefore be defined using the following XML
code in flat format:
40
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
1 <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
2 <!DOCTYPE System SYSTEM "hxm_flat.dtd">
3 <System name="C:\HyDE\Project3\Project3\aircon.hxm" type="Flat">
4 <Constant name="diffusionRate" type="Real" value="0.1"/>
5 <Constant name="furnace.heatingRate" type="Real" value="0.1"/>
6 <Variable name="indoorTemperature" type="Real" state="true" domain=""/>
7 <Variable name="outdoorTemperature" type="Real" state="false" domain=""/>
8 <Variable name="thermostat.setting" type="Real" state="false" domain=""/>
9 <Component name="furnace"/>
10 <Component name="thermostat"/>
11 <Location name="furnace.off" component="furnace"/>
12 <Location name="furnace.on" component="furnace"/>
13 <Location name="furnace.unknown" component="furnace"/>
14 <Transition from="furnace.on" to="furnace.off" probability="1"
guard="(indoorTemperature)=((thermostat.setting)+(5))" reset=""/>
15 <Transition from="furnace.on" to="furnace.unknown" probability="0.001" guard=""
reset=""/>
16 <Transition from="furnace.off" to="furnace.unknown" probability="0.001" guard=""
reset=""/>
17 <Transition from="furnace.off" to="furnace.on" probability="1"
guard="(indoorTemperature)=((thermostat.setting)-(5))" reset=""/>
18 <Constraint
expression="indoorTemperatureD=((outdoorTemperature-indoorTemperature)*diffusionRate)"
location="furnace.off" isassignmentconstraint="false"/>
19 <Constraint expression="(indoorTemperatureD)=(furnace.heatingRate)"
location="furnace.on" isassignmentconstraint="false"/>
20 </System>
An equivalent model of the complete model of the basic heating system derived above can also
be generated graphically using the GME Tool. This accelerates the model development process of
more complex HyDE models making exporting a model to XML format a relatively trivial process.
Figure 3.12 shows a graphical version of the simplified heating system model using the GME Tool.
Figure 3.12: System model of the simplified heating system.
The GME Tool allows a model designer to drag and drop components representing variables,
constants, components, locations and transitions. It is evident from Figure 3.12 that the heating
system has: an input variable indoorTemperature and an output variable outdoorTemperature;
a constant diffusionRate with the two subsystem components being the furnace and thermostat.
Figure 3.13 shows the component model of the furnace with the various locations on, off and
unknown and the transitions between them. The constraints for each location are represented
using constraint objects that allow the equations to be entered.
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Figure 3.13: Component model of the furnace.
3.1.3 Harness
The harness is the second input that is used in HyDE and defines two classes of information: firstly
the initial conditions of the hybrid system before execution begins and secondly the configuration
parameters that determine how HyDE performs diagnoses. The initial conditions consist of:
• the values of the state variables
• the locations or modes of operation of the components
• the input and output configuration for variables reported as observations.
It is assumed that input variables are observable and the harness is stored as a non-XML ASCII
file with the *. ham file extension or as an XML file with the *. hxm file extension who’s format is
specified using the Document Type Definition (DTD) file.
Harness Example
Having discussed the harness we now go back to the heating example. HyDE uses the differential
equations to update the value of the state variable during each time step using the update algorithm
V (ti+1) = V (ti) + (ti+1 − ti) ∗ V ′(ti) meaning that the state variable V is incremented by ∆V =
V
′
(t) ∗ ∆t when HyDE progresses from time ti to time ti+1. The smaller the ∆T the better the
approximation becomes. When looking at the following harness file written in flat XML format,
one can easily see the two classes of information being the initial conditions of the hybrid system
as well as the configuration parameters. Another evident property is the sensor noise setting for
observations of the indoorTemperature and the initial 20◦ indoor temperature.
1 <?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
2 <!DOCTYPE Harness SYSTEM "hxh.dtd">
3 <Harness>
4 <Component name="furnace" initiallocation="furnace.on"/>
5 <Variable name="thermostat.setting" input="true"/>
6 <Variable name="indoorTemperature" output="true" sensornoise="0.020000" state="true"
initialvalue="20"/>
7 <Variable name="outdoorTemperature" input="true"/>
8 <Parameter name="CommandsToBackTrackAcross" value="UNBOUNDED"/>
9 <Parameter name="FilterType" value="constraints"/>
10 <Parameter name="GenerateUniqueCandidates" value="false"/>
11 <Parameter name="HistoryTime" value="5"/>
12 <Parameter name="Integrator" value="Euler"/>
13 <Parameter name="SystemLocationChangesToBackTrackAcross" value="UNBOUNDED"/>
14 <Parameter name="MaximumCandidateCount" value="1"/>
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15 <Parameter name="MaximumCandidateSize" value="UNBOUNDED"/>
16 <Parameter name="MaximumCandidatesToTry" value="UNBOUNDED"/>
17 <Parameter name="MinimumCandidateProbability" value="0"/>
18 <Parameter name="NoiseModel" value="Percentage"/>
19 <Parameter name="NumberOfConsistencyChecks" value="1"/>
20 <Parameter name="PreferNewerCandidates" value="false"/>
21 <Parameter name="maximumcandidategenerationtime" value="UNBOUNDED"/>
22 <Parameter name="UseDependencyGraphs" value="true"/>
23 </Harness>
For the example heating system, we defined a two percent sensor noise margin for observations of the
indoor temperature and the Euler method as the integration method of choice. These configuration
parameters can be adjusted in GME before exporting the harness file and testing the diagnostic
engine using the observations reported in the scenario file.
3.1.4 Scenario
The last input to HyDE is the set of observations that are derived from the hybrid system observed.
These observations can be stored as non-XML ASCII files with the *. has file extension and used
during model development in GME or as function calls for real time execution using the HyDE
API. The scenario is a time series of values for the commands, input and output variables that
are defined in the harness file. HyDE reasons about all the time steps that have requests when
observations are supplied using function calls. When using scenario files, HyDE reasons about all
the time steps with observations and the step keyword can also be used to force HyDE to reason
about the time steps that have no observations.
Scenario Example
When HyDE is run with the model that has been defined, it begins by establishing the outdoor
temperature and the indoor temperature, set the thermostat’s temperature and start the furnace
in its initial location as shown in the following scenario file.
1 1 OBSERVE thermostat.setting 25.00
2 1 OBSERVE outdoorTemperature 15.00
3
4 50 OBSERVE thermostat.setting 25.00
5 50 OBSERVE outdoorTemperature 15.00
6
7 100 OBSERVE thermostat.setting 25.00
8 100 OBSERVE outdoorTemperature 15.00
9
10 150 OBSERVE thermostat.setting 25.00
11 150 OBSERVE outdoorTemperature 15.00
12
13 155 OBSERVE thermostat.setting 25.00
14 155 OBSERVE outdoorTemperature 15.00
15
16 160 OBSERVE thermostat.setting 25.00
17 160 OBSERVE outdoorTemperature 15.00
18
19 165 OBSERVE thermostat.setting 25.00
20 165 OBSERVE outdoorTemperature 15.00
21
22 170 OBSERVE thermostat.setting 25.00
23 170 OBSERVE outdoorTemperature 15.00
24
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25 250 OBSERVE thermostat.setting 25.00
26 250 OBSERVE outdoorTemperature 15.00
27 250 OBSERVE indoorTemperature 26.10
In looking at the scenario file, one can see that the observations for the indoor temperature are
not always reported to the diagnostic engine. In this case, it will continue simulating the system’s
behaviour until it receives information that suggests that the simulation of the system no longer
represents the actual state of the system.
At this point, the simulated behaviour will then be used to revise the set of candidates that represent
the state of the system. Figure 3.14 shows an example of a scenario file that has been loaded into
the GME Tool, at this point one can then simulate the system and probe HyDE for diagnoses to
verify that the model functions as intended.
Figure 3.14: Scenario file loaded into the GME Tool.
3.1.5 Reasoning
HyDE uses the model for both simulation and candidate generation. The diagnosis or reasoning
process revolves around the maintenance of a set of candidates, that might include multiple hypoth-
esised faults, that are consistent with observations reported. The candidate lists the transitions
(between fault modes) that are assumed to have been taken by the system at each time step. Re-
porting observations prompts HyDE to begin the reasoning process to determine if the candidates
in the candidate set are still consistent with the reported observations. Consistent candidates re-
main in the candidate set and the information about inconsistent candidates is used to generate
successor candidates while inconsistent candidates are discarded.
Figure 3.15 shows the main steps in the reasoning process and these include: 1) simulation, 2)
comparison, and 3) candidate generation. The model corresponding to the candidate being tested
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Figure 3.15: HyDE Reasoning Process, showing major functional steps, adapted from [11].
is used to simulate the behaviour of the system. The goal of the simulation is to predict the expected
values of the variables using the component models that correspond to the sensed observations.
The comparison step uses predictions from the simulation step and compares them with actual
sensor readings to identify inconsistencies and if a discrepancy is discovered the model is then used to
determine the cause. The uncertainties present (i.e. noise and sensor values) along with the hybrid
nature of the system is taken into account during the reasoning process. The main component of
the HyDE reasoning process revolves around the generation and maintenance of new candidates
when the existing candidates become inconsistent. A conflict directed search process, driven by
inconsistencies generated during simulation, is used to identify the cause(s) of discrepancies.
Each time the application calls the HyDE :: step() function, HyDE will update the value of the
state variable indoorTemperature when the transition guard is activated during an autonomous
transition out of the initial location. The transition will fire and the furnace will autonomously
change location thereby changing the active constraints and the differential equation governing the
change in indoor temperature. When we report indoor temperature observations, we prompt HyDE
to perform a diagnosis which results in a consistency check that ascertains the state of the system.
Reasoning Example
Following is an example of a C++ application that uses the HyDE API to simulate the behaviour
of the simplified heating system and report diagnoses that represent the state of the system. The
declarative model of the system is input into the application using the XML files generated by
the GME Tool. This application can then be executed in real time in an embedded system that
automates the behaviour of the heating system and one that is connected to an interface that can
report the state of the system to a person.
In this example an instance of HyDE is created and the model files aircon.hxm and aircon.hxh
representing the model and harness file respectively are loaded. This is followed by a series of
observations that are reported to HyDE and simulation steps that are requested of HyDE. Here
the time between the steps varies, for systems modelled in general, this would correlate with the
sample time of the system being simulated and observed.
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1 // include HyDE API header file
2 #include <API\HyDE.hpp>
3 // include io stream library
4 #include <iostream>
5
6 // open the HyDE API
7 using HyDEAPI::HyDE;
8 // open the std API
9 using namespace std;
10
11 // create the main method @author Sandile Memela
12 int main(int argc, char **argv) {
13
14 try { // attempt to execute codes
15
16 HyDE hyde; // instantiate HyDE
17 hyde.loadModel("aircon.hxm"); // load a simple HyDE model
18 hyde.loadHarness("aircon.hxh"); // load a simple configuration file
19
20 // report observations instruct HyDE to start reasoning
21 hyde.reportObservation(1, "thermostat.setting", "25.00");
22 hyde.reportObservation(1, "outdoorTemperature", "15.00");
23 hyde.step(1);
24 hyde.reportObservation(50, "thermostat.setting", "25.00");
25 hyde.reportObservation(50, "outdoorTemperature", "15.00");
26 hyde.step(50);
27 hyde.reportObservation(100, "thermostat.setting", "25.00");
28 hyde.reportObservation(100, "outdoorTemperature", "15.00");
29 hyde.step(100);
30 hyde.reportObservation(150, "thermostat.setting", "25.00");
31 hyde.reportObservation(150, "outdoorTemperature", "15.00");
32 hyde.step(150);
33 hyde.reportObservation(155, "thermostat.setting", "25.00");
34 hyde.reportObservation(155, "outdoorTemperature", "15.00");
35 hyde.step(155);
36 hyde.reportObservation(160, "thermostat.setting", "25.00");
37 hyde.reportObservation(160, "outdoorTemperature", "15.00");
38 hyde.step(160);
39 hyde.reportObservation(165, "thermostat.setting", "25.00");
40 hyde.reportObservation(165, "outdoorTemperature", "15.00");
41 hyde.step(165);
42 hyde.reportObservation(170, "thermostat.setting", "25.00");
43 hyde.reportObservation(170, "outdoorTemperature", "15.00");
44 hyde.reportObservation(170, "indoorTemperature", "18.10");
45 hyde.step(170);
46 hyde.reportObservation(250, "thermostat.setting", "25.00");
47 hyde.reportObservation(250, "outdoorTemperature", "15.00");
48 hyde.reportObservation(250, "indoorTemperature", "20.10");
49 hyde.step(250);
50
51 } catch (const exception& e) { // catch any errors that occur
52 cerr << e.what() << endl;
53 }
54
55 system("pause"); // wait for system exit
56
57 }
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Figure 3.16 shows the diagnostic results requested during each time step in the application. Here
each candidate contains a list of the components in the system and the state that each component
is in at that time. At time 170, one can see that the reported observations are still valid because
a 2% sensor noise tolerance was defined for the observations of the indoor temperature.
When the reported observation is inconsistent with the predicted observation, HyDE will generate
a list of candidates and order them based on the transition probabilities between likely locations
that contain constraints that explain the reported observations. HyDE reasons backwards and
forwards in time when attempting to generate candidates for models with stored observations or
telemetry.
Figure 3.16: Output of the c++ application accessing the HyDE API.
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3.2 Approximate Input Reconstruction
One of the key issues identified in the diagnosis task is limited observability. The number of sensors
that allow the system to be observed are limited on the Meraka Modular UAV. The Approximate
Input Reconstruction Algorithm or Method (AIRA), a Least Squares Algorithm (shown in Figure
1.5) based on the Moore-Penrose Generalised Inverse, is used to reconstruct unknown inputs which
can be used for fault detection. In this research, AIRA is used to estimate inputs that are compared
with commanded values. We use HyDE along with AIRA in order to perform actuator FDI through
input reconstruction since the control surfaces don’t have position sensors.
3.2.1 Overview
Discrepancies between known and unknown inputs to the system are used to perform fault detec-
tion. Unknown inputs to the system can be reconstructed using input observers based on System
Inversion Techniques as a part of the fault detection process. Once available these unknown inputs,
reconstructed using sensor measurements, can be compared with a model of the system along with
the known inputs in order to determine discrepancies that suggest the presence of faults.
System Inversion
AIRA is a Least Squares Algorithm with a similar foundation to the parity space approach, for
a detailed overview please see [25]. The applicability of AIRA to practical systems is heavily
dependent on a sound understanding of a critical issue inherent to System Inversion Techniques,
namely the presence of zeros. To understand AIRA we begin by examining this foundation from
the perspective of System Inversion in the case of the linear discrete time system G(z) shown in
Figure 3.17 with inputs U and outputs Y .
GU Y
Figure 3.17: System Transfer Function, with input U and output Y .
Inverse systems derived through System Inversion Techniques can be defined in two broad cate-
gories: left inversion and right inversion. Left inversion techniques are used in input observers and
right inversion techniques are used in feed forward control. In the left inverse system GL(z), shown
in Figure 3.18, which satisfies the condition GL(z)G(z) = I where I is an Identity Matrix, U is
output when Y is input. Similarly in the right inverse system GR(z), shown in Figure 3.19, which
satisfies the condition G(z)GR(z) = I, U is output given the desired output Y .
GLY U
Figure 3.18: Left Inverse System, with input Y and output U .
GRY U
Figure 3.19: Right Inverse System, with input Y and output U .
Moving forward, focus will be directed toward the left inversion technique by highlighting the
inversion process for SISO (Single Input Single Output) and MIMO (Multiple Input Multiple
Output) Systems. A system is invertible when there is a one-to-one relationship between its input
and output [33]. Consider the SISO system G(z) defined by the transfer function:
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G(z) =
Y (Z)
U(Z)
(3.1)
If the system is invertible then the system inversion process is relatively straight forward, GL(z) is
determined by the transfer function:
GL(z) =
U(Z)
Y (Z)
=
1
G(Z)
(3.2)
The locations of the system’s zeros affect the phase characteristics of the inverted system. The
locations of the zeros of a linear time invariant system are related to the characteristics of its phase
spectral function. A minimum phase system is a linear time invariant system that is, with its
inverse, casual and stable for small times k [33]. It will have all its zeros inside the unit circle and
on the left hand side of the complex plane. A maximum phase system is a linear time invariant
system that is stable and causal with an inverse that is causal and unstable for large times k [33].
Namely, it will have zeros on the right hand side of the complex plane and zeros outside the unit
circle. A mixed phase system has zeros on either side of the unit circle. Consider the MIMO system
defined by the transfer function:

Y1(z)
...
Yn(z)
 =

G11(z) G12(z) . . . G1m(z)
...
...
...
...
Gn1(z) Gn2(z) . . . Gnm(z)


U1(z)
...
Um(z)
 (3.3)
In this case, it is evident that the inversion process becomes non trivial which is why a more
sophisticated approach must be adopted to match the complexity of the inversion process. This is
where AIRA is employed to perform the system inversion. A generalised inverse is a matrix that
has some of the properties of an inverse matrix [22]. The Moore-Penrose Generalised Inverse GI of
G satisfies all of the conditions below [22]:
• GGIG = G
• GIGGI = GI
• (GGI)T = GIG
• (GIG)T = GGI
The Moore-Penrose Generalised Inverse exists for any matrix G and when G has full rank, GI
can be expressed using a simple equation [2]. When the linear system G has linearly independent
columns, the left inverse GL in GLG = I can be expressed as [2]:
GL = (G
TG)−1GT (3.4)
When the linear system G has linearly independent rows, the right inverse GR in GGR = I can be
expressed as [2]:
GR = G
T (GGT )−1 (3.5)
The linear least squares algorithm is used when fitting a mathematical model to data when the
idealised value (output) is expressed linearly in terms of the unknown parameters (inputs) of the
model. This applies to our case where we would like to determine the unknown inputs using the
generated outputs. We use the Moore-Penrose Generalised Inverse to determine the solution to the
equation of the form Y = GU where U solves the least squares problem [3].
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Input Reconstruction
Consider the linearised state space representation defined in Appendix C representing the decoupled
lateral and longitudinal dynamics of the Meraka Modular UAV:
[
∆x˙long
∆x˙lat
]
=
[
Along 0
0 Alat
][
∆xlong
∆xlat
]
+
[
Blong
Blat
][
ulong
ulat
]
(3.6)
The state space representation is discretised to give the following linear discrete time system:
xk+1 = Fxk +Guk (3.7)
yk = Hxk + Juk (3.8)
where xk ∈ Rn,uk ∈ Rm,yk ∈ Rp,F ∈ Rn×n,G ∈ Rn×m,H ∈ Rp×n and J ∈ Rp×m. We would
like to reconstruct the commanded input history U r of length r:
U r =

u0
u1
...
ur
 (3.9)
where r is a non negative integer, using the measured output sequence Y r:
Y r =

y0
y1
...
yr
 (3.10)
To determine the output sequence we find expressions for the output Y r and expanding Y r in
Equation 3.10 we get:
yk = Hxk + Juk (3.11)
yk+1 = Hxk+1 + Juk+1 (3.12)
= HFxk +HGuk + Juk (3.13)
and continuing we get:
Y r =

yk
yk+1
...
yk+r
 =

H
HF
...
HF r
xk +

J 0 . . . 0 0
HG J . . . 0 0
...
...
. . .
...
...
HF r−1G HF r−2G . . . HG J


uk
uk+1
...
uk+r
 (3.14)
where Γr ∈ R(r+1)p×n is the Observability Matrix given by:
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Γr =

H
HF
HF 2
...
HF r

(3.15)
and where the Markov Parameters Ma [9]:
Ma =
{
J a = 0
HF a−1G, a ≥ 1
(3.16)
are used to construct the Hankel Matrix M r ∈ R(r+1)p×(r+1)m given by:
M r =

J 0 . . . 0 0
HG J . . . 0 0
...
...
. . .
...
...
HF r−2G HF r−3G . . . J 0
HF r−1G HF r−2G . . . HG J

(3.17)
To determine the unknown input history U r and unknown initial state x0 we define the output
sequence Y r adapted from Equation 3.14 as:
Y r = Γrx0 +M rU r = Ψr
[
x0
U r
]
(3.18)
where Ψr ∈ R(r+1)p×[n+m(r+1)] is given by:
Ψr =
[
Γr M r
]
(3.19)
Notice how only the initial state and sensor measurements are used in 3.18, this adds to the
increased accuracy of AIRA. Define l = rank(F ) > 0, the linear discrete time system 3.7, 3.8 is
l delay input and state observable when there exists an input history of length r ≥ l such that
Ur = {0} for all r0 ≥ 1 where [25]:
r0 =
⌈
n
l −m
⌉
− 1 (3.20)
Ur =
{[
x0
U r
]
∈ Rn+(r+1)m : Y r = 0
}
(3.21)
and dae, N , Ur = N (Ψr) denotes the smallest integer greater than or equal to a, the null space,
and the input and state unobservable subspace respectively. Definition 3.5 in [25] states that a
system is input and state observable when Ur = {0} for all r ≥ r0. According to Theorem 3.6 in
[25], Ψr has full column rank for all r ≥ r0 when:
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• the discrete time system is input and state observable
• there exists r ≥ r0 where rank(Ψr) = n+ (r + 1)m
• rank(Ψr) = n+ (r + 1)m for all r ≥ r0
• Y r = 0 if and only if
[
x0
U0
]
= 0 for all r ≥ r0
• and rank(Ψn−1) = n(m+ 1)
This enables us to determine the unique solution of Equation 3.18 which is:
[
x0
U r
]
= Ψ†rYr =
(
ΨTr Ψr
)−1
ΨTr Yr (3.22)
where † represents the Moore-Penrose Generalised Inverse. The presence of invariant zeros in
the linear discrete time system 3.7, 3.8 implies that the input and state unobservable subspace
Ur 6= {0} and according to Definition 3.5 in [25], the system is no longer input and state observable.
Consequently exact reconstruction is no longer possible and the Moore-Penrose Generalised Inverse
is no longer given by Equation 3.22. By accounting for the locations of the invariant zeros relative
to the unit disc in the discrete plane, approximate reconstruction can be achieved. According to
Definition 4.1 in [25], the reconstructed state and input is given by:
x0 = x0,rec + x0,unrec, (3.23)
U r = U r,rec +U r,unrec (3.24)
where rec and unrec are the observable and unobservable state and input respectively. This suggests
that the output sequence or response for the linear time system has contributions from unobservable
system inputs and states x0,unrec,U r,unrec which in turn corrupt and affect the accuracy of the
reconstructed input. We now investigate the use of the AIRA using a few examples [9] to show that
the reconstructed inputU r,unrec is small for small and large values of k, respectively in a system that
has only minimum phase and non minimum phase zeros. In both cases the reconstruction process
involves a batch-processing algorithm. Note that in the mixed-phase case, the input estimates have
good accuracy for neither small or large values of k making the input reconstruction non causal.
3.2.2 Minimum Phase Zeros
In applying AIRA, the application designer needs to identify and account for the locations of the
system’s zeros relative to the unit disc. Consider now a minimum phase system with initial state
x0, simulated using the MATLAB script in Appendix D.1:
xk+1 =

0.6 −0.22 0.096
0.5 0 0
0 0.125 0
xk +

4
0
0
uk (3.25)
yk =
[
0 0.5 −2
]
xk (3.26)
x0 =

2
0.1
−1
 (3.27)
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The region inside the disc corresponds to the left half of the s-plane. Figure 3.20 shows the pole
zero plots of the minimum phase system with transmission zeros inside the unit disc in the z plane.
Figure 3.20: A minimum phase system’s pole zero plots in the s and z domains
If all of the transmission zeros are contained in the open unit disc, then approximate causal recon-
struction is possible for sufficiently large data sets and large times k. This is a consequence of the
unobservable components dying out with the increase in times k as shown in Figure 3.21.
Figure 3.21: Reconstructed input for a minimum phase system, used for illustrative purposes - the units
are not significant.
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3.2.3 Non Minimum Phase Zeros
If on the other hand, all the transmission zeros are contained in the complement of the closed
unit disc, then approximate non causal reconstruction is possible for sufficiently large data sets
and small times k. Consider now the minimum phase system given by equations 3.25 - 3.27 with
yk =
[
0 0.5 −6
]
xk, simulated using the MATLAB script in Appendix D.2. Figure 3.22 shows
the pole zero plots in the s and z domains respectively and the non minimum phase zero outside
the unit circle. Figure 3.23 shows the reconstructed input where the unobservable input increases
for large times k.
Figure 3.22: A nonminimum phase system’s pole zero plots in the s and z domains.
Figure 3.23: Reconstructed input for a nonminimum phase system, used for illustrative purposes - the
units are not significant.
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Consequently if all of the system transmission zeros are contained in either the open unit disc or
the complement of the closed unit disc, the approximate non causal reconstruction is possible for
sufficiently large data sets and small times k.
3.2.4 Zeros on Unit Circle
If at least one transmission zero lies on the unit circle, then approximate input reconstruction is
not possible since a persistent reconstruction error will corrupt the reconstructed inputs. Consider
now the system given by equations 3.25 - 3.27 with yk =
[
0 0.5 −4
]
xk +
[
0
]
uk, and yk =[
0 0.5 4
]
xk +
[
0
]
uk simulated using the MATLAB script in Appendix D.3. Figures 3.24 and
3.25 show the pole zero plots in the s and z domains respectively and the zeros on either side of
the unit circle. Figure 3.26 and 3.27 show the reconstructed input where the unobservable input
remains constant for large times k.
Figure 3.24: A system’s pole zero plots in the s and z domains with a zero on the unit circle.
Figure 3.25: A system’s pole zero plots in the s and z domains with a zero on the unit circle.
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Figure 3.26: Reconstructed input for system with zeros on unit circle, used for illustrative purposes - the
units are not significant.
Figure 3.27: Reconstructed input for system with zeros on unit circle, used for illustrative purposes - the
units are not significant.
3.2.5 Online Computation
The previous examples were investigated using the following implementation of AIRA in MATLAB.
This script can be ported to an embedded system for online or realtime estimation of inputs. The
script is included to highlight the simplicity of implementing AIRA given that such sophisticated
functionality can be achieved through a couple lines of MATLAB code.
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1 %% Approximate Input Reconstruction Algorithm @author Sandile Memela
2
3 % Initialise variables
4 IRA.r1 = SYS.r;
5 IRA.r2 = SYS.r;
6 IRA.p = size(SYS.H,1);
7 IRA.n = size(SYS.H,2);
8 IRA.m = size(SYS.G,2);
9 IRA.l = rank(SYS.F);
10 IRA.Mrr = zeros(IRA.p*(IRA.r1+1), IRA.m*(IRA.r2+1));
11 IRA.Gr = zeros(IRA.p*(IRA.r1+1), IRA.n);
12
13 % Generate the hankel matrix
14 for i = 0:IRA.r2
15 a = 0;
16 for j = 0:IRA.r1
17 if j >= i
18 if a == 0
19 IRA.Mrr(IRA.p*(j)+1:IRA.p*(j)+IRA.p, IRA.m*(i)+1:IRA.m*(i)+IRA.m) = SYS.J;
20 else
21 IRA.Mrr(IRA.p*(j)+1:IRA.p*(j)+IRA.p, IRA.m*(i)+1:IRA.m*(i)+IRA.m) =
SYS.H*(SYS.F^(a-1))*SYS.G;
22 end
23 a = a+1;
24 end
25 end
26 end
27
28 % Generate the observability matrix
29 for j = 0:IRA.r1
30 IRA.Gr(IRA.p*(j)+1:IRA.p*(j)+IRA.p,:) = SYS.H*(SYS.F^(j));
31 end
32
33 % Calculate and shift the reconstructed input
34 IRA.U = pinv([IRA.Gr IRA.Mrr].’*[IRA.Gr IRA.Mrr])*[IRA.Gr IRA.Mrr].’*SYS.y’;
35 IRA.U = IRA.U(IRA.l+1:size(IRA.U,1),:);
36
37 %% Plot the reconstructed input
38 h1 = stairs(SYS.k(1:SYS.r-IRA.l),[SYS.u(:,1:SYS.r-IRA.l)’ IRA.U(1:SYS.r-IRA.l,:)],’-’);
39 legend(h1,’Actual’,’Reconstructed’);
40 title(’Approximate Input Reconstruction’);
41 axis([0 SYS.r -1 3.0]);
42 xlabel(’Time’);
43 ylabel(’U’);
An advantage of this algorithm is its simplicity in implementation. A major disadvantage is the
large computational requirement for systems with a large number of inputs and outputs. This
results as a consequence of having to calculate the inverse of a square matrix that grows in size in
response to the desired number of inputs to be estimated. In light of this, the decision is made in
this research project to perform input estimation using this algorithm and SISO systems. This is
done in an effort to reduce the effect of the unobservable components present in the reconstructed
input. To simplify the computational complexity and to ensure the target fault diagnostic system’s
feasibility, inputs and outputs that seem to have observable and correlated relationships will be
selected when abstracting a SISO version of the linearised and discretised MIMO model of the
aircraft. In the case of the mathematical model of the aircraft that has been defined, the input and
output state space matrices can be inspected to see which states are more completely represented.
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3.3 Subsystem Characterisation
The fault modelling and identification process that follows requires a clearly defined description of
the functional relationships that exist between subsystem components. To this end, a Failure Mode
and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) is performed in order to characterise
the subsystem components. This enables us to identify which components need to be modelled
first, how, why and how they are functionally related which isn’t evident from looking at the bare
System or Subsystem Component Overview. This is critical to selecting the relevant subsystems
and constraining the complexity of the system model used to perform diagnoses in HyDE.
3.3.1 Meraka Modular UAV Subsystems
Guidance
System
ControlEstimation
Operator
input
Aircraft
Actuators
Sensors
RotorsOBC
RC / RF
Batteries
Diagnostics
Figure 3.28: System Component Overview, showing detail for aircraft subsystems.
The UAV’s subsystem components, estimation and guidance systems were examined which resulted
in the component overview shown in Figure 3.28. A detailed subsystem overview, shown in Figure
3.29, was generated in order to identify the UAV’s components. The major systems depicted
are the autonomous aircraft and the ground station. The subsystem level component schematic
represents key subsystem components. The schematic is used to model the structural and functional
relationships that determine the behaviour of the onboard subsystems.
Table 3.1 is a list of all of subsystem components and their functional component groupings. Focus
is placed on electronic components at the subsystem level. Effects that are not directly related to
the aircraft are excluded, an example of this is the ambient temperature. The subsystem component
manifest is used as one of the inputs to the Reliability Analysis adapted from comparable work in
[46] and performed in this project.
3.3.2 Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
The Failure Mode and Effects Analysis is a bottom up reliability analysis that is used for qualita-
tively analysing the ways in which a system fails [40]. It contains tabulated data for each of the
subsystem components in the UAV beginning at the component level and assigns different failure
types or modes, causes and effects to each component. Each part and its various failure modes
that can potentially result in an end effect failure are considered as well as determining the severity
of each mode and the compensation procedures. The entire system is broken down into a list of
individual components which is used as one of the process inputs when performing the FMEA,
shown in Figure 3.30, as outlined below:
1. for each of the component inputs, determine the ways that the input can go wrong
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Figure 3.29: Detailed Aircraft Subsystem Component Overview
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Figure 3.30: Failure Mode and Effects Analysis, detailing process inputs and outputs.
2. for each failure mode identified, determine the effects and severity level
3. identify the potential causes for each failure mode and select the associated level of occurrence
4. list the current controls or compensation methods for each cause and select the level of
detection for each cause
5. calculate the risk priority number (RPN) who’s range is between 1 (not severe) to 10 (very
severe):
(a) predicted severity: gauges the importance of the effect on the aircraft
(b) occurrence: frequency given to the cause that brings about failure mode
(c) detection levels: the ability of the control scheme to detect the cause of the failure
(d) RPN = severity × occurrence× detection
6. develop the recommended compensation actions prioritised by high RPNs.
A simplified FMEA is done and can be found in Appendix E.1. As a consequence, only the severity
of each failure mode and component failure rate is considered.The components are assigned a
severity to quantify how their failure impacts the entire system. The severity categories are used to
categorise the severity of the failure effects. The failure effects that are of concern for this research
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Subsystem	Components	Aircraft	1.1	 Avionics	Battery	 Powers	Onboard	Computer	(OBC)	and	Servo	Board	1.2	 Backup	Battery	 Powers	Servo	Board	and	RC	Receiver	1.3	 Motor	Batteries	 Powers	motors	Actuation	2.1	 RC	Receiver	 Allows	manual	control	of	the	actuation	system	2.2	 Servo	Board	 Applies	actuation	commands	to	servos	and	motors	2.3	 Speed	Controller	 Controls	the	speed	of	the	motors	2.4	 Left	Rudder	 Servo	deflects	left	rudder	control	surface	2.5	 Right	Rudder	 Servo	deflects	right	rudder	control	surface	2.6	 Left	Elevator	 Servo	deflects	left	elevator	control	surface	2.7	 Right	Elevator	 Servo	deflects	right	elevator	control	surface	2.8	 Left	Aileron	 Servo	deflects	left	aileron	control	surface	2.9	 Right	Aileron	 Servo	deflects	right	aileron	control	surface	2.10	 Left	Flaperon	 Servo	deflects	left	flaperon	control	surface	2.11	 Right	Flaperon	 Servo	deflects	right	flaperon	control	surface	2.12	 Left	Motor	 Generates	thrust	on	the	left	of	the	aircraft	2.13	 Right	Motor	 Generates	thrust	on	the	right	of	the	aircraft	Control	3.1	 PICA	 Main	aircraft	controller	3.2	 PICB	 Controls	the	GPS	module	3.3	 RF	Transmitter	 Transmits	data	to	Ground	Station	receiver	3.4	 CAN	Bus	 Enables	communication	between	subsystems	Sensors	4.1	 GPS	 Tracks	aircraft’s	position,	velocity	4.2	 IMU	 Measures	translation	accelerations	and	angular	rates	4.3	 Magnetometer	 Determines	aircraft’s	attitude	4.4	 Dynamic	Pressure	 Determines	airspeed	of	aircraft	4.5	 Static	Pressure	 Determines	aircraft’s	altitude	Meraka	UAV	Subsystems	 	Table 3.1: Subsystem Component Manifest, outlining component groupings, indices and functions.
#' Severity'Category' End'Effect'A' Uncontrolled'emergency'landing' Risk'of'catastrophic'damage'high'B' Controlled'emergency'landing' Risk'of'catastrophic'damage'low'C' Mission'critical'failure' Spoiling'or'loosing'flight'data''Severity'Categories'' 'Table 3.2: Severity Categories, with associated undesirable end effects.
have been separated into three ranked categories, in order of severity as shown in Table 3.2, and
include:
• failure effects that affect the aircraft’s ability to fly manually i.e. loss of radio control or a
stuck control surface that results in the loss of trim, in this case an uncontrolled landing is
expected with a high possibility for catastrophic damage
• failure effects that affect the aircraft’s ability to respond commands i.e. loss of thrust but the
aircraft remains trimmed, in this case a controlled landing is expected with a low possibility
for damage
• failure effects that affect the success of the flight mission and that are considered mission
critical i.e. the faulty sensor measurements that result in the loss of crucial flight data.
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A list of the component failure modes for one of the UAV’s actuators is shown in Table 3.3. A
component’s failure modes are the ways in which it malfunctions based on an identifiable cause.
The cause of the failure initiates a process which leads to the failure mode and serves as the source of
the malfunction. A detailed list of the UAV’s Component Failure Modes can be found in Appendix
E.1.1.
Failure'Mode'Number' Failure''Mode' Failure''Cause'2.6.1' Stuck'failure' Servo'halts'or'gets'jammed'2.6.2' Hardover'failure' Servo'rotates'in'one'direction'2.6.3' Floating'failure' Loose'mechanical'connection'2.6.4' Partial'loss'failure' Slipping'mechanical'connection'2.6.5' Unknown' Unexpected'actuator'behaviour''Example'Component'Failure'Modes' 'Table 3.3: Compon nt Failure Modes, shown with component indices, excerpt from Appendix E.1.1.
Once the component failure modes have been identified, the effects of the failure on the entire
system are determined as shown in Table 3.4. The effects are considered chronologically starting
with local subsystem effects before ultimately ending with the final system level effects. A detailed
list of the UAV’s Failure Effects Analysis can be found in Appendix E.1.2.
Failure'Mode'Number' Failure'Effects'(Local)' Failure'Effects'(Next'Level)' Failure'Effects'(End'Effect)' Severity'Category'
1.1.1' Non'ideal'voltage'supply' On'board'components'behave'erratically' Inaccurate'flight'data' C'
1.1.2' Low'voltage'supply' OBC'and'Servo'Board'looses'avionics'battery'power'
Controlled'emergency'landing' B'
1.1.3' Unknown'battery'fault' OBC'and'Servo'Board'malfunctions' Controlled'emergency'landing' B''Example'Failure'Effects'Analysis' 'Table 3.4: Component ailure Effects, identified at different system levels, excerpt from Appendix E.1.2.
3.3.3 Failure Detection Methods
The failure detection methods, as shown in Table 3.5, are the methods that can be applied to
recognise the failure mode. The compensating features consider either reconfiguration actions that
can be performed autonomously or the future redesign possibilities for increasing the reliability
of the aircraft. The failure detection is directly related to the failure cause and therefore the
compensation action that can be performed or taken. A detailed list of the UAV’s Failure Detection
Methods can be found in Appendix E.1.3.
3.3.4 Fault Tree Analysis
The Fault Tree Analysis is a top down reliability analysis method that is used for quantitatively
analysing the ways in which a system can fail [40]. Knowledge about the failure relationships defined
during the FMEA is one of the means available that are used to organise components. The failure
rates for system level end effect events are determined using fault trees constructed from AND and
predominantly OR gates. The functional relationships between the components including local,
subsystem and system level effects are used to identify the non redundant subsystems that must
61
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
Failure'Mode'Number' Failure'Detection''Method' Compensation''Action'1.1.1' Battery'precision'voltage'sensor' Monitor'battery'level,'notify'ground'station'operator'
1.1.2' Battery'precision'voltage'sensor' Prevent'start'up'of'on'board'components'then'activate'backup'battery'power'for'select'components'1.1.3' Battery'precision'voltage'sensor' Activate'backup'battery'for'select'components''Example'Fault'Detection'Methods' 'Table 3.5: Failure Detection Methods, outlining compensation actions for the particular component.
fail in order for the end effect event to occur using an iterative top-down process for major and
individual system components. The FTA end effects correspond to the severity categories in the
FMEA in the case of the Reliability Analysis for the Meraka Modular UAV. Software packages such
as RAM Commander [45] or the Logan Fault Tree and Event Analysis Software [32] can be used
to construct both the fault trees and perform the FMEA.
X
or
A B
(a) A OR gate
X
A B
and
(b) A AND gate
Figure 3.31: Component Fault Trees, two types shown.
The boolean OR and AND gates are shown in Figure 3.31 and these constitute the basic building
blocks for calculating the component failure rates at subsystem levels in the fault trees. The top
event X, representing a non redundant system as shown in Figure 3.31a, occurs if component A or
B fails. The top event X, representing a redundant system, shown in Figure 3.31b, occurs if both
component A and B fails. The probability of failure pX for a system failure characterised by an
OR gate is given by:
pX = pA + pB − (pApB) (3.28)
The term pApB arises from the probability that both A and B, shown in Figure 3.31a, fail si-
multaneously i.e. the servo board receives commands erratically from the RC receiver because of
insufficient battery voltage or corrupted commands received from the RC transmitter. If we assume
that no two faults within the same non redundant component fault tree occur simultaneously, then
we can ignore the term pApB. The probability for the system failure pX for a system characterised
by an AND gate is given by:
pX = pApB (3.29)
where both A and B as shown in Figure 3.31b must fail for X to occur. The Nonelectronic Parts
Reliability Data (NPRD) 1991 Handbook [54] is used to determine estimates for probabilities of
failure using component failure rates and the RAC’s Failure Mode Distributions 1991 Handbook
[13] can be used to determine the fault mode distributions for each component. This is useful when
it is necessary to determine the probability that the component is in either failure mode especially
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for components modelled in HyDE that have multiple locations and transitions with transition
probabilities. The upper bounds for the component failure rates are chosen as pessimistic estimates
of the probabilities of failure quoted in the NPRD Handbook. To determine the equivalence between
the component failure rates and probabilities of failure we use the NASA Fault Tree Handbook
with Aerospace Applications, that defines the component probability p is by [17]:
p = 1− e−λt (3.30)
where λ is the component failure rate with the units probabilities per unit time and t is the
time interval. Failure rates defined in the NPRD Handbook are quoted as one failure per million
hours of usage. For the purposes of this research, the rates are defined with respect to t = 1 hour
corresponding to a 1 hour UAV flight mission. With the maximum NPRD failure rate being failures
per million hours, for each subsystem component λ < 0.1 which implies that 3.30 can be simplified
to [17]:
p = λt (3.31)
which means that the quoted component failure rates can be divided by 1000000 which yields the
approximate probability of failure for a component during one UAV flight mission. Failure rates
from the NPRD Handbook provide adequate estimates and no conversion factors will be applied
in the case of failure rates for the Meraka Modular UAV seeing that the relative probabilities
for the component failures are what is important to rank component failures and not the actual
failure probabilities themselves. The details behind the UAV’s Fault Tree Analysis can be found
in Appendix E.2.
3.3.5 Hazards Analysis Matrix
The severity categories, listed in Table 3.2, and component failure rates determined during the
FMEA and FTA are used to generate the Hazards Analysis Matrix (HAM), shown in Figure 3.32.
The severity categories divide the vertical axis and the failure rates per hour divide the horizontal
axis. The components with the most critical and the least critical components are located on the
upper right and lower left quadrants respectively. The HAMwas used as a guide when characterising
the subsystem components, as shown in Figure 3.33, in the UAV so that priority is given to the
most critical components when developing the declarative model of the subsystem components for
use in the fault diagnostic system.
Figure 3.32: Hazards Analysis Matrix, used to identify critical subsystem components by severity category.
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Figure 3.33: Characterised Subsystem Model, highlighting critical subsystem components.
The results of the Reliability Analysis appear to correlate well with what one would expect from
a process that characterises the onboard subsystems on the UAV. The rudders and elevators are
the most critical components as they directly affect the aircraft’s ability to fly safely and have
the greatest effect on manoeuvrability. The subsystem components that enable the UAV to make
use of these components have also been identified as critical and in doing so, it becomes evident
that just modelling the actuators as part of the FDI process is not sufficient and in addition, the
avionics battery, servo board and RC receiver also need to be modelled for the fault diagnostics to
be effective in preventing the occurrence of an uncontrolled landing that could potentially result in
catastrophic damage to the Meraka Modular UAV.
3.4 Fault Modelling and Identification
The process of fault modelling and identification can begin now that the various subsystem com-
ponents of the UAV have been characterised. This starts off with the selection of system critical
components and is followed by an overview of the pertinent modes of operation. The mechanisms
behind the identification of the modes of operation are then defined before presenting a blueprint
for constructing the declarative model used in the fault diagnostic engine.
3.4.1 System Critical Components
System critical components are selected in order to limit the complexity of developing the declar-
ative model to be used for diagnostics. Critical components are characterised as having a Severity
Category A as shown in Figure 3.33 with the red outlines and include:
• Rudders and Elevators
• RC Receiver
• Backup Battery
• Servo Board
Given that actuator FDIR is an important aspect of this research, more detailed models are con-
structed for actuators where as for the other components the declarative models are abstracted.
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This results in the following revised list of the components of interest, which includes the remaining
less critical components characterised as having a Severity Category B, shown with blue outlines
in Figure 3.33:
• abstracted models:
– Backup and Avionics Batteries
– Servo Board and RC receiver
• detailed models:
– Rudders and Elevators
– Ailerons and Flaperons
It’s important to realise that this revised list has components that are functionally related, this is
an important aspect to model especially for system level reasoning since an actuator may get stuck
because it is not receiving power because the servo board is malfunctioning due to a battery fault.
Reasoning in this way wouldn’t be possible had these functional relationships been omitted.
3.4.2 Modes of Operation
We now investigate the modes of operation of the detailed actuator models. The modes of operation
of a component define the configuration that determines how it behaves in that instance in time
which is also a characteristic of a hybrid system [14]. In the case of an aircraft control surface, it
is expected that it will either be in a nominal, stuck or floating mode of operation [50].
(a) Nominal mode, notice how the commanded and ac-
tual deflections overlap.
(b) Partial loss of effectiveness failure, notice how the
actual deflection deviates after the fault occurs.
Figure 3.34: Actuator nominal modes of operation.
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Figures 3.34a and 3.34b show a control surface’s desired versus actual deflections in the ideal
case where the two deflections match and in the unideal case where the actuator partially looses
effectiveness while still trying to track the commanded control input. Deflection tracking and the
average deflection positions will make it easy to identify these modes.
(a) Stuck failure, notice how the actual deflection re-
mains constant after the fault occurs.
(b) Hardover failure, notice how the actual deflection
goes to max and remains constant after the fault occurs.
Figure 3.35: Actuator stuck modes of operation.
Figures 3.35a and 3.35b show a control surface’s desired versus actual deflections in the unideal case
where the actuator is stuck at a random position and at the maximum deflection point respectively.
Using the first derivative of the actual deflection will make it easy to identify this mode.
Figure 3.36: Actuator floating mode of operation, notice how the actual deflection becomes random after
the fault occurs.
Figure 3.36 shows a control surface’s desired versus actual deflections in the unideal case where
the actuator is floating and no longer responds to commanded inputs. Using the cross correlation
between the actual and desired deflections will make it easy to identify this mode.
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3.4.3 Identification of Modes
We now define the mechanisms behind the identification of modes starting with the input recon-
struction and ending off with stochastic signal processing. In the case of the aircraft’s actuators,
the most direct way is to reconstruct and compare the actual and desired deflections to determine
the mode of operation that the actuator is currently in.
Hybrid Diagnosis
One of the key issues identified in the diagnosis task is limited observability. The number of sensors
that allow the system to be observed are limited on the Meraka Modular UAV. AIRA in the same
way as the Kalman Filter, is used to estimate certain properties of the system which might not be
directly observable. We use AIRA to estimate the deflection angles of the control surfaces onboard
the Meraka Modular UAV since they don’t have position sensors. We do this by ’reconstructing
the input’ that would have given rise to the control surface’s actual deflection angle. In the ideal
case, the actual and desired deflection angles for the control surfaces are similar when everything
is working. When something breaks however, the control surfaces don’t necessarily respond to the
control inputs anymore and it’s possible to see this based on how the UAV behaves during flight.
Practical systems exhibit phenomena which can be observed using sensors i.e. acceleration in a car.
In order to become aware of the effects of these phenomena, devices or tools suitable for observing
these phenomena in a quantifiable manner must be used or developed. Fault detection methods
must be selected and used in conjunction with sensors to detect the occurrence of specific desirable
or undesirable phenomena which is a step beyond the data collection sensors perform. The Kalman
Filter can be ’tuned’ to become sensitive to the occurrence of specific phenomena i.e. a stuck fault
[38]. However in order to say definitively that there is a stuck fault a decision must be actively
made to either dismiss or accept an identified occurrence as a definitive indicator of a fault. This
is what a Gaussian Bayes Classifier can be used for in conjunction with the Kalman Filter by
deciding how similar an identified occurrence is to the actual known stuck fault. We use HyDE
along with AIRA and a few signal processing methods in order to perform actuator FDI. HyDE in
this case is the intelligence that reasons about the state of the entire system or component in order
to identify faults based on observations reported by any number and combination of sensors and
fault detection methods sensitive to the occurrence of specific phenomena.
Design Process
Inputs OutputsStates
Figure 3.37: AIRA operational model, highlighting a system’s cause-effect input-output relationship.
AIRA gives the control engineer considerable flexibility in its application. The only hard limit is that
the state space representation of the system must have no invariant zeros for exact reconstruction
or no zeros on the unit circle for approximate reconstruction. Little if any literature exists on how
to maximise the effectiveness of AIRA and for the purposes of this research, the application of the
algorithm is based on insights gained during its investigation. In the case of embedded systems
with limited computational resources, AIRA performs best when applied to SISO systems. As a
rule of thumb, represented by the applied design constraint in Figure 3.37, the best state space
representation of the system being observed is one where there are no unobservable components
and or one where there is a direct causal mathematical relationship between the input, states and
output. The rationale being, if a controller can be designed to produce a desired response then
a direct observable causal relationship between the input and output response exists barring the
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presence of significant noise. In using the control loops, the accuracy of the algorithm can be
increased significantly given that a well defined (quantifiable relationship between the input and
output has been identified) state space representation is being used to produce the desired response.
It is also the case that conventional aircraft utilise control systems to ensure safe flight. In the case
of the UAV’s aircraft model, the state space matrices were inspected in order to identify inputs
and outputs that most readily satisfy the above design constraint and the systems were sampled
at 50 Hz. When integrating a feedback control system into the UAV, AIRA can be reapplied to
determine the most suitable state space representation for input reconstruction.
The results of the investigation done in [38] concerning the use of passive fault detection methods
onboard the UAV for actuator FDI actively suggest that discerning between the left and right
actuators is a difficult task for the FDD method to perform given the limited observability of the
control surfaces and that a limited subset of the complete longitudinal and lateral flight dynamics
of the aircraft are modelled in [38] and in this research project. In light of this, an active decision is
made in this research to focus on tracking the combined behaviour of both left and right actuators
simultaneously and using only the left control surface inputs in order to limit the scope of the
research and the complexity of the developed system. It will still be possible to identify faults
despite not knowing whether it is the left or right control surface. Given that additional FDIR
techniques will be integrated with the diagnostic system in future and this is a prototype system,
provision is made through an expandable FDIR architecture for either an active fault tolerant
control method that excites the individual control surfaces or the installation of additional sensors
to enable the fault diagnostic system to discern between the left and right control surface deflections
by changing the Fault Diagnostic System.
To determine the control surface deflections for the ailerons, rudders, elevators and flaperons using
AIRA we perform the following steps iteratively:
1. Generate a state space representation of the system - done in Section 2.5.4.
2. Identify the outputs that correlate well to changes in inputs.
3. Generate a state space representation describing the output response to these inputs.
4. Account for the locations of the zeros in this this state space representation (inside, outside
or on the unit circle).
5. Decide whether to continue with the identified state space representation or modify it for use
by filtering the zero.
6. Generate an output response and use the chosen state space representation to verify input
reconstruction.
Elevator Deflection
∆x˙δE =

−0.1312 −2.3293 0 −9.8086
−0.0263 −5.0906 0.9509 0.0062
0 −21.3720 −6.8251 0
0 0 1 0


v
α
q
θ
+

0
−0.1614
−12.3041
0
 δE (3.32)
qδE =
[
0 0 1 0
]

v
α
q
θ
 (3.33)
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Selecting the pitch rate qδE to observe the effect of the elevator input was inspired by the Pitch
Rate Damper Longitudinal Controller. When inspecting the state space matrices (3.32, 3.33), it
is clearly evident that a mathematical relationship exists between the input, the state q and the
measured output qδE . Applying MATLAB’s ss2tf function gives the following transfer function:
qδE (s)
δE(s)
=
s(s+ 0.1181)(s+ 4.8233)
(s+ 0.0520± j0.3121)(s+ 5.9715± j4.4235) (3.34)
Using MATLAB’s pzmap function generated the following pole zero plots in the continuous and
discrete domains shown in Figures 3.38 and 3.39 respectively.
Figure 3.38: Elevator Deflection: qδE (s) response function, s-plane pole (+) zero (o) plot with a zero on
the origin.
Figure 3.39: Elevator Deflection: qδE (s) response function, z-plane pole (+) zero (o) plot with a zero on
the unit circle.
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Upon inspecting the transfer function, it is evident that there is a zero on the unit circle which
can be seen in the pole zero plot shown in Figure 3.38 and that the state space representation is
a minimum phase system as can be seen in Figure 3.39 because all the zeros are inside the unit
circle. This implies that causal reconstruction is possible and that the zero on the unit circle will
need to be filtered as there will likely be a persistent reconstruction error in the form of an offset
as shown in Figure 3.40.
,
Figure 3.40: Unfiltered Elevator Input Reconstruction, shown with a persistent reconstruction error.
Filtering the zero from equation 3.34 yields the following equation:
qδE (s)
δE(s)
=
(s+ 0.1181)(s+ 4.8233)
(s+ 0.0520± j0.3121)(s+ 5.9715± j4.4235) (3.35)
Using MATLAB’s pzmap function generated the following pole zero plots in the continuous and
discrete domains shown in Figures 3.41 and 3.42 respectively. Upon inspecting the transfer function,
it is evident that there is no zero on the unit circle which can be seen in the pole zero plots shown in
Figures 3.41 and 3.42. This implies that more accurate causal reconstruction is possible as shown
in Figure 3.43.
Figure 3.41: Filtered Elevator Deflection: qδE (s) response function, s-plane pole (+) zero (o) plot, showing
minimum phase zeros on the left hand plane.
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Figure 3.42: Filtered Elevator Deflection: qδE (s) response function, z-plane pole (+) zero (o) plot, showing
minimum phase zeros inside the unit circle.
Figure 3.43: Filtered Elevator Input Reconstruction (causal), shown without a persistent error.
A Precautionary Note: The effect of filtering the zero from the elevator’s transfer function merely
makes the response less damped which amounts to increased reconstruction accuracy however after
some time the filtered and unfiltered responses converge as can be seen in Figures 3.44a, 3.44b.
Rudder Deflection
∆x˙δR =

−0.3567 0.0033 −0.7765 0.3633
−11.1230 −7.1656 2.2419 0
19.2281 −0.8859 −1.1888 0
0 1 −0.0169 0


β
p
r
φ
+

0.0037
0.4545
−6.7148
0
 δR (3.36)
βpφδR =
[
1 1 0 1
]

β
p
r
φ
 (3.37)
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(a) Unfiltered pitch rate response qδE (s), more damped.
(b) Zero filtered pitch rate response qδE (s), less damped.
Figure 3.44: Pitch rate responses to elevator input.
Selecting the angle of side slip, roll angle and roll rate βpφδR to observe the effect of the rudder
input was inspired by the Dutch Roll Damper Lateral Controller. The outputs were combined to
reduce the time taken for the unobservable components to die out during reconstruction. This also
makes sense as it is easier to discern the effect of the rudder when considering the angle of side
slip, roll angle and roll rates as the effect of the ailerons also comes into play. When inspecting
the state space matrices (3.36, 3.37), it is clearly evident that a mathematical relationship exists
between the input, the states β p, φ and the measured output βpφδR . Applying MATLAB’s ss2tf
function gives the following transfer function:
βpφδR(s)
δR(s)
=
(s+ 1.7105± j1.7671)(s− 22.1426)
(s+ 0.8186± j4.0953)(s+ 7.1537)(s− 0.0797) (3.38)
Using MATLAB’s pzmap function generated the following pole zero plots in the continuous and
discrete domains shown in Figures 3.45 and 3.46 respectively. Upon inspecting the transfer function,
it is evident that there is no zero on the unit circle which can be seen in the pole zero plot shown in
Figure 3.45 and that the state space representation is a minimum phase system as can be seen in
Figure 3.46 because all the zeros are inside the unit circle. This implies that causal reconstruction
is possible as shown in Figure 3.47.
Aileron Deflection
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Figure 3.45: Rudder Deflection: βpφδR(s) response function, s-plane pole (+) zero (o) plot, showing
minimum phase zeros on the left half plane.
Figure 3.46: Rudder Deflection: βpφδR(s) response function, z-plane pole (+) zero (o) plot, showing
minimum phase zeros inside the unit circle.
∆x˙δA =

−0.3567 0.0033 −0.7765 0.3633
−11.1230 −7.1656 2.2419 0
19.2281 −0.8859 −1.1888 0
0 1 −0.0169 0


β
p
r
φ
+

−3.3197e− 04
−25.4541
1.0778
0
 δA (3.39)
rδA =
[
0 0 1 0
]

β
p
r
φ
 (3.40)
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Figure 3.47: Rudder Input Reconstruction (causal).
Selecting the yaw rate rδA to observe the effect of the aileron input was inspired by the Roll Angle
Lateral Controller, the output selection is based on the time taken for the unobservable components
to die out and the quality of the reconstruction. When inspecting the state space matrices, it is
clearly evident that a mathematical relationship exists between the input, the state r and the
measured output rδA . Applying MATLAB’s ss2tf function gives the following transfer function:
rδA(s)
δA(s)
=
(s+ 2.6691)(s− 2.1588)(s+ 27.9282)
(s− 0.0797)(s+ 7.1537)(s+ 0.8186± j4.0952) (3.41)
Using MATLAB’s pzmap function generated the following pole zero plots in the continuous and
discrete domains shown in Figures 3.48 and 3.49 respectively.
Figure 3.48: Aileron Deflection: rδA(s) response function, s-plane pole (+) zero (o) plot, showing mixed-
phase zeros on both halves of the complex plane.
Upon inspecting the transfer function, it is evident that there is no zero on the unit circle which
can be seen in the pole zero plot shown in Figure 3.48 and that the state space representation is a
system with both minimum and non minimum phase zeros as can be seen in Figure 3.49 because
there are zeros inside and outside the unit circle. This implies that causal reconstruction is possible
to a certain extent (the required input history r will need to be adjusted during implementation)
and the latest accurately reconstructed inputs will be delayed somewhat as shown in Figure 3.50.
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Figure 3.49: Aileron Deflection: rδA(s) response function, z-plane pole (+) zero (o) plot, showing mixed
phase zeros inside and outside the unit circle.
Figure 3.50: Aileron Input Reconstruction (mixed), representing a mixed phase system with growing
unobservable input components shown by the deviation between inputs.
Flaperon Deflection
∆x˙δF =

−0.3567 0.0033 −0.7765 0.3633
−11.1230 −7.1656 2.2419 0
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0 1 −0.0169 0
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rδF =
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 (3.43)
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Selecting the yaw rate rδF to observe the effect of the flaperon input was inspired by the Roll
Angle Lateral Controller, the output was selected based on the time taken for the unobservable
components to die out and the quality of the reconstruction. When inspecting the state space
matrices (3.42, 3.43), it is clearly evident that a mathematical relationship exists between the
input, the state r and the measured output rδF . Applying MATLAB’s ss2tf function gives the
following transfer function:
rδR(s)
δR(s)
=
(s+ 3.2386)(s− 3.7116)(s− 16.2006)
(s− 0.0797)(s+ 7.1537)(s+ 0.8186± j4.0952) (3.44)
Using MATLAB’s pzmap function generated the following pole zero plots in the continuous and
discrete domains shown in Figures 3.51 and 3.52 respectively.
Figure 3.51: Flaperon Deflection: rδR(s) response function, s-plane pole (+) zero (o) plot, showing mixed-
phase zeros on both halves complex plane.
Figure 3.52: Flaperon Deflection: rδR(s) response function, z-plane pole (+) zero (o) plot, showing mixed
phase zeros inside and outside the unit circle.
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Upon inspecting the transfer function, it is evident that there is no zero on the unit circle which
can be seen in the pole zero plot shown in Figure 3.51 and that the state space representation is a
system with both minimum and non minimum phase zeros as can be seen in Figure 3.52 because
there zeros are inside and outside the unit circle. This implies that causal reconstruction is possible
to a certain extent and the latest accurately reconstructed inputs will be delayed somewhat as
shown in Figure 3.53. In the case of the flaperons, the input state matrices are different for the
left and right input and the same process is applied in determining the state space representation
needed for input reconstruction.
Figure 3.53: Flaperon Input Reconstruction (causal), representing a mixed phase system with growing
unobservable input components shown by the deviation between inputs.
Signal Processing
We can now extract properties from the estimated control surface deflections having designed esti-
mators based on AIRA. The pertinent modes of operation for the aircraft’s actuators are analysed
in Section 3.4.2. A few signal properties were identified that make it possible to mathematically
distinguish between the different modes of operation given the actual and desired control surface
deflections:
1. deflection average - to determine what the average deflection values are
2. first derivative - to determine when the deflection is constant
3. cross correlation - to quantify the difference between the deflections
Once the actual and desired control surface deflections are available, signal processing functions in
MATLAB can be used to determine the required properties from the deflection signals. Figures 3.54
and 3.55 show the result of signal processing that has been applied to an elevator’s reconstructed
control input deflections in order to determine these properties using the sgolay, xcorr, tsmovavg
MATLAB functions.
The process of extracting these properties begins by first smoothing the reconstructed control
surface deflection given that noise is inherent in practical systems. Once this is done, the moving
average is determined based on the desired window length. This can be an additional step that is
used to further filter the signal. After this is done, the first derivate is calculated followed by the
cross correlation between the actual and desired control surface deflections. The cross correlation
is normalised to the [1,−1] range, to allow for the standardisation of the decision process, and only
the maximum value is used during the decision process. Similar signals will have values closer to 1
and dissimilar signals will have values closer to −1.
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(a) Smoothed input (b) Moving average
Figure 3.54: Smoothing applied to elevator input.
(a) First derivative (b) Cross correlation
Figure 3.55: Statistical properties of elevator input.
3.4.4 Fault Detection in FDIR System
The following table outlines properties that can be used by the Diagnostic System to uniquely
identify the mode of operation of each actuator.
Mode	 Observations	 Constraints	 Rate	
Nominal	 1	correlation	2	derivative	3	average	 correlation	=	0.9	average	=	deflection	 0.9998	Partial	 1	correlation	2	derivative	3	average	 correlation	=	0.7	 2.655e-5	Stuck	 1	correlation	2	derivative	3	average	 correlation	<	0.4	derivative	=	0	average	!=	deflection	 1.810e-5	Hardover	 1	correlation	2	derivative	3	average	 correlation	<	0.4	derivative	=	0	abs(average)	=	max	 3.258e-5	Floating	 1	correlation	2	derivative	3	average	 correlation	<	0.6	derivative	>	0	 4.345e-5	Actuator	modes	of	operation	Table 3.6: Signal properties and failure rates used to identify actuator modes of operation in HyDE.
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Table 3.6 lists the different actuator modes of operation along with the relevant symptom effects
listed as constraints. The Rate column is the probability that each mode of operation will oc-
cur based on the Reliability Analysis already outlined in Section 3.3. It is calculated using the
component failure rate for an actuator and the failure mode distributions for each actuator failure
mode. In HyDE modelling, this column represents the transition probabilities that would be used
to model transitions between modes of operation. The observations column represents all the num-
bered signals or observations (single values) that are used in the decision process at any instant in
time.
The nominal mode of operation is characterised by the actual and desired deflections being equal.
The cross correlation value of 0.9 was chosen as a design decision to allow for slight variation
between the two deflection signals. In addition, it is expected that the average deflection values
will be relatively similar to contrast this mode with the partial loss of effectiveness mode. HyDE is
able to add sensor noise tolerances to observations reported making it easy to take this variation
due to noise into account.
While in the partial loss of effectiveness mode, the control surface deflection varies and there is no
clear limit to how it will vary so comparing the average deflections would not be suitable. However,
since the control surface still attempts to track the signal and since the cross correlation doesn’t
vary significantly depending on the signal’s magnitude, the cross correlation can be used. A slightly
lower value 0.7 is chosen to allow for a greater degree of dissimilarity between the actual and desired
control surface deflections.
The stuck modes of operation are characterised by having a derivative of zero derivative = 0 to
reflect that the deflection is constant. The control surface deflection doesn’t change in response to
the control input anymore. The cross correlation of 0.4 between the actual and desired deflections
is also used to address the case where both the input and the output deflections are relatively
constant. It is desirable that the actual and desired control surface deflections aren’t similar in
order to reduce the occurrence of false alarms. In addition, for the stuck mode in particular, the
average deflection value is used to reflect that the desired and actual deflection values must not be
similar average ! = deflection. For the hardover fault, it is desirable that the average value be at
maximum deflection.
The floating mode of operation is characterised by a control surface deflection that changes ran-
domly. To reflect this we use a cross correlation of 0.6 to reflect the fact that it may vary but in a
similar way to the desired deflection. A higher cross correlation is also used in order to differentiate
between the stuck mode of operation and the floating mode operation. A deflection that varies is
characterised by a derivative that is not equal to zero. We enforce this as a constraint in order for
the floating mode of operation to not be confused with either the partial loss of effectiveness or
stuck modes of operation. This could result in a case where HyDE reports that the control surface
is in the partial mode and then momentarily moves into the floating mode and visa versa.
A high fidelity software in the loop simulation environment is used to test the integrated fault
diagnostic system. This ensures that it will function as expected in the field when used by the
Meraka Modular UAV and Ground Station Operator to maintain stable flight or request diagnoses.
Following is an outline for developing the Meraka’s declarative HyDE models and ways the fault
diagnostic system is used to achieve FDIR functionality.
3.5 Modelling Onboard Subsystems
Following is a description of the process of incrementally translating the Meraka’s subsystem com-
ponents into a diagnosable declarative model.
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3.5.1 Using the GME Tool
In Section 3.4.1 the subsystem components were characterised and system critical components
were selected in order to limit the complexity of constructing the declarative model used for fault
diagnostics. Figure 3.56, shown with Category A and B components highlighted, is the result of this
process and with the FDIR technology integrated, it’s possible to begin the process of generating
the declarative models using the GME Tool.
Figure 3.56: Characterised Subsystem Model, shown with the Category A and B components highlighted
in red and blue respectively.
The first step is to create a list of all the subsystem components to be modelled along with their
component numbers, desired HyDE prefixes and modes of operation as shown in Table 3.7. The
Simulink Model in Section 4.2.2 and the characterised subsystem model shown in Figure 3.56
are used to define the component groupings at the system and subsystem levels. The second step
requires the creation of system level components in HyDE, according to the system level component
names in Table 3.7, along with their port variables and connections as shown in Figure 3.57.
The modelling process for HyDE models created using the GME tool is iterative in a top-down
fashion. Interconnections are initially modelled at the system level with subsystem components
encapsulating the necessary component level detail according to the desired level of abstraction.
Figure 3.57: System level declarative component model of the UAV in GME.
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' Subsystem'Components'#' Component' HyDE'Prefix'(s)' Mode'Aircraft'1.1'–'1.2'
Batteries' aircraft.avionics_battery,'aircraft.backup_battery' nominal'degraded'discharged'unknown'Actuation'
2.1' RC'Receiver' actuation.rc_receiver' on'off'out_range'system_failure'
2.2' Servo'Board' actuation.servo_board' on'off'miscalibrated'unknown'
2.4'–'2.11'
Actuators' actuation.left_aileron,'actuation.right_aileron,'actuation.left_flaperon,'actuation.right_flaperon,'actuation.left_elevator,'actuation.right_elevator,'actuation.left_rudder,'actuation.right_rudder'
off'nominal'partial'stuck'hardover'floating'unknown''Components'and'modes'' 'Table 3.7: Characterised subsystem components to be modelled.
Figure 3.58: Aircraft system level component model in GME.
Figures 3.58 and 3.59 show the aircraft and actuation system level declarative component models
in GME. Both the avionics and backup batteries skeleton component models have been modelled
as well as the RC Receiver, Servo Board and actuator skeleton component models.
The last iterative step in the modelling process consists of adding the component level detail to each
component based on its properties as outlined in the Reliability Analysis in Appendix E. Before
actual modelling in GME can begin, the mode or location, constraints, transitions and transition
probabilities must be defined and extracted from the Reliability Analysis and tabulated. Once this
is done, the process of adding the component level detail to each component becomes trivial.
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Figure 3.59: Actuation system level component model in GME, shown with the Actuators, RC Receiver
and Servo Board.
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3.5.2 Modelling the Batteries
The aircraft subsystem components are the first components to be modelled followed by the ac-
tuation subsystem components. Table 3.8 lists the component level properties for the aircraft’s
batteries. In it, one can find the mode, constraints, transitions and transition rates for both the
avionics battery and the backup battery. The transition rates make it possible for HyDE to rank the
modes in descending order of prior probability when there are multiple consistent candidates. The
transition guards are the constraints in italics and enable HyDE models to actively or autonomously
switch between locations or modes of operation, modes with guards are highlighted.
Avionics'Battery'#' Mode' Constraints' Transitions' Rate'
N' nominal' battery_voltage'='terminal_voltage' E,'I,'U' 0.99998'E' degraded' (battery_voltageGterminal_voltage)/battery_voltage'<='0.7' N,'E,'U' 1.245eG5'I' discharged' terminal_voltage'='0' E,'U' 3.511eG6'U' unknown' ' ' 'Backup'Battery'#' Mode' Constraints' Transitions' Rate'N' nominal' battery_voltage'='terminal_voltage' E,'I,'U' 0.99998'E' degraded' (battery_voltageGterminal_voltage)/battery_voltage'<='0.7' N,'E,'U' 8.330eG6'I' discharged' terminal_voltage'='0' E,'U' 3.240eG6'U' unknown' ' ' ''Avionics'&'Backup'Batteries'modes'of'operation'' 'Table 3.8: Component level proper ies for th aircraft’s batteries, with highlighted constant, input andport variables.
Figure 3.60 is the result of translating the listed component properties in Table 3.8 into a detailed
model that can be simulated. In this model, the battery voltage is defined as a constant and the
terminal voltage is the observed voltage across the battery’s terminals.
Figure 3.60: Subsystem level component model of a battery, with highlighted constant and port variable.
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3.5.3 Modelling the RC Receiver
#	 Mode	 Constraints	 Transitions	 Rate	rc_receiver	O	 on	 voltage	=	voltage_rating	Tx	=	Rx	frame_loss	<=	20	 F,	R,	U	 0.9993	F	 off	 voltage	=	0	Tx	=	0	 O	 0.9993	R	 out_range	 voltage	=	voltage_rating	frame_loss	>	20	&&	frame_loss	<=	100	 O,	F,	U	 3.733e-4	U	 system_failure	 3.1801e-4	rc_receiver.power	P	 primary_power	 obc_voltage	>=	backup_voltage	 S	 1	S	 secondary_power	 backup_voltage	>	obc_voltage	 P	 1	Rc	receiver	modes	of	operation	Table 3.9: Component level properties for the RC receiver.
Table 3.9 lists the component level properties for the RC receiver. The constraints contain the
variables Tx and Rx which are used to represent actuator commands transmitted to the Servo
Board and the mixed actuator commands received from the Servo Board. The RC receiver has the
ability to receive power either directly from the OBC or from the backup battery. This functionality
is modelled using an internal power component within the RC receiver as shown in Table 3.9 and
allows the RC receiver to switch its power source autonomously.
Figure 3.61 is the result of translating the listed component properties in Table 3.9 into a detailed
model that can be simulated. In this model, the frame_loss is a measure of the quality of the
transmission between the controller and the receiver and is reported by the RC receiver onboard the
UAV. Figure 3.62 is the subsystem level component model of the RC receiver showing the power
component with its internal primary_power and secondary_power locations shown in Figure
3.63.
Figure 3.61: Subsystem level component model of the RC receiver’s locations with highlighted input and
output port variables.
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Figure 3.62: Subsystem level component model of the RC receiver showing the power component.
Figure 3.63: The RC receiver’s component model of the power subcomponent with highlighted input and
output port variables.
3.5.4 Modelling the Servo Board
The Servo Board’s functionality resembles that of the RC receiver in many ways as can be seen in
Table 3.10 and Figure 3.64. Both subsystem components have the power subcomponent and make
use of the Tx and Rx variables.
#	 Mode	 Constraints	 Transitions	 Rate	servo_board	O	 on	 voltage	=	voltage_rating	Tx	=	Rx	 F,	M,	U	 0.99998	F	 off	 voltage	=	0	Tx	=	0	 O	 2.76e-6	M	 miscalibrated	 voltage	=	voltage_rating	(Tx-Rx)/Tx	<=	0.9	 O,	F,	U	 9.24e-6	U	 unknown	servo_board.commands	P	 primary_commands	 ap_arm	 S	 1	S	 secondary_commands	 ap_arm	 P	 1	servo_board.power	P	 primary_power	 avionics_voltage	>=	backup_voltage	 S	 1	S	 secondary_power	 backup_voltage	>	avionics_voltage	 P	 1	Servo	board	modes	of	operation	T ble 3.10: Component level properties for the servo board.
The Servo Board also has the ability to receive actuator commands from either the OBC or the
RC Receiver in the same way that it can switch between power sources autonomously and this
behaviour is modelled using the subcomponents shown in Figures 3.65 and 3.67. The servo board’s
commands subcomponent performs the task of switching between receiving commands from the RC
receiver and the OBC based on the transition guard ap_arm shown in Figure 3.66 which signals
whether the auto pilot has been enabled.
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Figure 3.64: Subsystem level component model of the servo board’s locations, with highlighted input
variables.
Figure 3.65: Subsystem level component model of the servo board showing the power component.
Figure 3.66: The servo board’s component model of the commands subcomponent, with highlighted input
and output port variables.
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Figure 3.67: Subsystem level component model of the servo board showing the commands component,
with highlighted input and output port variables.
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3.5.5 Modelling the Actuators
#	 Mode	 Constraints	 Transitions	 Rate	
N	 nominal	 voltage	=	voltage_rating	correlation	=	0.9	average	=	deflection	 O,	P,	S,	H,	F,	U	 0.9998	P	 partial	 voltage	=	voltage_rating	correlation	=	0.7	 N,	S,	H,	F,	U	 2.655e-5	
S	 stuck	 voltage	=	voltage_rating	correlation	<	0.4	derivative	=	0	average	!=	deflection	 N,	P,	H,	F,	U	 1.810e-5	
H	 hardover	 voltage	=	voltage_rating	correlation	<	0.4	derivative	=	0	average	=	max	 N,	P,	S,	F,	U	 3.258e-5	F	 floating	 voltage	=	voltage_rating	correlation	<	0.6	derivative	>	0	 N,	P,	S,	H,	U	 4.345e-5	O	 off	 voltage	=	0	 N	U	 unknown	actuator	modes	of	operation	Table 3.11: Component level properties for the actuators.
Figure 3.68: Subsystem level component model of the actuator, with highlighted constants, input and
output port variables.
The component level properties, listed in Table 3.11, for the actuators are based on the work done in
Section 3.4 since their diagnoses depend on observations reported using signals generated by smart
adapters. The result of modelling these component level properties for the actuators is shown in
Figure 3.68. The voltage_rating and max constants represent the rated DC voltage and max
deflections for the actuator. The last step in the modelling process consists of testing the model
using scenarios and exporting it into an XML file that can be read by the diagnostic program. We
now move onto describing how HyDE enables autonomous fault diagnostics.
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3.6 Overview
An introduction and overview to HyDE is given in this chapter. The Hybrid Diagnosis Engine
(HyDE) is used to give the Meraka Modular UAV the ability to diagnose faults and detect changes
in its subsystem components. HyDE is investigated using a concrete example of a simplified heating
system within the context of a HyDE model, harness and scenario. The reasoning process HyDE
applies to diagnosis is also discussed.
Input reconstruction using the Approximate Input Reconstruction Algorithm (AIRA), based on
the parity space approach, is investigated using examples outlining its behaviour under certain
conditions. In this research, AIRA is used to estimate inputs that are compared with commanded
values. The investigation of AIRA results in a novel way of implementing the algorithm to create
SISO based smart adapters, mentioned in Chapter 4, designed based on the aircraft’s inner control
loops. It is discovered that accurate input reconstruction is possible using the UAV’s linearised
aircraft model with outputs generated with modulated sinusoidal inputs of any size and poor
reconstruction results for constant input signals.
Subsystem characterisation is done through a simplified Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA)
and Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) and culminates in the creation of a Hazards Analysis Matrix (HAM)
that is divided into three end event categories. This is done as a means of guiding the fault modelling
and identification process that follows.
The fault modelling and identification process requires a clearly defined description of the functional
relationships that exist between subsystem components. This is followed by the selection of system
critical components and is followed by an overview of the pertinent modes of operation for each
selected component. The mechanisms behind the identification of the modes of operation are then
defined before presenting a blueprint for constructing the declarative model in the fault diagnostic
engine using the Generic Modelling Environment Tool (GME).
The process of incrementally translating the UAV’s subsystem components into a diagnosable
declarative model is given. This process is based on the use of the characterised subsystem model
and the Generic Modelling Environment (GME) Tool. Selected models that have an observable
impact on Category A and B end event effects are modelled and these include the batteries, RC
receiver, servo board and actuators (control surfaces).
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Chapter 4
System Integration
An expandable FDIR architecture is developed to facilitate the addition of more FDIR methods in
an effort to allow the fault diagnostic system’s functionality to be enhanced easily. The architecture
is integrated based on the design of a simplified Integrated Vehicle Health Management (IVHM)
System. This system consists of a Diagnostic Agent built into the ESL’s custom Ground Station,
the Meraka Modular UAV, and a Diagnostic System that runs off a Model B+ Raspberry Pi.
4.1 Expandable FDIR Architecture
Building a model based diagnostic system requires that the control engineer have a good idea
of how to design and build models suited to the diagnosis task. In many cases, the diagnosis
problem is not clearly defined and having the flexibility to experiment with different kinds of models
and modelling strategies is paramount. This is where having an expandable FDIR architecture
becomes an advantage. Following is an overview of the IVHM architecture and corresponding
system configuration as well as the SIL configuration used to develop the integrated system.
4.1.1 IVHM Architecture
In the simplified IVHM architecture Figure 4.1, described in Section 1.3, the Diagnostic System runs
off a Model B+ Raspberry Pi which can be connected to the Meraka Modular UAV to communicate
with the OBC either directly using its PiCAN Interface Board or via ethernet. The Ground Station
software is being used as the foundation for the Diagnostic Agent along with a few modifications.
On-board Communication Systems
Subsystem Subsystem· · · 
Diagnostic
System
Ground Communication Systems
Diagnostic
Agent
Fault History
Repository
Wireless Comms Link
Figure 4.1: Simplified IVHM Architecture, showing the complementary Diagnostic Agent and System.
With the Diagnostic System installed onboard the UAV, it can not only perform the diagnosis task
in real time, it can also communicate with the other systems onboard as part of a fault mitigation
strategy. The Diagnostic System utilises the onboard communications system to communicate with
the OBC and the existing wireless comms link to communicate with and receive commands from
the Diagnostic Agent which complements the functionality of the Diagnostic Agent on ground.
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4.1.2 Integrated System
Diagnostic System (Computer)
Meraka UAV /
Simulated Aircraft
Augmented
Estimator
HyDE
System
Inputs
System
Outputs
Diagnostic Agent 
(Output & Control 
Interface)
Sensor Data &
Commands
Sensor Data &
Commands
Figure 4.2: IVHM System Configuration, showing the flow of information between systems.
For HyDE to perform diagnosis, the system shown in Figure 4.2 is developed to realise the IVHM
System Architecture shown in Figure 4.1.The estimation system shown in Figure 4.2 is augmented
in order to derive additional observations representing for example actuator deflections based on
the available estimated system states and sensor measurements. The approach used to derive
these additional measurements is based on the Approximate Input Reconstruction Algorithm as
described in Chapter 3.
4.1.3 SIL Configuration
CAN
Pressure & 
Magnetometer IMU
Servo 
Board
RC 
ReceiverAircraft Actuators
Avionics
Diagnostic
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HIL 
Board
MATLAB
Diagnostic
System
Servo
Commands
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Pilot & Servo
Commands
Sensor Data,
Commands
Sensor Data,
Commands
RFSerial
Sensor Data,
Commands
TCP
Sensor
Data
Sensor
Data
Serial
Figure 4.3: HIL Configuration, showing the complete test-bed system highlighting SIL components.
The HIL Configuration shown in Figure 4.3 above is the test-bed system used to develop the
Diagnostic System and Diagnostic Agent using the Meraka UAV’s onboard subsystems and HIL
Board shown with a dashed outline. With the use of this configuration, it becomes possible to
integrate and test the target system with the Raspberry PI connected. Before this process can
begin, SIL based development and testing needs to be done by decoupling the components in the
shaded region from the rest of the target system.
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Figure 4.4: SIL Configuration, highlighting the assembled technology for each system.
SIL based development and testing requires assembling the SIL configuration shown in Figure 4.4
with the different systems, subsystem components and communications interfaces between them.
Following is an overview of how these components are integrated within the context of the simplified
IVHM System being assembled.
4.2 Simulation Environment
We now give an overview of the functionality that is enabled by the simulation environment within
the context of the simplified IVHM System being assembled.
4.2.1 System Integration
MATLAB serves as the mediator between the Diagnostic Agent and Diagnostic System to facilitate
the exchange of information into and out of the simulation environment. It does this through a
mex s-function which is executed at every time step during simulation. It allows a serial connection
to be established with the Ground Station and an ethernet connection to be established with the
diagnostic program during SIL based development and testing.
4.2.2 Simulink Model
Figure 4.5: Button allocation on the game controller.
As part of the SIL setup, manual control of the Meraka UAV within the simulation environment
is simulated using the game controller. The game controller’s joysticks and controls are assigned
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functions which correspond with the inputs needed by the simulated aircraft as shown in Figure 4.5.
The control outputs from the game controller for the left and right actuator inputs are combined
to ensure that the UAV remains balanced during flight.
Figure 4.6: Simulink Model of the Meraka Modular UAV.
The Simulink model, shown in Figure 4.6, simulates the nonlinear aircraft dynamics and com-
municates with the diagnostic program and ground station using the mex s-function. The main
components in the Simulink model are:
• aircraft model - a non-linear model of the Meraka Modular UAV
• sensor model - a sensor model which packages simulation values as sensor data
• controller & diagnostics - the control and diagnostics block which contains a modified HIL
block and interface to the game controller
• servo model - models of the aircraft’s actuators that simulate the responses of the servos and
motors used on board
• data visualisation - the sim visualisation which is used for data logging and interfacing the
Simulink model with the QTGLEngine
4.2.3 MATLAB GUI
A closer look at the SIL setup is shown in Figure 4.7 with a MATLAB GUI on the left and the QT-
GLEngine on the right. The MATLAB GUI is used to control the simulation, configure MATLAB
and display sensor measurements generated using the Simulink model of the aircraft. These mea-
surements are then used to verify the performance of the Diagnostic System. The simulated aircraft
component grouping groups functions that configure the simulated aircraft. Callback functions are
used to setup the Simulink model’s parameters by loading constants and aircraft parameters and
open the QTGL Engine to visualise the Meraka Modular UAV using the outputs from the non
linear aircraft block. The simulation component grouping groups functions that adjust the aircraft
simulation parameters. The data source for simulation can be toggled between flight data or the
data from the non linear aircraft model. It is also possible to send commands to the Simulink model
to start and stop the simulation. The measurements component grouping groups functions that
make it possible to inspect the actuator deflections either for each actuator or all the actuators.
Callback functions generate figures from data that has been logged during the operation of the
simulation for the rudders, elevators, ailerons and flaps. Additional actuator specific measurements
that are shown are the first derivative, correlation and average.
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Figure 4.7: Meraka Modular UAV simulation using MATLAB and QT.
4.3 Diagnostic Agent
We now give an overview of the functionality that is enabled by the Diagnostic Agent within the
context of the simplified IVHM System being assembled.
4.3.1 System Integration
The Diagnostic Agent or Ground Station has several options for connecting with other systems.
These include serial and ethernet connections that are used to communicate with the UAV via an
RF connection and a TCP server for data logging. One of the available serial com ports have been
assigned for use with MATLAB and allow the Ground Station to connect to MATLAB through the
mex s-function via an emulated serial com port. Any data that needs to be sent to the Diagnostic
System via the UAV goes through MATLAB.
4.3.2 Existing Modules
Existing modules in the Ground Station’s stack were adapted in order to incorporate the func-
tionality needed by the Diagnostics GUI. Any callback functions that are triggered through the UI
are translated into commands that can be sent to the Diagnostic System through the UAV. The
functionality to also translate the data received from the Diagnostic Agent into information that
can be visualised on the interface is also contained within these adapted modules.
4.3.3 Diagnostics GUI
The Diagnostic Panel, shown in Figure 4.8 with a red border, in the Ground Station was modified
to reflect the added functionality delivered by HyDE. The main component groupings include the
scenario, diagnostics, time, stage, system schematic and HyDE panels. The scenario panel is used
to setup the sample time, sleep time, total time, faults, and sensor noise diagnostics parameters.
These parameters are used by the diagnostic program when creating and managing the HyDE
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Figure 4.8: Diagnostics Panel on the Ground Station.
instance that runs on the Raspberry PI. The fault injection scheduler in the diagnostic program
receives commands from the Diagnostic Agent and commands the OBC; data monitors or smart
adapters in the augmented estimator to simulate the fault until commanded to remove it.
The diagnostic panel is used to start or stop, and pause or resume the execution of a scenario based
on the scenario’s execution parameters entered in the scenario panel. The time and stage panels
are indicators received from the diagnostic program representing the execution time in seconds of
the simulation and the status or stage of execution of the diagnostic program.
The HyDE panel allows the Ground Station operator to activate and deactivate the execution of the
HyDE instance in the diagnostic program. The diagnoses are also listed in the form of a candidate
set that specifies the state of each component which includes its name, location, prior probability
at the requested time step. The system schematic is updated each time a diagnosis in the form of a
candidate set is sent from the diagnostic system based on the mode or location of each component.
4.4 Diagnostic System
We now give an overview of the functionality that is enabled by the Diagnostic System within the
context of the simplified IVHM System being assembled.
4.4.1 System Integration
The Model B+ Raspberry PI, shown in Figure 4.9, with Raspian OS is used as the computational
platform that the diagnostic program runs off. It communicates with the Diagnostic Agent and the
rest of the subsystems onboard the UAV using ethernet and has the option of also using the PiCAN
expansion board to connect to the CAN (Controller Area Network). Sensor data and commands
are fetched directly from the OBC instead of the individual components. Each component onboard
the UAV reports its own status directly to the OBC. When the OBC receives data from each
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component, it first transforms this data into a usable form before it sends it to the Ground Station.
The Diagnostic System leverages access to the OBC to get the sensor measurements instead of
repeating the same task that is performed by the OBC. Collecting observations in this way allows
the Diagnostic System to focus on performing diagnoses instead of transforming data collected from
onboard subsystems into usable form.
Figure 4.9: Model B+ Raspberry PI with PiCAN Expansion Board.
4.4.2 Processing and Logging
Boost PiCAN
Utilities
System I/O
Main
HyDE
Figure 4.10: Functional overview of the diagnostic program.
Figure 4.10 shows a functional overview of the components in the diagnostic program. The main
function in the diagnostic program responds to program requests from the Diagnostic Agent or
UAV and activates the diagnostic program’s subroutines accordingly. In addition to maintaining
the execution time, the diagnostic program’s processing and logging layer packages the reported
diagnoses so that they can be transmitted to the Ground Station.
Additional components of interest within the Diagnostic Program are System I/O, Boost, PiCAN ,
Utilities and HyDE blocks. The System I/O block serves the function of abstracting away
the implementation level detail necessary for the Diagnostic Program to interact with the rest of
the IVHM System on behalf of the main function. The Boost and PiCAN blocks enable the
Diagnostic Program to communicate using either ethernet or the CAN bus. The Utilities block
contains additional logic that enables the Diagnostic Program to leverage access to the Boost
Library in order to perform functions such as creating and synchronising threads. The HyDE
block deals directly with the HyDE instance that is instantiated and houses the logic necessary for
the Augmented Estimator to perform its task as mediator.
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The Augmented Estimator and the Fault Injection Scheduler, shown in Figure 4.11, are arguably the
most important elements of the Diagnostic System’s Diagnostic Program. For HyDE to function, it
needs to be able to receive data in the form of observations that are meaningful for the diagnosis task
at hand. This is the function that the Augmented Estimator provides by being the synchronised
mediator between HyDE and the rest of the IVHM System. The Fault Injection Scheduler’s function
is to take over control from the OBC when needed in order to simulate the desired faults for the
particular scenario being simulated. Once the simulated fault has reached the end of its lifetime,
the Fault Injection Scheduler will stop simulating the fault and relinquish control over the relevant
component by commanding the OBC to resume standard operational control over the component.
Diagnostic System (Computer)
Meraka UAV /
Simulated Aircraft
Augmented
Estimator
HyDE
Sensor Data &
Commands
System
Inputs
System
Outputs
Fault Injection
Scheduler
Data Monitor &
Smart Adapters
Figure 4.11: Meraka Modular UAV HyDE Interface.
Data monitors and smart adapters, shown in Figure 4.12, are used to prepare observations to be
reported in HyDE and run in different threads of execution. They simulate sensor noise when
commanded by the Fault Injection Scheduler and convert sensor data from the UAV into a usable
form and use it to estimate or calculate additional data that can be reported as observations.
These observations are reported to the HyDE instance in the next level of the diagnostic program’s
stack. Smart adapters can also be additional FDIR methods that produce diagnosis results that
can be reported to HyDE in order to reason about the system. Smart adapters are used for signal
processing using the incoming sensor data in order to simulate sensor noise and calculate the first
derivative, correlation and actuator deflection averages after smoothing the reconstructed input.
HyDEData Monitor
Smart 
Adapters
Smart 
Adapters
...
Diagnosis
Figure 4.12: HyDE Interface, shown with data monitor and smart adapters.
97
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
Integration with the Diagnostic Program is done by using code generated with MATLAB’s code
generator to obviate the need for the integration of additional processing and logging APIs. The
actuator deflections are determined by calculating the reconstructed inputs using an implementation
of AIRA, shown in Algorithm 1, repurposed for real time execution coupled with a digital FIR low
pass filter designed using MATLAB’s pwelch and dsp.LowpassF ilter functions.
Algorithm 1 Real time approximate input reconstruction
1: procedure realtimeAIRA
2: initialise:
3: initialise system variables
4: initialise aira variables
5: calculate hankel matrix
6: calculate moorepenroseinverse matrix
7: publish state ’initialised’
8: while if outputbuffer is not full:
9: outputbuffer← sample
10: samplecount← samplecount + 1
11: if outputbuffer is full publish state ’ready’
12: while state is ’ready’ and samplecount = length (ouputbuffer):
13: outputbuffer ← shift(outputbuffer, 1)
14: outputbuffer(lastsample) ← sample
15: window ← filter(outputbuffer)
16: window ← shift(reconstructinput(window), delay)
17: inputbuffer ← shift(inputbuffer, delay)
18: inputbuffer ← latestsample(window)
19: smoothedinput ← smoothing(inputbuffer)
20: inputsignal ← latestsample(smoothedinput)
21: correlationsignal ← max(xcorrelation(smoothedinput))
22: averagesignal ← latestsample(average(smoothedinput))
23: derivativesignal ← latestsample(derivative(smoothedinput))
The smart adapters that incorporate a realtime version of AIRA need to be initialised before they
can be used in real time. We know from the theory behind AIRA that given the size of the Hankel
matrix, calculating the Moore-Penrose Inverse will take a long time which isn’t sufficient for near
real time calculation. Once the smart adapters are initialised, output data from the sensors is
buffered before the reconstructed input and signals can become available.
4.4.3 HyDE Interface
The HyDE layer in the Diagnostic Program’s stack creates and controls the HyDE instance and
loads the harness and model files generated using the GME Tool. The fault injection scheduler
is used to inject simulated faults into the system and coordinates this using the execution time
maintained in the processing and logging layer. Depending on the type of fault, the data from the
processing and logging layer is either modified or commands are sent to the UAV to fail specific
components.
Observations directly from the OBC or smart adapters through the processing and logging layer
are reported to HyDE at 50Hz or at a sample rate specified using the Diagnostic Agent. The main
function of the HyDE interface layer is to correctly report the sensor data to HyDE and ensure
that it corresponds to observations that are relevant to the system being simulated. Diagnoses
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are requested and sent at the sampling frequency set by the Ground Station Operator. Before the
requested diagnoses can be sent, they are first converted into candidate set objects from which vital
information about the subsystem can be extracted such as locations and the values of the variables
for each component.
4.5 Automated Fault Diagnosis
Following is a description of how HyDE is used to enable both autonomous fault diagnosis and
automated aircraft reconfiguration.
4.5.1 Monitoring Aircraft Behaviour
Automating the process of monitoring the behaviour of the UAV depends partly on tracking the
state of the system while it’s operating which is enabled through the use of HyDE. The other part
of the process involves processing and visualising this information in an actionable way. A straight
forward way to do this is by using indicators that encapsulate desired states of components and
conventionally this is done using printouts of the values of variables or coloured labels representing
a component’s state being either nominal, faulty or warning.
Figure 4.13: Diagnostic Agent’s system schematic representing the UAV’s subsystems.
Figure 4.13 shows a screenshot from the Ground Station’s Diagnostic’s interface and in it one can
see a system schematic which represents the subsystem components of the Meraka Modular UAV.
The interface to the Diagnostic System is accessible graphically using the Ground Station Software
which represents the Diagnostic Agent. Each time the Diagnostic Agent receives diagnoses from
the Diagnostic System, it changes the colour of the relevant component on the Ground Station
to either red, yellow, or green which represents either a known or unknown fault or a nominal
location for each component respectively.
4.5.2 Performing Fault Isolation
Automated Fault Diagnosis is achieved through the use of both the Diagnostic System and Diag-
nostic Agent. The Diagnostic System is configured using the scenario panel and the diagnosis panel
as shown in Figure 4.14. The interface allows the vehicle operator to send commands to the Diag-
nostic System and receive status updates. Sensors can be configured, diagnoses can be saved and
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Figure 4.14: Diagnostic Agent’s Scenario and Diagnostics Interface to HyDE.
faults can also be injected into the various components. Faults detected at each time step are listed
in the HyDE panel along with the fault probability. The reported diagnoses are transformed to
represent the state of the system using colour-coded labels for the respective on-board subsystems.
4.6 Utilising Fault-Free Subsystems
An effective method for detecting and utilising fault-free subsystems is needed to ensure the safety
and reliability of the Meraka Modular UAV during flight missions. This process begins with fault
diagnosis and is followed by aircraft reconfiguration. We now briefly discuss the mechanisms that
will enable the UAV to perform these functions autonomously.
4.6.1 Reconfiguring the Aircraft
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Figure 4.15: Meraka Modular UAV HyDE Interface.
The UAV is connected directly, as shown in red in Figure 4.15, to the Diagnostic System. This
enables it to request diagnoses on demand or in real time and to also get an overall impression
of the state of the system and the subsystem components using HyDE during the fault diagnosis
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stage shown in red in Figure 4.16. This information, once extracted from the diagnoses reported by
HyDE, can be used by the aircraft’s guidance system or system supervisor operating in the OBC
to make adjustments to the way the subsystem components are used during the reconfiguration
stage shown in yellow in Figure 4.16. This could for instance include switching the power source to
the backup batteries or even notifying the control system about actuators that are malfunctioning
which could result in the activation of the control allocation optimisation algorithm to compensate
for actuator stuck faults.
Flight 
Mission
Perform Fault
Detection
Perform Fault
Isolation
Reconfigure
Aircraft
Maintain 
Stable Flight
Fault Diagnosis
Figure 4.16: Operational stages in FDIR.
The implementation of the stages shown in yellow and green in Figure 4.16 are beyond scope of this
research project and will be enabled in future iterations of the developed fault diagnostic system
and modified target system based on the design of an IVHM System.
4.6.2 Maintaining Stable Flight
The development of the FDIR system began with an outline, listed in Chapter 1, of the stages that
describe the operation of an FDIR System as shown Figure 4.16. We now briefly put into context
how the FDIR system, based on HyDE, enables the UAV to maintain stable flight shown in green
in Figure 4.16.
At this stage the UAV’s system supervisor, shown in Figure 4.17, will have been instructed to use
the new system configuration as the new model for the aircraft in order to maintain stable flight.
Figure 4.17: Supervised Fault Tolerant Control, adapted from [50].
With the FDI component at the center of the supervised fault tolerant control system, the reliability
and adaptability of the system is increased. The end result of using HyDE within this context is
that the flight mission is able proceed until such a time that there is a significant change in the
aircraft’s behaviour.
An important issue to take note of during the last stage, shown in green in Figure 4.16, is that the
relevant systems onboard the UAV must be aware of the new system configuration and have the
flight mission adapted accordingly. This adaptation needs to be prioritised based on the end effect
mitigation procedures defined during the Reliability Analysis done before the fault modelling and
identification process. This needs to be done in order to make system reconfiguration effective in
reducing potentially adverse end effect events most notably an uncontrolled landing.
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4.7 Overview
In this chapter an expandable FDIR architecture is developed to facilitate the addition of more
FDIR methods in an effort to allow the fault diagnostic system’s functionality to be enhanced easily.
The architecture is integrated based on the design of a simplified Integrated Vehicle Health Manage-
ment (IVHM) System. An overview of the IVHM architecture, corresponding system configuration
as well as the SIL configuration used to develop the integrated system is given.
The simulation environment based on MATLAB serves as the mediator between the Diagnostic
Agent and Diagnostic System. It also allows the control engineer to test the fault diagnostic
system being developed. A Simulink Model is used to simulate the non linear dynamics of the
aircraft using a repurposed game controller, MATLAB GUI and QTGLEngine.
The Diagnostic Agent or Ground Station is used as the command central that sends instructions to
the UAV from the ground station operator’s computer. It has several options for connecting with
other systems and connects with the MATLAB based simulation environment through a virtual
serial port. A brand new Diagnostics GUI was built into the Ground Station to monitor the UAV
and detect faults and changes in subsystems in real time.
The Diagnostic System built on the Model B+ Raspberry Pi is used to perform diagnoses onboard
the Meraka Modular UAV. It communicates with the Diagnostic Agent and the rest of the sub-
systems onboard the UAV using ethernet and has the option of also using the PiCAN expansion
board to connect to the CAN (Controller Area Network). Data monitors and smart adapters that
implement a real time version of AIRA are used to perform input reconstruction and report obser-
vations to the HyDE instance instantiated in the diagnostic program. In Chapter 5, the declarative
subsystem component models for the UAV are developed for use in the fault diagnostic system.
A description of how HyDE is used to enable both autonomous fault diagnosis and automated
aircraft reconfiguration is given. This includes a description of how the process of monitoring the
behaviour of the UAV and performing fault isolation is automated. The Diagnostic Agent’s brand
new diagnostic interface is described and includes a scenario, diagnostics and a system schematic
panel that updates in real time representing the states of the UAV’s onboard subsystems.
The process of utilising fault-free subsystems begins with fault diagnosis and is followed by aircraft
reconfiguration. The mechanisms that enable the UAV to perform these functions autonomously
are described. These include the reconfiguration of the aircraft and maintaining stable flight in the
presence of a modified system configuration. In Chapter 6 system tests are performed using the
integrated fault diagnostic engine and declarative models of the Meraka Modular UAV’s critical
subsystems.
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Chapter 5
System Tests
As part of the system testing process, we begin by defining the test conditions and then describe
how the developed fault diagnostic system is tested extensively by deliberately failing the UAV’s
actuators during simulated flight. The performance of the system is then verified by using flight
test data collected by the Meraka Modular UAV during flight missions.
5.1 Test Conditions
Defining the test conditions begins by describing the link between the theoretical model of the UAV
and the physical aircraft. Focus can then be shifted toward specifying the flight trajectory followed
by the aircraft and the various hypotheses that need to be tested and the performance measures
used.
5.1.1 Physical Aircraft
Figure 5.1: An image of the Meraka Modular UAV.
The mathematical model developed in Chapter 2 that describes the dynamics of the Meraka Mod-
ular UAV, shown in Figure 5.1, is based on the use of AVL software. The declarative models for
HyDE and the state space representations used in AIRA are also based on the mathematical model
of the aircraft. It is important to analyse the UAV’s structure, shown in Figure 5.2 in order to
gain insight into how the actuators behave. The aircraft’s reference system is defined according
to the control surface deflection δ and location in the wings and tail, and anticipated flight based
on the geometric structure in Figure 5.2. The size of all control surfaces on the UAV are small
relative to the size of each structure that they are housed in. Hypotheses are evaluated by reporting
observations derived from the behaviour of the actuators and other components during tests.
It is evident that the moments caused by the deflection of the elevators relative to the yB axis are
large by observing where the elevators are relative to the rest of the UAV. It is expected that the
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Figure 5.2: A geometric model of the Meraka Modular UAV showing components of interest and the
associated reference system.
best FDI performance will result from using the pitch rate p and that it will be difficult for the
FDIR system to discern between the left and right elevators because of the aircraft’s symmetry.
Similarly, the rudders also produce small moments around the xB axis but produce larger moments
about the zB axis. It is expected that the best FDI performance will result from using the yaw
rate r combined with another observable property affected by the rudder’s deflection.
The ailerons and flaperons produce large moments about the xB axis and their combined effect
affects both the aircraft’s roll and yaw rates given that the rudder has a smaller effect on the yaw
rate r. However in light of this, it is expected that the best FDI performance will result form using
a combination of the roll rate p and the yaw rates r. It is also expected that it will be difficult for
the FDIR system to discern between the left and right control surfaces as the combined effect of
the control surfaces result in the observed behaviour the aircraft exhibits.
An accurate mathematical model of the UAV should exhibit the same characteristics observed from
the geometric model and these can be readily seen by inspecting the state space matrices, written
in Section 2.5.4, calculated at trim.
5.1.2 Flight Trajectory
Flight tests are a crucial part of validating the effectiveness of the design and development process.
The following flight tests were conducted in [38] to test the performance of the FDIR system:
1. Simulate actuator stuck faults at 0◦
2. Simulate actuator stuck faults at 2.5◦.
The control reallocation system developed in [7] was tested at 2.5◦ intervals to solve the control
optimisation problem for faulty actuators within a 0◦ to 15◦ deflection range. As a consequence
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of this, in the previous research project [38], the decision was made to simulate and test FDI
performance for 0◦ and 2.5◦ stuck faults. Given that the same flight test data collected in [38] is
reused, the same stuck in place faults are simulated in this research project as well. The flight tests
were conducted at the Helderberg Radio Flyers Club in the Western Cape South Africa [38]. The
actuators on the aircraft were failed deliberately for the durations specified and flight test data was
collected using onboard sensors. During the flight tests, it is reported that the wind velocity was
more than the anticipated 2 m/s velocity and the minimum and maximum wind gusts were 2.3
and 7.7 m/s respectively. The FDI system needs to take these into account to ensure effective FDI
performance.
Figure 5.3: Flight trajectory, adapted from [38].
The ESL’s UAV pilot took on the role of the UAV’s control system as shown in Figure 1.8. The
UAV was flown in the flight trajectory shown in Figure 5.3. No faults were injected into the UAV
for half the time it was on the track (30 seconds). For the other half of the time it was on the
track (30 seconds), faults were injected into the UAV for specific durations. This flight sequence
was repeated until all tests were completed.
5.1.3 Scenarios
Structuring the approach used to test the FDIR system is crucial for gaining reproducible and
specific insights in an effective manner. These particular scenarios were chosen in [38] to investigate
the FDI performance at different levels of actuator excitation as well as flight trajectory. The
performance of the FDI methods compared in [38] depends on the use of residuals in order to
inform the fault decisions that are taken concerning the existence of a fault. It was found that an
increase in actuator excitation (due to process noise or flight manoeuvres) makes the existence of
faults more prominent [38]. This improves FDI performance by making it easier to identify active
fault scenarios due to an increase in the variance of the residuals generated by each FDD method.
The following scenarios were generated in order to test certain hypotheses:
1. Straight and level flight with minimal process noise.
• It is hypothesised that poor FDI performance will result as a consequence of minimal
process noise which decreases the variance of the residuals used.
2. Circular flight path that closely resembles flight test trajectory.
• It is hypothesised that poor FDI performance will result when the aircraft performs
manoeuvres that deviate significantly from trim working point designed for.
3. Arbitrary flight mission that induces actuator excitation.
• It is hypothesised that FDI performance improves as a consequence of additional actuator
excitation due to the additional actuator excitation from the flight manoeuvres.
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4. Straight and level flight with substantial process noise.
• It is hypothesised that FDI performance improves as a consequence of substantial process
noise which increases actuator excitation and the variance of the residuals used.
Actuator deflections need to be shown and it is desirable that fault decisions made by the FDIR
system follow the real scenarios as closely as possible. It is expected that high levels of process
noise and unmodelled dynamics may affect the outcome. According to [38], the following flight test
event summaries shown in Table 5.1 were performed where simulations of Flight Test 1 are done
according to Scenario 4 and Flight Test 2 according to Scenario 1 unless stated otherwise.
Flight	Test	One	Start	Time	(s)	 End	Time	(s)	 Event	Description	35.6	 65.6	 Fail	left	aileron	at	0°	 stuck	90.32	 123.52	 Fail	right	aileron	at	0°	 stuck	146.84	 180.92	 Fail	left	elevator	at	0°	from	trim	 stuck	204.44	 236.92	 Fail	right	elevator	at	0°	from	trim	 stuck	261.76	 292.12	 Fail	left	rudder	at	0°	 stuck	316.32	 347.36	 Fail	right	rudder	at	0°	 stuck	Flight	Test	Two	Start	Time	(s)	 End	Time	(s)	 Event	Description	28.96	 63.4	 Fail	left	aileron	at	+2.5°	 stuck	87.72	 120.70	 Fail	right	aileron	at	+2.5°	 stuck	145	 182.2	 Fail	left	elevator	at	-2.5°	from	trim	 stuck	204.6	 238.7	 Fail	right	elevator	at	-2.5°	from	trim	 stuck	263.2	 289.08	 Fail	left	rudder	at	+2.5°	 stuck	311.44	 339.6	 Fail	right	rudder	at	+2.5°	 stuck	Flight	test	event	summary	Table 5.1: First and second flight test event descriptions.
5.1.4 Performance Measures
It is necessary to identify specific standardised performance measures that can be used when eval-
uating the performance and quality of the developed fault diagnostic system. The quality of an
FDIR system can be determined in the following ways according to [20]:
• false alarm rate - spurious faults per unit time announced
• missed detection rate - rates per unit time that faults are missed
• fault sensitivity - fault magnitude required in non-nominal location
• detection time - time taken to report or isolate non-nominal locations
• robustness - stability of the diagnostic performance in the presence of noise.
Please see Sections 1.3.3 and 1.3.5 for a description of the test conditions in addition to those
reflected by the reconstructed actuator inputs shown for each flight test. Modulated control input
signals (sinusoidal) are used as actuator inputs during model development for component testing
only and not during system tests. Actuator excitation is varied from zero to three degrees [38] in
order to determine fault sensitivity and to determine robustness, the aerodynamic stability and
process noise is varied in the MATLAB Simulation.
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5.2 Simulation Tests
Simulated flight based hypothesis testing begins with an evaluation of the effectiveness of the input
reconstruction algorithm. This is followed by an analysis of the simulation results and the FDI
performance of the fault diagnostic system.
5.2.1 Reconstructed Inputs
In conventional flight, the aircraft’s flight envelope is limited to trim condition. From the scenarios
listed in Section 5.1.3, straight and level flight most closely resembles conventional aircraft flight
and it is with this in mind that the effectiveness of the input reconstruction algorithm is evaluated.
Consider the reconstructed inputs representing estimated and actual actuator deflections, shown in
Figure 5.4, that are produced through a simulation resembling the first flight test event description
in Table 5.1. It is evident that the actuator deflections are accurately reconstructed with a consistent
reconstruction delay even during faults. Note that the left and right actuator deflections are similar
by design and provisions were made, see Section 3.4.3, for the future integration of AFTC methods
or position sensors to enable the Diagnostic System to discern between the control surfaces.
Figure 5.4: Reconstructed actuator deflections produced during simulations of straight and level flight with
process noise (2 m/s wind velocity).
Consider the reconstructed inputs representing actuator deflections, as shown in Figure 5.5, pro-
duced during a simulation resembling the second flight test event description in Table 5.1. It is
important to notice that AIRA’s ability to estimate the control surface deflection is not affected
by the occurrence of faults since the states observed are related to the aircraft’s flight dynamics.
5.2.2 Simulation Results
Having considered the effectiveness of the input reconstruction algorithm, we now move onto in-
vestigating the simulation results generated from the scenarios outlined in Section 5.1.3. The first
three of the scenarios are simulated according to the flight test one event description listed in Table
5.1. This is followed by a more in depth investigation through a simulation of Scenario 4 according
to the flight test two event description listed in Table 5.1. Table 5.2 contains a summary of the
results produced during simulations of Scenario 1 - straight and level flight with minimal process
noise. It is expected that poor FDI performance will result as a consequence of minimal process
noise. Due to the increased sensitivity of AIRA and filtering incorporated in the smart adapters,
107
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
Figure 5.5: Reconstructed actuator deflections produced during simulations of straight and level flight
without process noise.
the fault diagnostic system is still able to detect and isolate faults with the elevator having the
fastest isolation time followed by the ailerons and lastly the rudders. The varying detection times
throughout the system tests are attributed largely to the natural motion of the aircraft charac-
terised by the phugoid, dutch roll and short period modes. These modes tend to naturally move
the aircraft around and in different directions. The actuators that either have higher frequency
natural disturbances or larger actuator excitation are generally detected faster than those that
don’t. Since passive fault detection is performed, the Fault Diagnostic System needs to wait for
the actuators to receive enough excitation to breach the 0.4◦ actuator excitation threshold used in
HyDE. In addition, HyDE only finds out about faults about 1 second after they’ve occurred and
must backtrack to discover what fault occurred and when based on reported inconsistencies.
Detailed'Models'Mode' Diagnosis' Description' !! ' !! ' Valid'2.8.1,'2.9.1' actuation.left_aileron.stuck,'actuation.right_aileron.stuck' Left'&'right'aileron'stuck'at'0°' 1.0' 1.8' Yes'2.6.1,'2.7.1' actuation.left_elevator.stuck,'actuation.right_elevator.stuck' Left'&'right''elevator'stuck'at'0°'from'trim' 1.0' 1.6' Yes'2.4.1,'2.5.1' actuation.left_rudder.stuck,'actuation.right_rudder.stuck' Left'&'right'rudder'stuck'at'0°' 1.0' 2.0' Yes''straight'and'level'flight'with'minimal'process'noise'>'actuators'stuck'at'0'degrees' 'Table 5.2: Results of diagnoses performed during simulations of straight and level flight with process noise,where td is the d tection time and ti is the total fault detection and isolation time.
Table 5.3 lists the results produced during simulations of Scenario 2 - a circular flight path that
closely resembles flight test trajectory. When compared to the results in Table 5.2, the isolation
times are noticeably larger, with the rudder having the largest, although the detection times are
similar. This is a consequence of the aircraft producing manoeuvres that move it out of the trim
condition flight envelope which is the working point the reconstruction algorithm is designed around.
The circular trajectory also produces biases in the yaw and roll rates which inadvertently affect the
reconstructed aileron and rudder deflections.
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' Detailed'Models'Mode' Diagnosis' Description' !! ' !! ' Valid'2.8.1,'2.9.1' actuation.left_aileron.stuck,'actuation.right_aileron.stuck' Left'&'right'aileron'stuck'at'0°' 1.0' 2.0' Yes'2.6.1,'2.7.1' actuation.left_elevator.stuck,'actuation.right_elevator.stuck' Left'&'right''elevator'stuck'at'0°'from'trim' 1.0' 1.5' Yes'2.4.1,'2.5.1' actuation.left_rudder.stuck,'actuation.right_rudder.stuck' Left'&'right'rudder'stuck'at'0°' 1.0' 2.5' Yes''Circular'flight'path'that'closely'resembles'flight'test'trajectory'' 'Table 5.3: Res lts of diagnoses perf rmed during simula ions of a ircular flight path, where td is thedetection time and ti is the total fault detection and isolation time.Detailed'Models'Mode' Diagnosis' Description' !! ' !! ' Valid'2.8.1,'2.9.1' actuation.left_aileron.stuck,'actuation.right_aileron.stuck' Left'&'right'aileron'stuck'at'0°' 1.0' 1.3' Yes'2.6.1,'2.7.1' actuation.left_elevator.stuck,'actuation.right_elevator.stuck' Left'&'right''elevator'stuck'at'0°'from'trim' 1.0' 1.1' Yes'2.4.1,'2.5.1' actuation.left_rudder.stuck,'actuation.right_rudder.stuck' Left'&'right'rudder'stuck'at'0°' 1.0' 1.2' Yes''randomly'generated'flight'mission'that'induces'actuator'excitation'>'actuator'stuck'0'deg'?'' 'Table 5.4: Results of diagnos s perfor ed during simulations of arbitrary flight missions, where td is thedetection time and ti is the total fault detection and isolation time.
Simulations of Scenario 3 - an arbitrary flight mission that induces actuator excitation, appear to
have comparably produced the best results as seen in Table 5.4. The isolation times are considerably
smaller, the FDI performance improves as a consequence of additional actuator excitation. This
is inline with the underlying principle of the fault diagnostic system’s smart adapters. Actively
producing a noticeable difference between desired and actual actuator deflections directly affects
the correlation between the two quantities which makes it easier for the FDI system to reason about
the state of the component.
Simulations of Scenario 4 - straight and level flight with substantial process noise, have produced
results, shown in Table 5.5, that are comparable in nature to those produced during simulations
of Scenario 3. The additional process noise results in increased actuator excitation which leads to
improved performance during straight and level flight. In this more thorough analysis, the results
of injecting faults into abstracted system components are included as well. It is important to note
that all the detailed model diagnoses listed contain multiple discrete faults instead of just one fault
and this is a consequence of HyDE’s ability to detect and reason about multiple discrete faults.
To reduce the isolation times for the other actuator faults, some tuning of the thresholds needed to
be done. It is also worthwhile noticing that the relative fault isolation times between the detailed
and abstracted models are similar. However the detection times for the abstracted components are
considerably faster due to not having a delay from using smart adapters to report observations.
Overall during the simulation of the Scenarios in Section 5.1.3, HyDE generated the most likely
candidates and detected the faults consistently with varying isolation times for each component.
Having investigated HyDE’s diagnostic capabilities in simulation, we can now move to analysing
the FDI performance using standardised performance measures.
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Detailed'Models'Mode' Diagnosis' Description' !! ' !! ' Valid'2.8.1,'2.9.1' actuation.left_aileron.stuck,'actuation.right_aileron.stuck' Left'&'right'aileron'stuck'at'2.5°' 1.0' 1.5' Yes'2.6.1,'2.7.1' actuation.left_elevator.stuck,'actuation.right_elevator.stuck' Left'&'right''elevator'stuck'at'2.5°'from'trim' 1.0' 1.1' Yes'2.4.1,'2.5.1' actuation.left_rudder.stuck,'actuation.right_rudder.stuck' Left'&'right'rudder'stuck'at'2.5°' 1.0' 1.2' Yes'2.8.1,'2.9.1,'2.6.1,'2.7.1'
actuation.left_aileron.stuck,'actuation.right_aileron.stuck,'actuation.left_elevator.stuck,'actuation.right_elevator.stuck'
Left'&'right'aileron'&'elevator'stuck'at'2.5°' 1.0' 1.5' Yes'2.10.4,'2.11.4' actuation.left_flaperon.partial,'actuation.right_flaperon.partial,' Left'and'right'flaperon'loose'effectiveness' 1.0' 1.3' Yes'2.4.2,'2.5.2' actuation.left_rudder.hardover,'actuation.right_rudder.hardover,' Left'and'right'rudder'hardover' 1.0' 1.2' Yes'2.6.3,'2.7.3' actuation.left_elevator.floating,'actuation.right_elevator.floating,' Left'and'right'elevator'floating' 1.0' 1.3' Yes'Abstracted'Models'Mode' Diagnosis' Description' !! ' !! ' Valid'2.2.1' actuation.servo_board.miscalibrated' Servo'board'miscalibrated' 0.2' 0.3' Yes'2.1.1' actuation.rc_receiver.out_range' RC'receiver'out'of'range' 0.2' 0.5' Yes'1.1.1' aircraft.avionics_battery.degraded' Avionics'battery'degraded' 0.1' 0.3' Yes'1.2.2' aircraft.backup_battery.discharged' Backup'battery'discharged' 0.1' 0.2' Yes'1.2.3' aircraft.backup_battery.unknown' Backup'battery'fault'unknown' 0.1' 0.5' Yes''straight'and'level'flight'with'minimal'process'noise'>'actuators'stuck'at'2.5'degrees'' 'Table 5.5: Results of diagnoses performed during simulati ns of s raight and level flight, where td is thedetection time and ti is the total fault detection and isolation time.
5.2.3 Diagnostic Performance
We now analyse the FDI performance that is expected during a typical 1 hour fight mission by
generating standardised performance indicators using simulation results from 120 experiments,
lasting 30 seconds each, performed on the linux virtual machine emulating the Raspberry Pi.
Generating these performance indicators helps one understand the FDI performance under practical
conditions where opportunities for testing are limited. In following the methodology adopted in
the previous research project [38], the following performance indicators will be used to determine
the FDI system’s fault sensitivity and detection time:
• process noise - the process noise resulting from wind disturbances is varied from low wind to
a substantial amount of wind
• parameter variation - the system parameters are varied by changing the aerodynamic stability
and control derivatives
• actuator excitation - the actuator deflections are varied between the allowable limits
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Figure 5.6: Simulated detection time and false alarms per minute due to varying stuck positions.
Figure 5.6 shows the detection time and false alarms per minute trends due to varying actuator
deflection stuck positions. These indicators are constructed by using the averages of the results
from the experiments performed during straight and level flight with substantial process noise.
Missed detections are not considered given that HyDE in general takes less than 5 seconds to
detect and isolate faults. A readily noticeable characteristic of this figure is that the there were
no false alarms and that the total fault detection and isolation times vary between stuck positions.
This is to be expected given that the results aren’t reproduced exactly during each experiment due
to the inherent randomness of the simulation environment with ambient wind disturbances. The
number of experiments performed over the stuck position interval is also relatively low, however
it is expected that the trends for the detection times will average to relatively constant values
with the increase in experiments performed. Looking at the detection times, it is evident that
the elevator detection time is the fastest followed by the ailerons and rudders. The false alarm
rate remains consistently low and the detection times average to about 1.5 seconds at 2 degrees.
This is the consequence of having tuned the thresholds used in the constraints for each actuator
mode of operation as a trade off between fault sensitivity and false alarms due to disturbances.
For larger deflections, it is expected that the FDI performance degrades as the aircraft flies outside
trim condition. However, while still in the trim flight envelope, AIRA will perform as expected and
reconstruct the actuator input regardless of the magnitude of the deflection.
Figure 5.7 shows how the performance indicators change due to varying all the dimensionless
aerodynamic constants from their original values (100%). The detection times correspond to the
experiments used to investigate stuck faults at trim deflection. The stuck position needed to
remain constant while the dimensionless aerodynamic constants were varied in order to derive the
performance indicator through the experiments. The lowest detection time is around 100% of
the original values and degrades considerably around a 10% deviation. The increase in detection
time is attributed to the increase in false alarms which affects HyDE’s reasoning process causing
HyDE to search for additional consistent candidates. This is the inherent cost of the increased
sensitivity of AIRA which requires more accurate process parameters and flight around trim. FDI
performance is poor under ideal conditions it then improves with increased process noise before
degrading as can be seen by the increasing false alarms per minute rate in Figure 5.8. To derive
this performance indicator, the stuck positions remained at trim deflection (for each control surface
investigated) before averaging the results. An important observation to make here is that when
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there aren’t any wind disturbances (wind velocity is 0m/s) the aircraft’s natural modes of motion
tend to influence the passive diagnosis process by inducing smaller levels of excitation at lower
frequencies. Once the ambient wind velocity increases, the process noise increases and with it
the level of actuator excitation along with a decrease in cross correlation between the actual and
desired actuator deflections. This explains why the total fault detection and isolation time decreases
drastically, at around 0.2m/s, with increasing wind velocity before increasing again. For larger
wind velocities this effect is most pronounced at around 3m/s as is evident from the increasing
false alarms per minute rate. This implies that noise makes it difficult to distinguish between the
actuator modes and that about 30 false alarms can be expected for wind velocities in the range of
4 m/s over a 1 hour flight mission.
Figure 5.7: HyDE detection time and false alarms per minute due to varying parameters.
Figure 5.8: HyDE detection time and false alarms per minute due to process noise.
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5.3 Flight Tests
Actual flight based hypothesis testing begins with an evaluation of the effectiveness of the input
reconstruction algorithm. This is followed by an analysis of the flight test results and the FDI
performance of the fault diagnostic system.
5.3.1 Reconstructed Inputs
Having evaluated the input reconstruction algorithm through simulation tests in Section 5.2.1, we
now move to the results produced during practical flight testing. Flight testing is done according to
Scenarios 1 and 4 in Section 5.1.3 based on the flight test event descriptions in Table 5.1. Consider
the reconstructed inputs representing estimated and actual actuator deflections, shown in Figure
5.9, that are produced during the first flight test with the event description shown in Table 5.1.
It is evident that the actuator deflections are accurately reconstructed within reasonable margins
and with a consistent reconstruction delay even during faults and filtering is effective in reducing
the effects of noise. It is important to observe that the reconstruction algorithm follows the faulty
actuator input for both left and right actuators, this reconstructed input along with the commanded
input is what is fed into HyDE to perform actuator fault diagnosis.
Figure 5.9: Reconstructed actuator deflections produced with data from flight test one.
Consider now the reconstructed inputs representing actuator deflections, as shown in Figure 5.10,
produced during the second flight test with the event description shown in Table 5.1. Unfortunately
the experiments with the rudder deflections weren’t successful for both flight tests. Note that the
left and right reconstructed actuator deflections are similar and have been adjusted to account for
the control input mixing done by the servo board however only the least correlated input is used.
Just as in the case of the simulated input reconstruction in Section 5.2.1, actuator excitation that
results from the added process noise adds to the effectiveness of the input reconstruction algorithm.
5.3.2 Flight Test Results
Having considered the effectiveness of the input reconstruction algorithm, we now move onto in-
vestigating the flight test results generated from the scenarios outlined in Section 5.1.3 according
to the flight test event descriptions in Table 5.1. For detail regarding the actual tests, please see
[38]. The fault diagnostic system was tested using the flight test data collected onboard the Meraka
Modular UAV. Flight test data was simulated and fed into the diagnostic system along with the
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Figure 5.10: Reconstructed actuator deflections produced with data from flight test two.
Detailed'Models'Mode' Diagnosis' Description' !! ' !! ' Valid'2.8.1,'2.9.1' actuation.left_aileron.stuck,'actuation.right_aileron.stuck' Left'&'right'aileron'stuck'at'0°' 1.0' 5.0' Yes'2.6.1,'2.7.1' actuation.left_elevator.stuck,'actuation.right_elevator.stuck' Left'&'right''elevator'stuck'at'0°'from'trim' 1.0' 2.5' Yes'2.4.1,'2.5.1' actuation.left_rudder.stuck,'actuation.right_rudder.stuck' Left'&'right'rudder'stuck'at'0°' 1.0' 3.0' Yes''HyDE'Flight'Test'two'one' 'Table 5.6: Results of diagnoses performed using data from flight test one, where td is the detection time
and ti is the total fault detection and isolation time.
then injected locked-in-place or stuck faults. The input reconstruction algorithm was also modified
to match the flight conditions the flight test data was collected under. Tables 5.6 and 5.7 list the
diagnoses produced using data from flight test one and two. The performance of the fault diagnostic
system is as expected according to insights gained during simulation tests with the added difference
of the isolation times taking considerably longer. This is due to the inherent noise and increased
wind disturbances that affect the accuracy of the diagnoses - HyDE spends more time searching for
and prioritising candidates that are consistent. HyDE also takes considerably longer to detect 0◦
stuck faults relative to the 2.5◦ stuck faults. Performing back transversals to isolate faults becomes
easier when the actuator stuck positions i.e. at 2.5◦ deviate from the 0◦ trim deflections.
5.3.3 Diagnostic Performance
Standardised performance indicators were generated through simulation tests done in Section 5.2.2.
These performance indicators make it possible to determine what FDI performance can be expected
and by what margin they will need to be adjusted to reflect physical reality. The fault diagnostic
program was tested while running on the Raspberry Pi instead of the linux virtual machine.
Only scenarios 1 and 4 were generated during flight tests one and two so effectively only a few
data points from Tables 5.6 and 5.7 are available for each performance measure. These are overlaid
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Detailed'Models'Mode' Diagnosis' Description' !! ' !! ' Valid'2.8.1,'2.9.1' actuation.left_aileron.stuck,'actuation.right_aileron.stuck' Left'&'right'aileron'stuck'at'2.5°' 1.0' 3.5' Yes'2.6.1,'2.7.1' actuation.left_elevator.stuck,'actuation.right_elevator.stuck' Left'&'right''elevator'stuck'at'2.5°'from'trim' 1.0' 1.5' Yes'2.4.1,'2.5.1' actuation.left_rudder.stuck,'actuation.right_rudder.stuck' Left'&'right'rudder'stuck'at'2.5°' 1.0' 2.0' Yes''HyDE'Flight'Test'two'result''''' 'Table 5.7: Results of diagnoses performed using data from flight test two, where td is the detection timeand ti is the total fault detection and isolation time.
Figure 5.11: HyDE detection time and false alarms per minute due to varying stuck positions.
onto the relevant performance measures as shown in Figures 5.11, 5.12 and 5.13 to see how well
the trends match and by how much they need to be adjusted. These results suggest that there are
unmodelled dynamics in the simulations partly due to the slightly inaccurate parameters shown by
the shifted flight test results in Figure 5.12. They also show that practically, fault detection takes
considerably longer although the flight test and simulation results are comparable. The flight test
data also has inherent noise due to the flight test conditions which explains the more parabolic
nature of the flight test results due to varying parameters. The slightly longer detection times in
this case is a good indication and suggests that the Raspberry Pi’s more constrained processing
environment (less RAM = 512 MB and processing speed = 700 MHz) is able to still effectively
perform fault diagnosis which is a crucial observation. No examples have been found in literature
that mention the Raspberry Pi being used to perform diagnoses using HyDE.
5.4 Evaluation of Results
Evaluating the simulation and flight test results is a crucial part of determining the effectiveness of
the design and development process. Furthermore, comparing the results produced in this research
project with the research project that directly precedes it also serves as a means of gauging the
progress that has been made. Lastly, briefly investigating results produced independently is an
effective way of getting an indication of the FDI performance of the fault diagnostic system.
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Figure 5.12: HyDE detection time and false alarms per minute due to varying parameters.
Figure 5.13: HyDE detection time and false alarms per minute due to process noise.
5.4.1 Tests Evaluation
Table 5.8 shows a summary of the diagnosis results generated through using simulation and flight
test data for both detailed and abstracted models. All relevant actuator fault modes are listed
along with their varying isolation times. The detection times of the more detailed models are
larger which also suggests that they are more computationally intensive. In contrast to this, the
abstracted models have considerably lower isolation times and were relatively easier to implement.
Noticeable differences between the actuator faults suggest that fault detection that involves ailerons
or flaperons takes longer to isolate followed by rudder faults and lastly elevator faults. HyDE’s
flexible modelling paradigm enables the control engineer to easily model systems that exhibit be-
haviour that is discrete, continuous or both whilst allowing different levels of abstraction. Systems
modelled using higher levels of abstraction through the use of thresholds are generally faster. More
detailed system models in general are better able to detect and isolate faults using less sensors
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however they generally don’t incorporate fault detection during transients. The main disadvantage
of using more detailed models is the increase in computational requirements and the implementa-
tion time required which is generally unbounded. Having evaluated the results we now move to
comparing the FDI performance indicators.
Detailed'Models'Mode' Diagnosis' Description' !! ' !! ' Valid'2.8.1,'2.9.1' actuation.left_aileron.stuck,'actuation.right_aileron.stuck' Left'&'right'aileron'stuck'at'2.5°' 1.0' 3.5' Yes'2.6.1,'2.7.1' actuation.left_elevator.stuck,'actuation.right_elevator.stuck' Left'&'right''elevator'stuck'at'2.5°'from'trim' 1.0' 1.5' Yes'2.4.1,'2.5.1' actuation.left_rudder.stuck,'actuation.right_rudder.stuck' Left'&'right'rudder'stuck'at'2.5°' 1.0' 2.0' Yes'2.8.1,'2.9.1,'2.6.1,'2.7.1'
actuation.left_aileron.stuck,'actuation.right_aileron.stuck,'actuation.left_elevator.stuck,'actuation.right_elevator.stuck'
Left'&'right'aileron'&'elevator'stuck'at'2.5°' 1.0' 3.5' Yes'2.10.4,'2.11.4' actuation.left_flaperon.partial,'actuation.right_flaperon.partial,' Left'and'right'flaperon'loose'effectiveness' 1.0' 3.0' Yes'2.4.2,'2.5.2' actuation.left_rudder.hardover,'actuation.right_rudder.hardover,' Left'and'right'rudder'hardover' 1.0' 1.5' Yes'2.6.3,'2.7.3' actuation.left_elevator.floating,'actuation.right_elevator.floating,' Left'and'right'elevator'floating' 1.0' 1.5' Yes'Abstracted'Models'Mode' Diagnosis' Description' !! ' !! ' Valid'2.2.1' actuation.servo_board.miscalibrated' Servo'board'miscalibrated' 0.2' 0.5' Yes'2.1.1' actuation.rc_receiver.out_range' RC'receiver'out'of'range' 0.2' 1.0' Yes'1.1.1' aircraft.avionics_battery.degraded' Avionics'battery'degraded' 0.2' 0.5' Yes'1.2.2' aircraft.backup_battery.discharged' Backup'battery'discharged' 0.2' 0.5' Yes'1.2.3' aircraft.backup_battery.unknown' Backup'battery'fault'unknown' 0.2' 1.0' Yes''HyDE'Results'Evaluation''' 'Table 5.8: Summary of he diagnosis results generated through simulation and flight tests, where td is thedetection time and ti is the total fault detection and isolation time.
5.4.2 Results Comparison
We now compare the FDI performance indicators of FDI systems based on the optimised parity
space method used in the previous research project and the approximate input reconstruction
algorithm (AIRA) used in this research project. This research is a continuation of a series of
projects done at the Electronic System Laboratory (ESL) that deal with the design and development
of Fault Tolerant Control Systems. The focus of the research project that immediately precedes
this one is the analysis and comparison of two methods for UAV actuator FDI. This resulted in
the appropriate use cases for the different methods where the MMAE method (bank of Kalman
filters) was found to be more accurate in isolating faults and the parity space method was found
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to be more sensitive to the occurrence of faults as stated in Section 1.1.3. The MMAE and parity
space methods were evaluated in order to establish their suitability for integration with HyDE
in Section 1.2.3. The MMAE method requires a bank of Kalman filters to be enumerated for
each possible failure mode so practically this would imply, for the case of actuator locked-in-place
faults, having to enumerate a filter for each actuator deflection interval. For this particular use
case this would be impractical so the MMAE method was ruled out despite its superior filtering
capability. The parity space method was also evaluated and it was found that the method is
preferable since it has superior fault sensitivity and in this case fault detection is based on the
difference between desired and actual actuator deflections. However the only disadvantage is its
ability to provide a quantifiable measure of this difference which would assist with the decision
process in HyDE without the use of residuals that encapsulate this information. So with this in
mind the approximate input reconstruction algorithm was selected for integration with HyDE as
it encompasses the superior sensitivity derived from it being based on the same foundation as the
parity space method and it also provides an accessible means to measure the difference between
desired and actual actuator deflections. This obviates the need to enumerate each possible interval
magnitude for each actuator fault mode and also creates the opportunity to diagnose different kinds
of faults. The main disadvantage of the approximate input reconstruction algorithm at this stage
is its lack of filtering capabilities which is why filters are incorporated into the smart adapters
interfaced with HyDE to leverage the advantages of having an alternate to the Kalman Filter.
Figure 5.14: Compared detection time and false alarms per minute due to actuator excitation, [38].
When comparing the FDI performance due to actuator excitation for straight and level flight
without substantial process noise, as shown in Figure 5.14, it is evident that the average detection
time of HyDE is comparably lower than the optimised parity space method. The FDI indicator for
the AIRA, HyDE system is calculated using the detection time due to actuator stuck faults at trim
deflection. The Parity, CUSUM system has comparably superior fault detection performance for
lower levels of actuator excitation below the 0.4◦, 0.007 rad threshold for the AIRA, HyDE system.
The drastic increase in the AIRA, HyDE system detection time at lower levels of excitation is
due to the slower aircraft response time and increasing cross correlation between the actual and
desired control surface deflections, the average deflections become similar. We can expect the false
alarms to increase at larger excitation values as the aircraft flies further away from trim since
AIRA begins inducing increasing amounts of noise into the reconstructed signal. Given that AIRA
is insensitive to the magnitude of actuator excitation the AIRA, HyDE system’s false alarms per
minute rate is consistent, within acceptable limits of conventional flight, along with a marginal
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variation in detection time when compared with the variation in actuator excitation. This implies
that the AIRA, HyDE system’s FDI performance is relatively agnostic to actuator excitation when
compared with the optimised parity space approach which has the worst performance when there
is larger actuator excitation given that it is based on a method that is optimised for trim flight and
the use of residuals which are sensitive to the magnitude of actuator excitation.
Figure 5.15: Compared detection time and false alarms per minute due to varying parameters, [38].
Figure 5.16: Compared detection time and false alarms per minute due to process noise, [38].
When compared with the optimised parity space method, it is evident that AIRA is more stringent
in its requirements for accurate process parameters compared with the more flexible optimised
parity space method. This is based on the more parabolic detection times and false alarms per
minute rate as can be seen in Figure 5.15. The superior robustness to the variation in system
parameters afforded by the parity space method is crucial for instances where there is uncertainty
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concerning the system parameters to use. This added robustness is essential in cases where there
are unmodelled dynamics and the models used are an approximation. The false alarm rates for both
FDD methods also increase in a relatively similar manner. These results suggest that to optimise
for the decrease in false alarms, focus should be directed toward tuning the system parameters as
well as those of the diagnostic system itself.
Figure 5.16 shows how the presence of substantial process noise affects FDI performance. Once suf-
ficient process noise exists, the actuators receive enough excitation to enable passive fault detection
as reflected by the drastic decrease in fault detection time. It is clear that the FDI performance
based on the parity space method degrades significantly with the increase in process noise. The
AIRA, HyDE system however is relatively unaffected by changes in process noise at larger magni-
tudes. This can be attributed to use of low pass filters which filter out the additional noise before
the reconstruction process compared to the filterless Parity, CUSUM fault diagnostic system. In
addition the AIRA based FDI method’s FDI performance improves at lower levels of process noise
due to an increase in excitation and decrease in the cross correlation between the actual and de-
sired deflections. The AIRA, HyDE system does not make direct use of residuals which are also
the largest contributing factor to the varying performance of the Parity, CUSUM system. The false
alarms per minute rate is expected to increase with increased process noise due to the lack of inher-
ent filtering capabilities in AIRA, however with the added filters more acceptable FDI performance
can be expected for the conventional actuator deflection range. These results suggest that the use
of filters in the fault detection and diagnosis task is of paramount importance and may result in
improved performance.
5.4.3 Associated Research
Having compared this research project’s results with the results of the previous research project,
we can move onto comparing the FDI performance with results produced in a similar research
project [24]. Briefly investigating results produced independently is an effective way of getting an
indication of the FDI performance of the fault diagnostic system. The aim is to get a qualitative
indicator of the performance of the developed system given that the the comparison is not done
using standardised FDI performance indicators and the testing conditions for the two research
projects aren’t identical. The research done by Dr. Redouane Hallouzi on Multiple-Model Based
Diagnosis for Adaptive Fault-Tolerant Control contains comparable FDI performance indicators
[24]. Focus is directed toward making a comparison between the fault detection times for the
aileron, elevator and rudder faults with those of the associated research project with comparable
testing conditions.
(a) HyDE (b) MMAE adapted from [24]
Figure 5.17: Fault detection times for aileron input due to varying stuck positions.
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The detection times of the aileron stuck faults for HyDE and the MMAE based diagnosis appear
to be comparable with the exception that the detection times for HyDE are lower as shown in
Figure 5.17. Interestingly when it comes to the fault detection times for the elevators, the results
are comparably lower for both diagnosis methods when compared with the aileron stuck faults as
shown in Figures 5.17 and 5.18. Quite a few incorrect isolations occur for elevator stuck faults
closer to the trim deflection angle, this is attributed to the lack of actuator excitation as is the case
in this research project. The detection times for the rudder stuck faults are also quite similar as
shown in Figure 5.19 and follow the trend where elevators have the fastest detection times followed
by rudders and lastly ailerons. For the MMAE rudder detection times however, there appears to
be a region where there are no faults detected as a consequence of insufficient additional excitation
to enable effective fault detection.
(a) HyDE (b) MMAE adapted from [24]
Figure 5.18: Fault detection times for elevator input due to varying stuck positions.
(a) HyDE (b) MMAE adapted from [24]
Figure 5.19: Fault detection times for rudder input due to varying stuck positions.
Tables 5.9 and 5.10 contain a summary of the FDI performance indicators for the HyDE based
fault diagnosis system and the MMAE based fault diagnosis method. It is apparent that the fault
detection rates of the two methods for the stuck in place faults are comparable with HyDE’s fault
detection rates being higher and fault detection times being faster. It’s worthwhile mentioning that
HyDE has higher false alarm rates compared to the MMAE method and this can be attributed to
the effects of wind in the aircraft’s ambient environment contributing to added process noise.
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Property' Elevator'Stuck' Aileron'Stuck' Rudder'Stuck'Valid'Isolation' 97.2%' 95.7%' 94.3%'Missed'Alarm' 0%' 0%' 0%'False'Alarm' 0.3%' 0.2%' 0%'Time'delay'(s)' 1.5' 3.5' 2''HyDE'Detection'Properties'' 'Table 5.9: Summary of HyDE isolation results.' Rate' Elevator'Stuck' Aileron'Stuck' Rudder'Stuck'Valid'Isolation' 91.4%' 93.4%' 75.2%'Missed'Alarm' 0%' 0%' 21.8%'False'Alarm' 0%' 0%' 0%'Time'delay'(s)' 2' 5' 3.5''Research'Detection'Rates'' 'Table 5.10: Summary of MMAE isolation results sourced from [24].
5.4.4 Out of Scope Investigation
An important aspect of the development of a fault diagnostic system to consider is the improvement
of the system’s ability to track system behaviour accurately and provide valid diagnoses without
undue development effort.
Control' Sensitive'Variables'Aileron' !' !' !' !' !' E'Flaperon' !' !' !' !' !' E'Rudder' !' !' !' !' !' E'Elevator' !' !' !' !' D' N'Engine'1' !' !' !' !' !' !'Engine'2' !' !' !' !' !' !''Sensitive'state'variables'for'different'faults'' 'Table 5.11: Sensitive state variables for control inputs adapted from [19].
In developing the declarative model for the UAV’s actuators, the first element that had to be
identified is the causal relationship between the inputs and the observable outputs. In this research,
the observable outputs are the states of the decoupled aircraft dynamics. Table 5.11 shows the state
variables that are sensitive to changes of the control inputs to the aircraft. The highlighted cells
show the state variable used in the implementation of the smart adapters. For the rudder control
input, three of the states are highlighted which implies that for a smart adapter with acceptable
FDI performance, additional points of observation were required. As an example of this principle,
Figure 5.20 shows the reconstructed rudder inputs before and after an additional variable was
incorporated. In general this principle applies to other subsystems and future improvements to the
fault diagnostic system will need to take this principle into account during the design process.
5.5 System Level Reasoning
The developed Fault Diagnostic System’s ability to reason about the system is an important aspect
to investigate given that HyDE is a hybrid diagnosis engine. The aim of this research project is
to develop a generalised fault diagnosis system that is housed in an expandable architecture. Up
until this point, we have performed benchmark tests to evaluate the system’s performance at the
component level. We now move on to investigating some of the emergent properties exhibited by
a system that simulates components that can be influenced by one another other.
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(a) Two state variables: p, r (b) Three state variables: β, p, φ
Figure 5.20: Effect of incorporating additional points of observation in rudder input reconstruction.
5.5.1 Mode Evaluation
Fault	Diagnostic	System	
Function	 Kalman,	Bayes	 Parity,CUSUM	 AIRA,	HyDE	Multiple	Simultaneous	Faults	 -	 -	 √	Actuator	Isolation	(Left/Right)	 √	 √	 x	Aileron	Control	Surfaces	 √	 √	 √	Elevator	Control	Surfaces	 √	 √	 √	Flaperon	Control	Surfaces	 √	 √	 √	Rudder	Control	Surfaces	 √	 √	 √	Actuator	Nominal	Mode	 √	 x	 √	Actuator	Stuck	Faults	 √	 √	 √	Actuator	Hardover	Faults	 √	Actuator	Partial	Faults	 √	Actuator	Floating	Faults	 √	Actuator	Unknown	Faults	 √	Actuator	Off	 √	Avionics	Battery	 √	Backup	Battery	 √	Battery	Isolation	 √	Battery	Nominal	Mode	 √	Battery	Degraded	Fault	 √	Battery	Discharged	Fault	 √	Battery	Unknown	Fault	 √	RC	Receiver	On	Mode	 √	RC	Receiver	Off	Mode	 √	RC	Receiver	Out	of	Range	Fault	 √	RC	Receiver	System	Failure	Fault	 √	Servo	Board	On	Mode	 √	Servo	Board	Off	Mode	 √	Servo	Board	Miscalibrated	Fault	 √	Servo	Board	System	Failure	Fault	 √	Implemented	features	of	the	FTC	Group’s	relevant	Fault	Diagnostic	Systems\cite{odendaal2012},	key	√	implemented,	x	not	implemented,	-	notinvestigated.	Table 5.12: Implemented features of the FTC Group’s relevant Fault Diagnostic Systems [38], key Ximplemented, x not implemente , - not investigated.
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Table 5.12 contains a listing of all the relevant fault detection and diagnosis methods investigated
by the Fault Tolerant Control Group in the ESL at Stellenbosch University thus far. The table lists
the functionality implemented in each self contained system and also serves to suggest the progress
of the research toward developing a generalised Fault Diagnostic System for the Meraka Modular
UAV. The Parity Space Method and AIRA are compared in this research project in order to identify
the relative strengths and weaknesses of each of the fault detection methods. Table 5.12 aims to
highlight the functionality enabled by each of the developed Fault Diagnostic Systems. The initial
systems focussed predominantly on actuator fault detection where as with this research, focus is
directed toward system development and the migration of existing fault detection methods into a
generalised system. Evaluating this generalised system requires an awareness and understanding
of each of the modes of operation listed in Table 5.12. One of the ways available to do this is a
Cause and Effects Matrix.
5.5.2 Cause and Effects Matrix
Cause	and	Effects	Matrix	 Rank	I/O	 a_bat	 b_bat	 rc	 board	 aile	 elev	 flap	 rudd	 -	a_bat	 √	 √	 √	 3	b_bat	 √	 √	 √	 3	rc	 √	 √	 2	board	 √	 √	 √	 √	 √ 5aile	 √	 1	elev	 √	 1	flap	 √	 1	rudd	 √ 1Cause	and	effects	matrix	Table 5.13: Cause and Effects Matrix, outlining functional relationships between components.
Reasoning about a hybrid system with several subsystem components is a challenging task. This
is due to the complexities inherent in tracking the behaviour evolution of each component and
determining alternative trajectories in a system’s modes and states. Evaluating a FDD method in
order to determine it’s capability to reason is not a straight forward task due to the multitude of
permutations of modes of operation a interconnected system gives rise to.
A simplified cause and effects matrix, shown in Table 5.13, is used to give a functional overview of
the ’reasoning space’ for the system that has been modelled in HyDE based on comparable work
done in [23]. Each of the major components of interest are represented in the table where a_bat
is the Avionics Battery, b_bat is the Backup Battery, rc is the RC Receiver, board is the Servo
Board, aile represents the aileron control surfaces, elev represents the elevators control surfaces,
flap represents the flaperon control surfaces and rudd represents the rudder control surfaces. The
cause and effects matrix has a list of all the inputs on the left hand side column and a list of all
the corresponding outputs on the top row. The highlighted cells correspond to functional input
output relationships that have been identified between components based on the Characterised
Subsystem Component Model generated in Section 3.3. The green diagonal entries in the matrix
correspond to the component level diagnoses. These are equivalent to a FDD method that can only
reason about a component individually without taking into consideration other components that
may influence the component’s behaviour. The cells that are in blue in the matrix correspond to
the output components influenced directly by the input components, this functionality wouldn’t be
possible without HyDE being able to model the interconnection of components at the system and
subsystem level. When changes in the input components occur the effects cascade into the output
components as well which then influence their output components until the effect has propagated
to all the relevant components in the system. The right most column lists the ranking of the
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respective component based on the number of components the input component affects directly.
The from these results, it is clear that the servo board followed by the batteries are the most
important components onboard the UAV. We use this understanding to prioritise the generation
of scenarios that we can use to determine how well the UAV’s subsystems are modelled and how
accurate HyDE is at reasoning about the state of the system.
5.5.3 Hybrid Diagnosis
The results generated during the benchmark tests are reused to shed some light into how HyDE has
been reasoning about the system. Table 5.14 contains a list of the diagnoses requested from HyDE
in response to the fault scenarios injected into the system during benchmark testing that has been
done thus far. In addition to the mode of interest a list has been given of all other components and
their locations except the other actuators since they are similar.
Hybrid	Diagnosis	Mode	 Diagnosis	 Description	 !! 	 !! 	 Valid	
2.2.1	 actuation.servo_board.miscalibrated	 Servo	boardmiscalibrated	 0.2	 0.5	 Yes	aircraft.avionics_battery.nominal	aircraft.backup_battery.nominal	actuation.rc_receiver.on	actuation.left_elevator.nominal	
1.1.1	 aircraft.avionics_battery.degraded	 Avionics	battery	degraded	 0.2	 0.5	 Yes	aircraft.backup_battery.nominal	actuation.rc_receiver.on	actuation.servo_board.on	actuation.left_elevator.nominal	
1.2.2	 aircraft.backup_battery.discharged	 Backup	battery	discharged	 0.2	 0.5	 Yes	aircraft.avionics_battery.nominal	actuation.rc_receiver.off	actuation.servo_board.off	actuation.left_elevator.off	
2.1.1	 actuation.rc_receiver.out_range	 RC	receiver	out	of	range	 0.2	 1.0	 Yes	aircraft.avionics_battery.nominal	aircraft.backup_battery.nominal	actuation.servo_board.unknown	actuation.left_elevator.unknown	HyDE	Results	Evaluation	(Stochastic	Reasoning)		Table 5.14: brid Diagnosis, outli ing system level reasoning to changes in modes of operation, where tdis the detection time and ti is the total fault detection and isolation time.
What we would like to see is the consistency in the modes of operation of the subsystem components.
The entire system is reset to nominal state before, and after faults are injected into the system.
When the Servo Board is miscalibrated we expect that the rest of the system is relatively unaffected.
This is confirmed by the observation that each of the components are still either nominal or on.
For the second test, we expect that the avionics battery degrading shouldn’t affect the rest of the
system and this is confirmed by observing that all the components are either on or nominal at
this point in time. If however the backup battery becomes discharged then we expected nothing to
happen to the disconnected avionics battery and the rest of the system to switch off. This occurs as
anticipated given that each of the components in the off mode of operation are constrained to only
operating when there is a specified voltage. When the RC receiver is out of range of the transmitter,
we expect that the batteries will remain unaffected and for the servo board and actuators to specify
that unexpected behaviour has been encountered. This occurs as expected given that no provisions
have been made to model what the components should do if for some reason the RC receiver stops
working thereby preventing it from sending control inputs to the servo board and actuators.
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5.6 Overview
In this chapter the test conditions are defined followed by a description of how the developed
fault diagnostic system is tested extensively by deliberately failing the UAV’s actuators during
simulated flight. This begins by defining the test conditions and by describing the link between
the theoretical model of the UAV and the physical aircraft. Focus is placed on specifying the
flight trajectory followed by the aircraft and the various hypotheses that need to be tested and the
performance measures that can be used.
The effectiveness of the input reconstruction algorithm is evaluated using simulation and flight
based hypothesis testing. This is followed by an analysis of the simulation and flight test results
and the FDI performance of the fault diagnostic system. The performance of the system is then
verified by using flight test data collected by the Meraka Modular UAV during flight missions.
An evaluation of the simulation and flight test results is done as a crucial part of determining the
effectiveness of the design and development process. Furthermore, comparing the results produced
in this research project with the research project that directly precedes it also serves as a means of
gauging the progress that has been made. Lastly, investigating independently produced results is
an effective way to get an indication of the FDI performance of the fault diagnostic system. It is
discovered that the incorporation of additional points of observation enhances the FDI performance
of the fault diagnostic system.
The developed fault diagnostic system’s ability to reason at the system level is investigated. This
investigation begins with an evaluation of the implemented features of the FTC Group’s relevant
fault diagnostic systems and diagnosable modes of operation. This is followed by the use of a cause
and effects matrix which is used to give a functional overview of the reasoning space of the system
modelled in HyDE. Thereafter an evaluation of the fault diagnostic system’s ability to perform
hybrid diagnosis is done to confirm that it performs as intended.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
6.1 Conclusion
The aim of this research is to develop a generalised fault diagnosis system that is housed in an
expandable architecture as stated in Section 1.1.2. The research scope is more clearly outlined in
the Diagnostic System’s Design and Development Specification in Appendix A. All of the research’s
requirements and most basic objectives are met as outlined in Sections A.3 and A.2 respectively.
These include basic objectives concerning the development and integration of an expandable FDIR
architecture and optional extras such as diagnosing onboard power and embedded hardware; and
the implementation of new FDIR methods.
One of the core capabilities of HyDE is its ability to allow the control engineer to model systems
using abstracted concepts such as components, locations, transitions, commands, variables and
constraints with added support for logical and first order differential equations. Performing a
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis goes a long way in formalising the process of inferring the various
faults and defining the diagnostic scope of the declarative models. Using the FMEA and FTA the
diagnostic scope was limited to Category A and B end event effects resulting in uncontrolled and
controlled emergency landings.
The main difference with HyDE when compared to other diagnostic systems is based on its diag-
nostic model being predictive and on its model based reasoning approach. Many diagnostic systems
start with sensor data and classify it where as with HyDE, both the nominal and faulty system
behaviour is simulated. In addition with the use of the approximate input reconstruction algorithm,
HyDE’s flexible modelling language, extensible architecture and conflict directed search algorithm
contribute towards the Diagnostic System’s enhanced reasoning capabilities.
This research has resulted in a larger number and type of subsystem components on the Meraka
Modular UAV that can be diagnosed and include the left and right elevators, rudders and ailerons;
the RC receiver and servo board, and lastly the avionics and backup batteries. The isolation
time for each component varied and it was found that the average detection time of 4 seconds
for ailerons, 2.5 for rudders and 2 for elevators can be decreased by increasing HyDE’s minimum
candidate probability parameter for scenarios which results in less CPU time spent searching for
candidates.
The fault diagnostic system was tested extensively by deliberately failing the UAV’s actuators
during simulated flight. The performance of the system was then verified by using flight test
data collected by the Meraka Modular UAV during flight missions. When compared with the
associated FDIR research, the FDI performance of the fault diagnostic system is found to be
relatively agnostic to actuator excitation. For the Meraka Modular UAV in particular, it is found
that the fault diagnostic system performs as expected in the presence of disturbances and noise
and improvements can be made by incorporating additional points of observation.
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6.2 Contributions
More states were incorporated into the state space matrices that describe the Meraka Modular UAV
using decoupled aircraft dynamics. An innovative system inversion technique was investigated and
implemented in order to reconstruct inputs that correspond to actuator deflections. A new design
method for applying the approximate input reconstruction algorithm (AIRA) to the linearised
aircraft model was also described. Through investigation, it was found that modulating the inputs
with sinusoidal signals improves input reconstruction for nonlinear aircraft models using SISO state
space representations.
HyDE, an innovative generic framework for stochastic model based reasoning developed at NASA
along with a real time version of AIRA was integrated in an expandable FDIR architecture based on
the Model B+ Raspberry Pi which is the first for HyDE. The ESL’s Ground Station was modified to
include a diagnostics panel that allows the ground station operator to visually monitor the changes
in the subsystem components and faults that occur onboard the Meraka Modular UAV in real time.
A Reliability Analysis framework based on the Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) was introduced into the design and development process to allow sub-
systems to be categorised. Future research can now be done towards ensuring that negative effects
and the possible occurrence of end effect events such as uncontrolled emergency landings, controlled
emergency landings and failures in flight missions are minimised.
As a consequence of this research, additional failure modes have been incorporated into the FDIR
architecture being developed. It is now possible to not only detect stuck faults but also hardcover,
partial loss of effectiveness, floating and the nominal mode of operation for actuators. In addition,
subsystem components such as the batteries, RC receiver and servo board can now be diagnosed.
6.3 Recommendations
The implementation of additional optional project objectives that weren’t met in this research
project is recommended. This would give the UAV the ability to detect and diagnose plant faults,
sensor, rotor (engine) problems and OBC problems in addition to tracking the behaviour of the
actuators, RC receiver, servo board and onboard batteries.
Setting up a maintained and standardised HIL based testbed environment, with a comprehensive
fault diagnostics test suite, for UAV’s that is similar to the Advanced Diagnostics and Prognostics
Testbed (ADAPT) at NASA Ames Research Center is recommended. This testbed would be fully
equipped with sensors, OBC, servo board, RF receiver and HIL Board and would streamline the
development and testing of future diagnostics platforms. The purchase of updated versions of the
NPRD and FMD Handbooks, and commercially available HyDE software for MATLAB will provide
a more feature rich toolset that will further enhance the design and development process for future
systems.
The design and development of an independent, standardised and rigorously tested fault diagnos-
tics platform that incorporates the design elements of a supervised active control system, based
on this research for the vehicles in the ESL is recommended. The standardisation of the fault
diagnostic system’s housing and the interface between fault diagnostic system and the vehicles in
the ESL is also recommended. This would make using the same diagnostic platform in different
vehicles less cumbersome when accompanied by a specification document outlining the procedures
to be followed when integrating the fault diagnostics platform in other vehicles. Designing and
implementing a closed loop control system for the Meraka Modular UAV and the reapplication of
the input reconstruction algorithm will result in more accurate input reconstruction. This results
as a consequence of using a direct causal relationship between the control inputs and measured
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output variables. Investigating and implementing approaches to enable the nonlinear operation of
the parity space method can also add to resolving AIRA’s inability to operate effectively outside
trim. This would enable the fault diagnostic system to reliably operate in a larger range of aircraft
manoeuvres and in parts of the aircraft’s flight mission that don’t include straight and level flight
considering that these other parts contain critical stages such as Autonomous Take-off and Landing
(ATOL).
The incorporation of active FDI for critical FDI tasks such as left and right aileron detection is
recommended. The incorporation of more points of observations in future research is of paramount
importance especially for cases where these observations can be derived from the subsystems elec-
tronically without the need for additional hardware. This will further add to the diagnostic system’s
ability to reason about the state of the system and track the behaviour evolution of the subsystem
components through time.
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Appendix A
System Development
A.1 Project Aim
The aim of this project is to allow an autonomous Unmanned Aircraft to be able to automatically
diagnose faults or significant changes in the behaviour of on-board sub-systems and if possible
it should be able to automatically reconfigure the aircraft to maintain stable flight control using
fault-free sub-systems.
A.2 Research Objectives
The desired research output for this project includes the development of the following:
1. A Fault Diagnosis and Reconfiguration System - which consists of:
• creating a FDIR engine structure that is expandable
• combining the chain of fault detection and isolation with reallocation technologies
• demonstrating this process using a system that can be embedded on board the Meraka
Modular UAV.
2. Optionally, a Generalised FDIR System - which consists of:
• extending the detected fault types, in addition to actuator (control surface) faults, to
include:
– plant faults
– sensor problems
– rotor (engine) problems
– on-board power (battery) problems
– embedded hardware (OBC - on-board computer) problems
– all sorts of other things in more of a general path such as the embedded software.
• the implementation of new FDIR methods including for example:
– the combination of active and passive fault detection
– new FDIR methods that might be applicable to the various fault types
– the reconfiguration of on-board sub-systems e.g. power, OBC hardware, sensors etc.
A.3 Research Requirements
The following project requirements have been identified as per the problem statement and project
proposal:
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• draw from, expand and improve upon associated research performed in the ESL:
– development of a working model for the autonomous aircraft system and FDIR methods
– identification and modelling of the fault types to be diagnosed in the developed FDIR
system
• combine fault detection and isolation research with the reconfiguration technologies already
demonstrated:
– development of an expandable architecture for the integration of FDIR technology
– implementation of integrated FDIR technology within a simulation environment
• design, test and demonstrate a system capable of running on-board the CSIR DPSS Modular
UAV (Autonomous Unmanned Aircraft) that allows it to:
– automatically diagnose faults or significant changes in the behaviour of on-board sub-
systems
– automatically reconfigure the aircraft to maintain stable flight control using fault-free
sub-systems.
A.4 Development Approach
• Model the aircraft and system faults - The aircraft system must be modelled at this stage
along with the fault modes for the existing sub-systems. Having done this, it will be possible to
create a simulation of the system in order to verify the correct operation of the FDIR System to be
developed. The existing aircraft system also must be analysed to ensure that the aircraft control
system and estimator are in a working condition in order to avoid creating a faulty system model.
• Implement FDIR methods selected - Selected FDIR methods will need to be implemented
separately and tested before they are integrated within the larger FDIR system. In this way the
efficacy of each method will be verified and in doing so, the pathways available for the integration
of the methods will become apparent which will then allow for a clearer overview of each method’s
functionality.
• Develop an expandable IVHM System architecture - The developed Diagnosis System will be
comprised of varying FDIR components which then work together in order to produce the intended
functionality. It is therefore essential that an expandable architecture be developed which gives the
system the flexibility for components to be added as needed.
• Integrate the FDIR technology - The FDIR technology then needs to be integrated within the
developed IVHM System using the expandable system architecture. Once the technology has been
integrated, it can then be simulated before being implemented practically on-board the aircraft.
• Get the existing aircraft system working - The existing aircraft system must be restored to
working condition before further work can be done. This will ensure that any faults or problems
with the existing system can be resolved before attempting to make modifications.
• System Implementation - The developed IVHM System along with the integrated FDIR
technology will then be practically implemented on-board the Meraka Modular UAV and associated
aircraft system components. This will include the design and development of the actual hardware
to be used or the augmentation of existing components which will allow system implementation.
• Simulate the integrated FDIR technology - The developed system will need to be simulated
initially via a SIL (Software in the Loop) Simulation in order to verify that the developed system
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performs as expected and to remove any problems early in the development of the system. This
can be followed by a HIL (Hardware in the Loop) Simulation in order to verify that the developed
system will perform as expected when implemented on the aircraft system’s hardware.
• Perform a flight test - The flight test will be used to practically demonstrate the functionality
of the developed system. Here the various fault conditions will be triggered artificially under trim
conditions and the data generated will be used to verify the performance of the developed system.
A.5 Criteria for Success
The success of the project is rests on the level of completion of the following outcomes:
• Successfully modelling the fault modes of the Meraka Modular UAV using applicable FDIR
methods that allow the aircraft to diagnose faults.
• The successful combination of FDIR research and the development of an expandable archi-
tecture that can be used as part of an accurate simulation of the aircraft.
• The implementation of a system capable of running on board the Meraka Modular UAV
and a successful flight-test that verifies the autonomous fault diagnostic functionality of the
aircraft.
These loosely defined criteria for successful implementation, based on the research requirements,
can be used to define the preliminary design specifications for the project.
A.6 Research Phases
The following phases for the execution of the project have been identified given the problem state-
ment and the proposed solution.
Project Phases:
1. Initiation Phase
2. Definition Phase
3. Design and Development (Prototype) Phase
4. Documentation Phase
5. Presentation and Delivery Phase
6. Termination Phase
The project phases were then used to guide development approach that would be taken in order
to complete the project successfully as shown in Figure A.1. This begins with the project proposal
followed by literature study, which includes course work. The development of the prototype requires
modelling the system and the respective fault modes, followed by the research and integration of
FDIR technology that is then used to develop the desired diagnostic system. The performance of
this system is then tested practically before writing the project documentation.
A.7 Preliminary Design Specifications
These preliminary design specifications were derived from the project requirements and define
the communication, control, autonomy, estimation, environment and safety of the system to be
developed.
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Figure A.1: Research Project Decomposition
A.7.1 Autonomy Requirements
The following autonomy requirements where identified to ensure that the aircraft performs au-
tonomously:
• The system must be able to autonomously perform fault detection, isolation and if possible
reconfiguration.
• It is intended for the system to be autonomous in nature therefore it is required that it be
able to maintain stable flight and track given paths and follow instructions.
• We assume that there are no obstacles in the aircraft’s flight path so it wont have to perform
collision avoidance.
A.7.2 Communication Requirements
The following communication requirements were identified to ensure operability between the aircraft
and the ground station:
• The ground station should send and receive data relating to the aircraft’s state, position and
fault conditions.
• The aircraft should be able to send and receive instructions and data from the ground station
and communicate with the on-board components as necessary.
A.7.3 Control Requirements
In order to ensure accurate control of the aircraft, the following requirements where identified:
• It is important that the aircraft be able to reduce the error between the output and its
reference as accurately as possible.
• The aircraft’s bandwidth must be chosen so that it allows for realistic performance while
maintaining robustness to modelling error.
• The aircraft’s control system must be able to maintain effective control of the aircraft whilst
performing all related activity on board.
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A.7.4 Environment Considerations
The following needs to be considered for the aircraft’s testing and operating environment:
• It is assumed that the aircraft will be high enough above the ground and clear from any
obstacles that may collide with it.
• Wind disturbances and related weather conditions are likely to have a significant impact on
the aircraft’s performance. It can be assumed that these effects can be modelled as process
noise and disturbances.
A.7.5 Estimation Requirements
The following estimation requirements where identified for the project:
• The estimator dynamics can be assumed to be much faster than the controller dynamics.
• It is assumed that estimation of the aircraft’s states will be available during all control updates
and fairly accurate to avoid undesirable control effects.
A.7.6 Safety Requirements
The safety of the system is of paramount importance therefore the following requirements where
identified:
• The aircraft will not attempt to simulate injected faults beyond a specified time in order to
prevent the likelihood of damage to the system resulting from the faults simulated.
• Should the aircraft’s autopilot malfunction, the land pilot will always have the ability to
resume full control of the aircraft and safely land it.
• For safety requirements, it is assumed that the aircraft will not allow the on-board power
systems or critical aircraft sub-systems to be disengaged at any stage, even as part of recon-
figuration procedures.
A.8 System Architecture
It is preferable for the physical implementation of the system to not be state dependent therefore;
the Figure A.2 describes the state independent system. The diagnostic system will be the main
focus of the work to be done given that the existing systems should be in working order. The
operator input is the only source of input to the autonomous system that governs its operation.
A.9 Software Architecture
The following software architecture governs the operation of the developed system.
A.9.1 System Interface
The following operator input can be given to the system as instructions to guide its state transitions:
1. Guidance: Causes the aircraft to disengage control of the aircraft and await further instruction
to either receive commands or execute a flight mission.
2. Mission: This instruction is used to cause the aircraft to execute its flight mission by tracking
waypoints at trim conditions.
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Figure A.2: Autonomous Aircraft System Architecture
3. Probe: Instructs the Guidance System to inject faults into the aircraft, which can be used to
simulate faults.
4. Suspend: This instruction commands the aircraft to suspend or resume any activity that it
is currently performing which would lead to it remaining in its current state.
5. Restore: Restores the aircraft to nominal operating conditions by returning the aircraft to
nominal free fault conditions.
6. Command: Issues the instruction that causes the aircraft to follow and maintain given position
or translation requests.
A.9.2 System States
The overall states of the aircraft can be described as follows:
0. Disengage: At this state, the system is waits to receive instruction to either follow given
commands or execute the flight mission stored on-board the flight computer.
1. Flight mission: At this stage the aircraft’s guidance system maintains control of the aircraft
and guides it along a specified flight trajectory. This will then simulate normal aircraft
behaviour at trim that then allows for the simulation of the occurrence of faults by injecting
faults into the system.
2. Monitor aircraft behaviour: The aircraft’s behaviour is continuously monitored at this stage
in order to detect any simulated faults. This will be done while the aircraft continues normal
operation and any faults detected will then need to be isolated.
3. Perform fault isolation: After the detection of a fault, the FDIR system will attempt to
determine what has caused the fault by isolating the root cause using the available sensor
data and system model.
4. Reconfigure aircraft: After the fault isolation, the system will attempt to reconfigure aircraft
based on the fault and the available fault mitigation procedures needed in order to restore
nominal flight operation using the existing fault free subsystems.
5. Maintain stable flight: At this state the FDIR system will use the new system configuration
as the new model for the aircraft in order to maintain stable flight. The flight mission will
then proceed until such a time that there is a significant change in the aircraft’s behaviour
or until instructions are received to disengage the system or follow commands.
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6. Command: At this state, the system receives commands that can be used to verify the correct
operation of the on-board hardware and software.
A.9.3 State Transitions
0
5
42
3
1
6
Figure A.3: System state transitions
The states described above are linked by the autonomous structure shown in Figure A.3. These lines
suggest the flow of control of the aircraft’s systems where transitions are governed by commands
given or the states themselves.
A.10 Issues, Constraints and Limitations
There are potential issues and limitations that must be noted as these may affect the overall system,
hardware and software required for the successful completion of this project.
A.10.1 System Overview
Since this is a continuation of the work done by others in the ESL, any prior work that is funda-
mental to the operation of the aircraft and associated software must be verified to ensure that the
system will perform as expected.
A.10.2 Developed Hardware
Since this project requires a flight test or using flight test data, the existing hardware must also
be restored to a working condition. It is also important to note that there is only one aircraft and
with any damage to the aircraft, time penalties will be incurred to fix it, which will ultimately
affect the schedule.
A.10.3 Developed Software
It is assumed that the ground station software along with the aircraft embedded software is in
working order. This will need to be verified before further work on the aircraft can proceed along
with the guidance system. The SIL simulation software along with the development software for
the existing hardware will need to be reintegrated and tested before the aircraft and its components
can be used and tested.
A.10.4 Engine Selection
In addition to those already identified, the following issues were taken into consideration when
determining the suitability of the diagnosis engine: it supports multiple modelling paradigms, has
near realtime processing, handles time delays in components, handles stochastic reasoning, models
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component behaviour, incorporates models for noise, can be accessed via an API, incorporates
Failure Mode Effects Analysis (FMEA), can be executed on an embedded system, is open source or
freely available, runs on Windows / Linux / RTOS, enables varied levels of abstraction, diagnoses
discrete and continuous behaviour, diagnoses multiple faults, uses model based reasoning.
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Appendix B
Meraka Modular UAV
B.1 Aircraft Parameters
The aircraft parameters and the moment of inertia tensor were determined using a three dimensional
geometric model of the Meraka Modular UAV in Autodesk Inventor.
Parameter' Value'm' Mass' 26.0kg'!' Mean'aerodynamic'chord' 0.36m'e' Oswald'efficiency'factor' 0.85'A' Wing'aspect'ratio' 11.11'S' Wing'reference'area' 1.44!!'b' Wing'span' 4.0m''Aircraft'parameters' 'Table B.1: Aircraft Parameters
Ib =

12.18 0 0
0 5.86 0
0 0 17.29
 kg.m2 (B.1)
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B.2 Aerodynamic Coefficients
These aerodynamic coefficients were calculated with AVL Software using a simulation of the aircraft
at a trim velocity of 22 m/s and a positive angle of attack. The control derivatives are used in
the actuator vector δ during calculations of the non-dimensional aerodynamic force and moment
coefficients. The symbols on the left specifically denote the subscripts of the coefficients above each
column in Tables B.2 and B.3.
' !!' !!' !!' !! ' !!' !!'0' 0.06' 0.5' ' ' G0.05' '!' ' 5.557928' ' ' G1.069455' '!' ' ' G0.389444' G0.071508' ' 0.102214'!' ' ' 0.049295' G0.621899' ' G0.063578'!' ' 8.046991' ' ' G18.442581' '!' ' ' 0.244026' G0.085316' ' G0.085316''Stability'derivatives'' 'Table B.2: Stability Derivatives
Actuator' !!! ' !!! ' !!! ' !!! ' !!! '!! ' G0.47515' G0.009786' G0.16364' 0.062452' 0.005796'!! ' 0.47515' G0.009786' G0.16364' G0.062452' 0.005796'!! ' 0.17624' G0.028361' 0.0072193' G0.6157' 0.0092819'!! ' 0.17624' 0.028361' G0.0072193' G0.6157' G0.0092819'!! ' 0.59232' G0.010199' 0.11539' G0.065031' 0.003495'!! ' 0.59232' 0.010199' G0.11539' G0.065031' G0.003495'!! ' G0.3856' 0.10766' 0.0029221' 0.13189' G0.035695'!! ' 0.3865' 0.10766' 0.0029221' G0.13189' G0.035695''Control'derivatives'' 'Table B.3: Control Derivatives
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Appendix C
Linearised Dynamics
C.1 State Matrices
The following state space matrices encompass the linearised dynamics of the aircraft at trim.
Modifications that have been made to the state space matrices have been based on the simplification
assumptions listed in Chapter 2.
∆x˙ = AT∆x+BT∆u (C.1)
[
∆x˙long
∆x˙lat
]
=
[
Along 0
0 Alat
][
∆xlong
∆xlat
]
+
[
Blong
Blat
][
ulong
ulat
]
(C.2)
The modifications made allow the aircraft’s dynamics to be decoupled into longitudinal and lateral
dynamics.
∆x˙long =

∂U˙
∂U
VT
∂U˙
∂W
∂V˙
∂Q
∂U˙
∂θ
1
VT
∂W˙
∂U
∂W˙
∂W
1
VT
∂W˙
∂Q
1
VT
∂W˙
∂θ
∂Q˙
∂U
VT
∂Q˙
∂W
∂Q˙
∂Q
∂Q˙
∂θ
∂θ˙
∂U
VT
∂θ˙
∂W
∂θ˙
∂Q
∂θ˙
∂θ


v
α
q
θ

+

∂U˙
∂δEr
∂U˙
∂δEl
∂U˙
∂∆Tr
∂U˙
∂∆T l
1
VT
∂W˙
∂δEr
1
VT
∂W˙
∂δEl
1
VT
∂W˙
∂∆Tr
1
VT
∂W˙
∂∆T l
∂Q˙
∂δEr
∂Q˙
∂δEl
∂Q˙
∂∆Tr
∂Q˙
∂∆T l
∂θ˙
∂δEr
∂θ˙
∂δEl
∂θ˙
∂∆Tr
∂θ˙
∂∆T l


δEr
δEl
∆Tr
∆T l
 (C.3)
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∆x˙lat =

∂V˙
∂V
1
VT
∂V˙
∂P
1
VT
∂V˙
∂R
1
VT
∂V˙
∂φ
1
VT
∂P˙
∂V
∂P˙
∂P
∂P˙
∂R
∂P˙
∂φ
1
VT
∂R˙
∂V
∂R˙
∂P
∂R˙
∂R
∂R˙
∂φ
1
VT
∂φ˙
∂V
∂φ˙
∂P
∂φ˙
∂R
∂φ˙
∂φ


β
p
r
φ

+

1
VT
∂V˙
∂δAr
1
VT
∂V˙
∂δAl
1
VT
∂V˙
∂δFr
1
VT
∂V˙
∂δFl
1
VT
∂V˙
∂δRr
1
VT
∂V˙
∂δRl
∂P˙
∂δAr
∂P˙
∂δAl
∂P˙
∂δFr
∂P˙
∂δFl
∂P˙
∂δRr
∂P˙
∂δRl
∂R˙
∂δAr
∂R˙
∂δAl
∂R˙
∂δFr
∂R˙
∂δFl
∂R˙
∂δRr
∂R˙
∂δRl
∂φ˙
∂δAr
∂φ˙
∂δAl
∂φ˙
∂δFr
∂φ˙
∂δFl
∂φ˙
∂δRr
∂φ˙
∂δRl


δAr
δAl
δFr
δFl
δRr
δRl

(C.4)
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C.2 Partial Derivatives
The partial derivatives for each of the nonzero state space matrices Along, Alat, Blong, Blat are
evaluated at trim.
U˙
U
∣∣∣∣∣
T
=
∂
∂U
(
X
m
+ V R−WQ
)
(C.5)
=
ρVTS
m
CXT (C.6)
VT
∂U˙
∂W
∣∣∣∣∣
T
= VT
∂
∂α
(
X
m
+ V R−WQ
)
(C.7)
=
VT
m
∂
∂α
[
CXT
(
1
2
P |V |2S
)]
(C.8)
=
VT
m
∂
∂α
{
(−Cd cosα+ Cl sinα)
(
1
2
P |V |2S
)}
(C.9)
=
qTS
m
(
CLααT + CLT −
2CLTCLα
piAe
)
(C.10)
∂U˙
∂Q
∣∣∣∣∣
T
=
∂
∂Q
(
X
m
+ V R−WQ
)
(C.11)
= 0 (C.12)
VT
∂U˙
∂θ
∣∣∣∣∣
T
=
∂
∂θ
(
X
m
+ V R−WQ
)
(C.13)
=
∂
∂θ
(−mgsinθ
m
)
(C.14)
= −gcosθT (C.15)
1
VT
∂W˙
∂U
∣∣∣∣∣
T
=
1
VT
∂
∂U
(
Z
m
+ UQ− V P
)
(C.16)
=
−pS
m
CLT (C.17)
∂W˙
∂W
∣∣∣∣∣
T
=
∂
∂W
(
Z
m
+ UQ− V P
)
(C.18)
=
1
m
∂
∂α
[
CZ
(
1
2
ρ|V |2S
)
+mg cos θ cosφ
]
(C.19)
=
−qTS
mVT
CLα (C.20)
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1VT
∂W˙
∂Q
∣∣∣∣∣
T
=
1
VT
∂
∂Q
(
Z
m
+ UQ− V P
)
(C.21)
= 1− qTSc
mVT 2VT
CLQ (C.22)
1
VT
∂W˙
∂θ
∣∣∣∣∣
T
=
1
VT
∂
∂θ
(
Z
m
+ UQ− V P
)
(C.23)
=
1
VTm
∂
∂θ
[
CZ
(
1
2
ρ|V |2S
)
+mg cos θ cosφ
]
(C.24)
= − 1
VT
g sin θT (C.25)
∂Q˙
∂U
∣∣∣∣∣
T
=
∂
∂V
[
M
Iyy
− PR
Iyy
(Ixx − Izz)
]
(C.26)
= 0 (C.27)
VT
∂Q˙
∂W
∣∣∣∣∣
T
= VT
∂
∂α
[
M
Iyy
− PR
Iyy
(Ixx − Izz)
]
(C.28)
=
qTSc
Iyy
Cmα (C.29)
∂Q˙
∂Q
∣∣∣∣∣
T
=
∂
∂Q
[
M
Iyy
− PR
Iyy
(Ixx − Izz)
]
(C.30)
=
qTSc
Iyy2VT
CmQ (C.31)
∂Q˙
∂θ
∣∣∣∣∣
T
=
∂
∂θ
[
M
Iyy
− PR
Iyy
(Ixx − Izz)
]
(C.32)
= 0 (C.33)
∂θ˙
∂U
∣∣∣∣∣
T
=
∂
∂V
(Q cos θ −R sinφ) (C.34)
= 0 (C.35)
∂θ˙
∂W
∣∣∣∣∣
T
=
∂
∂α
(Q cos θ −R sinφ) (C.36)
= 0 (C.37)
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∂θ˙
∂Q
∣∣∣∣∣
T
=
∂
∂Q
(Q cos θ −R sinφ) (C.38)
= 1 (C.39)
∂θ˙
∂θ
∣∣∣∣∣
T
=
∂
∂θ
(Q cos θ −R sinφ) (C.40)
= 0 (C.41)
∂V˙
∂V
∣∣∣∣∣
T
=
∂
∂β
(
Y
m
− UR+WP
)
(C.42)
=
∂
∂β
[
1
m
{
CY
(
1
2
ρ|V |2S
)}]
(C.43)
=
qTS
mVT
Cyβ (C.44)
1
VT
∂V˙
∂P
∣∣∣∣∣
T
=
1
VT
∂
∂P
(
Y
m
− UR+WP
)
(C.45)
=
qTSb
mVT 2VT
Cyp (C.46)
1
VT
∂V˙
∂P
∣∣∣∣∣
T
=
1
VT
∂
∂P
(
Y
m
− UR+WP
)
(C.47)
=
qTS
mVT
Cyr − 1 (C.48)
1
VT
∂V˙
∂φ
∣∣∣∣∣
T
=
∂
∂φ
(
Y
m
− UR+WP
)
(C.49)
=
g
VT
cos θT (C.50)
VT
∂P˙
∂V
∣∣∣∣∣
T
= VT
∂
∂β
[
L
Ixx
− QR
Ixx
(Izz − Iyy)
]
(C.51)
=
qTSb
Ixx
Clβ (C.52)
∂P˙
∂P
∣∣∣∣∣
T
=
∂
∂P
[
L
Ixx
− QR
Ixx
(Izz − Iyy)
]
(C.53)
=
qTSb
2
Ixx2VT
Clp (C.54)
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∂P˙
∂R
∣∣∣∣∣
T
=
∂
∂R
[
L
Ixx
− QR
Ixx
(Izz − Iyy)
]
(C.55)
=
qTSb
2
2IxxVT
Clr (C.56)
∂P˙
∂φ
∣∣∣∣∣
T
=
∂
∂φ
[
L
Ixx
− QR
Ixx
(Izz − Iyy)
]
(C.57)
= 0 (C.58)
VT
∂R˙
∂V
∣∣∣∣∣
T
= VT
∂
∂β
[
N
Izz
− PQ
Izz
(Iyy − Ixx)
]
(C.59)
=
qTSb
Izz
Cnβ (C.60)
∂R˙
∂P
∣∣∣∣∣
T
=
∂
∂P
[
N
Izz
− PQ
Izz
(Iyy − Ixx)
]
(C.61)
=
qTSb
2
Izz2VT
Cnp (C.62)
∂R˙
∂P
∣∣∣∣∣
T
=
∂
∂P
[
N
Izz
− PQ
Izz
(Iyy − Ixx)
]
(C.63)
=
qTSb
2
Izz2VT
Cnr (C.64)
∂R˙
∂φ
∣∣∣∣∣
T
=
∂
∂φ
[
N
Izz
− PQ
Izz
(Iyy − Ixx)
]
(C.65)
= 0 (C.66)
VT
∂φ˙
∂V
∣∣∣∣∣
T
= VT
∂
∂β
[P +Q sinφ tan θ +R sinφ tan θ] (C.67)
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∂
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∂φ˙
∂R
∣∣∣∣∣
T
=
∂
∂R
[P +Q sinφ tan θ +R sinφ tan θ] (C.71)
= tanθT (C.72)
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∂φ˙
∂φ
∣∣∣∣∣
T
=
∂
∂φ
[P +Q sinφ tan θ +R sinφ tan θ] (C.73)
= 0 (C.74)
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mVT
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1
VT
∂
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Z
m
+ V Q− UP
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= −qTSc
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∂Q˙
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∂
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= 0 (C.90)
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1VT
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∂δ_
∣∣∣∣∣
T
=
1
VT
∂
∂δ_
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Y
m
− UR+WP
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=
1
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N
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=
qTSb
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Cnδ_ (C.96)
∂φ˙
∂δ_
∣∣∣∣∣
T
=
∂
∂δ_
[P +Q sinφ tan θ +R sinφ tan θ] (C.97)
= 0 (C.98)
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C.3 Decoupled Aircraft Dynamics
The values for these state space matrices can be calculated at trim in order to simulate the flight
of the UAV.
∆x˙long =

ρVTSCX
m
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m
(
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0 0
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Appendix D
AIRA Simulation
The following MATLAB scripts were used during the investigation of the AIRA.
D.1 Minimum Phase Zeros
The following MATLAB script was used to investigate a minimum phase system.
1 % Initialise state space matrices
2 SYS.x0 = [2 0.1 -1];
3 SYS.F = [0.6 -0.22 0.096; 0.5 0 0; 0 0.125 0];
4 SYS.G = [4; 0; 0];
5 SYS.H = [0 0.5 -2];
6 SYS.J = 0;
7
8 % Simulate the discrete system
9 SYS.r = 33;
10 SYS.l = rank(SYS.F);
11 SYS.k = 0:1:((SYS.r+1)*size(SYS.H,1))-1;
12 SYS.u = sin(SYS.k/4)+1;
13 SYS.x = zeros(3,size(SYS.k,2));
14 SYS.x(:,1) = SYS.x0;
15 SYS.y = zeros(1,size(SYS.k,2));
16 for n = 1:1:(((SYS.r+1)*size(SYS.H,1))-1)
17 SYS.x(:,n+1) = SYS.F*SYS.x(:,n) + SYS.G*SYS.u(n);
18 SYS.y(n+1) = SYS.H*SYS.x(:,n+1) + SYS.J*SYS.u(n+1);
19 end
20
21 % Generate pole plots
22 subplot(1,2,1);
23 pzmap(d2c(ss(SYS.F,SYS.G,SYS.H,SYS.J,1)));
24 subplot(1,2,2);
25 pzmap(ss(SYS.F,SYS.G,SYS.H,SYS.J,1));
26 axis([-2 2 -2 2]);
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D.2 Nonminimum Phase Zeros
The following MATLAB script was used to investigate a non minimum phase system.
1 % Initialise state space matrices
2 SYS.x0 = [2 0.1 -1];
3 SYS.F = [0.6 -0.22 0.096; 0.5 0 0; 0 0.125 0];
4 SYS.G = [4; 0; 0];
5 SYS.H = [0 0.5 -6];
6 SYS.J = 0;
7
8 % Simulate the discrete system
9 SYS.r = 33;
10 SYS.l = rank(SYS.F);
11 SYS.k = 0:1:((SYS.r+1)*size(SYS.H,1))-1;
12 SYS.u = sin(SYS.k/4)+1;
13 SYS.x = zeros(3,size(SYS.k,2));
14 SYS.x(:,1) = SYS.x0;
15 SYS.y = zeros(1,size(SYS.k,2));
16 for n = 1:1:(((SYS.r+1)*size(SYS.H,1))-1)
17 SYS.x(:,n+1) = SYS.F*SYS.x(:,n) + SYS.G*SYS.u(n);
18 SYS.y(n+1) = SYS.H*SYS.x(:,n+1) + SYS.J*SYS.u(n+1);
19 end
20
21 % Generate pole plots
22 subplot(1,2,1);
23 pzmap(d2c(ss(SYS.F,SYS.G,SYS.H,SYS.J,1)));
24 subplot(1,2,2);
25 pzmap(ss(SYS.F,SYS.G,SYS.H,SYS.J,1));
26 axis([-2 2 -2 2]);
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D.3 Zeros on Unit Circle
The following MATLAB script was used to investigate a system with zeros on the unit circle.
1 % Initialise state space matrices
2 SYS.x0 = [2 0.1 -1];
3 SYS.F = [0.6 -0.22 0.096; 0.5 0 0; 0 0.125 0];
4 SYS.G = [4; 0; 0];
5 SYS.H = [0 0.5 -4];
6 SYS.J = 0;
7
8 % Simulate the discrete system
9 SYS.r = 33;
10 SYS.l = rank(SYS.F);
11 SYS.k = 0:1:((SYS.r+1)*size(SYS.H,1))-1;
12 SYS.u = sin(SYS.k/4)+1;
13 SYS.x = zeros(3,size(SYS.k,2));
14 SYS.x(:,1) = SYS.x0;
15 SYS.y = zeros(1,size(SYS.k,2));
16 for n = 1:1:(((SYS.r+1)*size(SYS.H,1))-1)
17 SYS.x(:,n+1) = SYS.F*SYS.x(:,n) + SYS.G*SYS.u(n);
18 SYS.y(n+1) = SYS.H*SYS.x(:,n+1) + SYS.J*SYS.u(n+1);
19 end
20
21 % Generate pole plots
22 subplot(1,2,1);
23 pzmap(d2c(ss(SYS.F,SYS.G,SYS.H,SYS.J,1)));
24 subplot(1,2,2);
25 pzmap(ss(SYS.F,SYS.G,SYS.H,SYS.J,1));
26 axis([-2 2 -2 2]);
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Appendix E
Reliability Analysis
E.1 FMEA Documentation
E.1.1 Failure Modes
On the following page is a table containing the failure modes for the Meraka Modular UAV.
Table E.1: Component Failure Modes
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Failure'Mode'Number' Failure''Mode' Failure''Cause'1.1.1' Degraded' Several'recharge'cycles'and'aging'1.1.2' Discharged' Battery'needs'charging'or'is'damaged'1.1.3' Unknown' Battery'behaves'unexpectedly'1.2.1' Degraded' Several'recharge'cycles'and'aging'1.2.2' Discharged' Battery'needs'charging'or'is'damaged'1.2.3' Unknown' Battery'mode'undetectable'1.3.1' Degraded' Several'recharge'cycles'and'aging'1.3.2' Discharged' Battery'needs'charging'or'is'damaged'1.3.3' Unknown' Battery'mode'undetectable'2.1.1' Range'error' RC'Controller'is'out'of'range'2.1.2' System'failure' RC'receiver'stops'working'2.2.1' Miscalibration' Incorrect'mixing'matrix'or'gains'2.2.2' Unknown' Servo'board'behaves'unexpectedly'2.3.1' Power'failure' ESC'looses'power'connection'2.3.2' Miscalibration' Incorrect'PWM'settings'2.4.1' Stuck'failure' Servo'halts'or'gets'jammed'2.4.2' Hardover'failure' Servo'rotates'in'one'direction'2.4.3' Floating'failure' Loose'mechanical'connection'2.4.4' Loss'of'effectiveness'failure' Slipping'mechanical'connection'2.4.5' Unknown' Unexpected'actuator'behaviour'2.5.1' Stuck'failure' Servo'halts'or'gets'jammed'2.5.2' Hardover'failure' Servo'rotates'in'one'direction'2.5.3' Floating'failure' Loose'mechanical'connection'2.5.4' Loss'of'effectiveness'failure' Slipping'mechanical'connection'2.5.5' Unknown' Unexpected'actuator'behaviour'2.6.1' Stuck'failure' Servo'halts'or'gets'jammed'2.6.2' Hardover'failure' Servo'rotates'in'one'direction'2.6.3' Floating'failure' Loose'mechanical'connection'2.6.4' Loss'of'effectiveness'failure' Slipping'mechanical'connection'2.6.5' Unknown' Unexpected'actuator'behaviour'2.7.1' Stuck'failure' Servo'halts'or'gets'jammed'2.7.2' Hardover'failure' Servo'rotates'in'one'direction'2.7.3' Floating'failure' Loose'mechanical'connection'2.7.4' Loss'of'effectiveness'failure' Slipping'mechanical'connection'2.7.5' Unknown' Unexpected'actuator'behaviour'2.8.1' Stuck'failure' Servo'halts'or'gets'jammed'2.8.2' Hardover'failure' Servo'rotates'in'one'direction'2.8.3' Floating'failure' Loose'mechanical'connection'2.8.4' Loss'of'effectiveness'failure' Slipping'mechanical'connection'2.8.5' Unknown' Unexpected'actuator'behaviour'2.9.1' Stuck'failure' Servo'halts'or'gets'jammed'2.9.2' Hardover'failure' Servo'rotates'in'one'direction'2.9.3' Floating'failure' Loose'mechanical'connection'2.9.4' Loss'of'effectiveness'failure' Slipping'mechanical'connection'
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2.9.5' Unknown' Unexpected'actuator'behaviour'2.10.1' Stuck'failure' Servo'halts'or'gets'jammed'2.10.2' Hardover'failure' Servo'rotates'in'one'direction'2.10.3' Floating'failure' Loose'mechanical'connection'2.10.4' Loss'of'effectiveness'failure' Slipping'mechanical'connection'2.10.5' Unknown' Unexpected'actuator'behaviour'2.11.1' Stuck'failure' Servo'halts'or'gets'jammed'2.11.2' Hardover'failure' Servo'rotates'in'one'direction'2.11.3' Floating'failure' Loose'mechanical'connection'2.11.4' Loss'of'effectiveness'failure' Slipping'mechanical'connection'2.11.5' Unknown' Unexpected'actuator'behaviour'2.12.1' Stuck'failure' Motor'rotation'halts'2.12.2' Slipping'failure' Loose'mechanical'connection'2.12.3' Unknown' Unexpected'motor'behaviour'2.13.1' Stuck'failure' Motor'rotation'halts'2.13.2' Slipping'failure' Loose'mechanical'connection'2.13.3' Unknown' Unexpected'motor'behaviour'3.1.1' Communication'failure' Microcontroller'doesn’t'acknowledge'3.1.2' System'failure' Microcontroller'halts'3.1.3' Unknown' Unexpected'microcontroller'behaviour'3.2.1' Communication'failure' Microcontroller'doesn’t'acknowledge'3.2.2' System'failure' Microcontroller'halts'3.2.3' Unknown' Unexpected'microcontroller'behaviour'3.3.1' Range'error' RC'Controller'is'out'of'range'3.3.2' System'failure' RC'receiver'stops'working'3.4.1' Node'failure' Node'fails'to'acknowledge'3.4.2' Communication'failure' Multiple'devices'access'bus'3.4.3' System'failure' CAN'bus'malfunctions'4.1.1' Bias' Temperature'or'mechanical'changes'4.1.2' Stuck' Mechanical'error'in'the'detection'mechanism'4.1.3' Drift' High'rates'for'physical'quantities'detected'with'significant'noise'4.1.4' Scale'error' Sensor'detects'high'rates'for'physical'quantities'4.1.5' Unknown' Sensor'behaves'unexpectedly'4.2.1' Bias' Temperature'or'mechanical'changes'4.2.2' Stuck' Mechanical'error'in'the'detection'mechanism'4.2.3' Drift' High'rates'for'physical'quantities'detected'with'significant'noise'4.2.4' Scale'error' Sensor'detects'high'rates'for'physical'quantities'4.2.5' Unknown' Sensor'behaves'unexpectedly'4.3.1' Bias' Temperature'or'mechanical'changes'4.3.2' Stuck' Mechanical'error'in'the'detection'mechanism'4.3.3' Drift' High'rates'for'physical'quantities'
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detected'with'significant'noise'4.3.4' Scale'error' Sensor'detects'high'rates'for'physical'quantities'4.3.5' Unknown' Sensor'behaves'unexpectedly'4.4.1' Bias' Temperature'or'mechanical'changes'4.4.2' Stuck' Mechanical'error'in'the'detection'mechanism'4.4.3' Drift' High'rates'for'physical'quantities'detected'with'significant'noise'4.4.4' Scale'error' Sensor'detects'high'rates'for'physical'quantities'4.4.5' Unknown' Sensor'behaves'unexpectedly'4.5.1' Bias' Temperature'or'mechanical'changes'4.5.2' Stuck' Mechanical'error'in'the'detection'mechanism'4.5.3' Drift' High'rates'for'physical'quantities'detected'with'significant'noise'4.5.4' Scale'error' Sensor'detects'high'rates'for'physical'quantities'4.5.5' Unknown' Sensor'behaves'unexpectedly''' '
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E.1.2 Failure Effects
On the following page is a table containing the failure effects analysis for the failure modes identified
for the Meraka Modular UAV.
Table E.2: Failure Effects Analysis
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Failure'Mode'Number' Failure'Effects'(Local)' Failure'Effects'(Next'Level)' Failure'Effects'(End'Effect)' Severity'Category'
1.1.1' Non'ideal'voltage'supply' On'board'components'behave'erratically' Inaccurate'flight'data' C'
1.1.2' Low'voltage'supply' OBC'and'Servo'Board'looses'avionics'battery'power'
Controlled'emergency'landing' B'
1.1.3' Unknown'battery'fault' OBC'and'Servo'Board'malfunctions' Controlled'emergency'landing' B'1.2.1' Non'ideal'voltage'supply' RC'Receiver'and'Servo'Board'behave'erratically' Uncontrolled'emergency'landing' A'
1.2.2' Low'voltage'supply' RC'Receiver'and'Servo'Board'looses'avionics'battery'power'
Uncontrolled'emergency'landing' A'
1.2.3' Unknown'battery'fault' RC'Receiver'and'Servo'Board'malfunctions' Uncontrolled'emergency'landing' A'1.3.1' Non'ideal'voltage'supply' Speed'controller'behaves'erratically' Controlled'emergency'landing' B'1.3.2' Low'voltage'supply' Speed'controller'and'motors'loose'power' Controlled'emergency'landing' B'1.3.3' Unknown'battery'fault' Speed'controller'looses'malfunctions' Controlled'emergency'landing' B'
2.1.1' Control'signals'received'erratically' Servo'board'receives'commands'erratically'
Uncontrolled'emergency'landing' A'
2.1.2' Control'signals'not'received' Servo'board'stops'receiving'commands' Uncontrolled'emergency'landing' A'2.2.1' Servo'board'distorts'commands' Faulty'commands'sent'to'actuators' Uncontrolled'emergency'landing' A'2.2.2' Servo'board'malfunctions' Faulty'commands'sent'to'actuators' Uncontrolled'emergency'landing' A'2.3.1' ESC'stops'working' No'commands'sent'to'motors' Controlled'emergency'landing' B'2.3.2' ESC'distorts' Faulty'commands' Controlled' B'
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commands' sent'to'motors' emergency'landing'
2.4.1' Control'surface'gets'stuck' Aircraft'possibly'looses'trim'or'does'dangerous'manoeuvre''
Uncontrolled'emergency'landing' A'
2.4.2' Control'surface'gets'stuck'' Aircraft'possibly'looses'trim'or'does'dangerous'manoeuvre'
Uncontrolled'emergency'landing' A'
2.4.3' Control'surface'starts'flapping' Aircraft'possibly'looses'trim'or'does'dangerous'manoeuvre'
Uncontrolled'emergency'landing' A'
2.4.4' Control'surface'looses'effectiveness' Aircraft'possibly'looses'trim'or'does'dangerous'manoeuvre'
Uncontrolled'emergency'landing' A'
2.4.5' Control'surface'behaves'unexpectedly' Aircraft'possibly'looses'trim'or'does'dangerous'manoeuvre'
Uncontrolled'emergency'landing' A'
2.5.1' Control'surface'gets'stuck' Aircraft'possibly'looses'trim'or'does'dangerous'manoeuvre''
Uncontrolled'emergency'landing' A'
2.5.2' Control'surface'gets'stuck'' Aircraft'possibly'looses'trim'or'does'dangerous'manoeuvre'
Uncontrolled'emergency'landing' A'
2.5.3' Control'surface'starts'flapping' Aircraft'possibly'looses'trim'or'does'dangerous'manoeuvre'
Uncontrolled'emergency'landing' A'
2.5.4' Control'surface'looses'effectiveness' Aircraft'possibly'looses'trim'or'does'dangerous'manoeuvre'
Uncontrolled'emergency'landing' A'
2.5.5' Control'surface'behaves'unexpectedly' Aircraft'possibly'looses'trim'or'does'dangerous'manoeuvre'
Uncontrolled'emergency'landing' A'
2.6.1' Control'surface'gets'stuck' Aircraft'possibly'looses'trim'or'does'dangerous'manoeuvre''
Uncontrolled'emergency'landing' A'
2.6.2' Control'surface'gets'stuck'' Aircraft'possibly'looses'trim'or'does'dangerous' Uncontrolled'emergency'landing' A'
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manoeuvre'
2.6.3' Control'surface'starts'flapping' Aircraft'possibly'looses'trim'or'does'dangerous'manoeuvre'
Uncontrolled'emergency'landing' A'
2.6.4' Control'surface'looses'effectiveness' Aircraft'possibly'looses'trim'or'does'dangerous'manoeuvre'
Uncontrolled'emergency'landing' A'
2.6.5' Control'surface'behaves'unexpectedly' Aircraft'possibly'looses'trim'or'does'dangerous'manoeuvre'
Uncontrolled'emergency'landing' A'
2.7.1' Control'surface'gets'stuck' Aircraft'possibly'looses'trim'or'does'dangerous'manoeuvre''
Uncontrolled'emergency'landing' A'
2.7.2' Control'surface'gets'stuck'' Aircraft'possibly'looses'trim'or'does'dangerous'manoeuvre'
Uncontrolled'emergency'landing' A'
2.7.3' Control'surface'starts'flapping' Aircraft'possibly'looses'trim'or'does'dangerous'manoeuvre'
Uncontrolled'emergency'landing' A'
2.7.4' Control'surface'looses'effectiveness' Aircraft'possibly'looses'trim'or'does'dangerous'manoeuvre'
Uncontrolled'emergency'landing' A'
2.7.5' Control'surface'behaves'unexpectedly' Aircraft'possibly'looses'trim'or'does'dangerous'manoeuvre'
Uncontrolled'emergency'landing' A'
2.8.1' Control'surface'gets'stuck' Aircraft'possibly'looses'trim'or'does'dangerous'manoeuvre''
Controlled'emergency'landing' B'
2.8.2' Control'surface'gets'stuck'' Aircraft'possibly'looses'trim'or'does'dangerous'manoeuvre'
Controlled'emergency'landing' B'
2.8.3' Control'surface'starts'flapping' Aircraft'possibly'looses'trim'or'does'dangerous'manoeuvre'
Controlled'emergency'landing' B'
2.8.4' Control'surface'looses'effectiveness' Aircraft'possibly'looses'trim'or'does'dangerous'manoeuvre'
Controlled'emergency'landing' B'
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2.8.5' Control'surface'behaves'unexpectedly' Aircraft'possibly'looses'trim'or'does'dangerous'manoeuvre'
Controlled'emergency'landing' B'
2.9.1' Control'surface'gets'stuck' Aircraft'possibly'looses'trim'or'does'dangerous'manoeuvre''
Controlled'emergency'landing' B'
2.9.2' Control'surface'gets'stuck'' Aircraft'possibly'looses'trim'or'does'dangerous'manoeuvre'
Controlled'emergency'landing' B'
2.9.3' Control'surface'starts'flapping' Aircraft'possibly'looses'trim'or'does'dangerous'manoeuvre'
Controlled'emergency'landing' B'
2.9.4' Control'surface'looses'effectiveness' Aircraft'possibly'looses'trim'or'does'dangerous'manoeuvre'
Controlled'emergency'landing' B'
2.9.5' Control'surface'behaves'unexpectedly' Aircraft'possibly'looses'trim'or'does'dangerous'manoeuvre'
Controlled'emergency'landing' B'
2.10.1' Control'surface'gets'stuck' Aircraft'possibly'looses'trim'or'does'dangerous'manoeuvre''
Controlled'emergency'landing' B'
2.10.2' Control'surface'gets'stuck'' Aircraft'possibly'looses'trim'or'does'dangerous'manoeuvre'
Controlled'emergency'landing' B'
2.10.3' Control'surface'starts'flapping' Aircraft'possibly'looses'trim'or'does'dangerous'manoeuvre'
Controlled'emergency'landing' B'
2.10.4' Control'surface'looses'effectiveness' Aircraft'possibly'looses'trim'or'does'dangerous'manoeuvre'
Controlled'emergency'landing' B'
2.10.5' Control'surface'behaves'unexpectedly' Aircraft'possibly'looses'trim'or'does'dangerous'manoeuvre'
Controlled'emergency'landing' B'
2.11.1' Control'surface'gets'stuck' Aircraft'possibly'looses'trim'or'does'dangerous'manoeuvre''
Controlled'emergency'landing' B'2.11.2' Control'surface' Aircraft'possibly' Controlled' B'
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
gets'stuck'' looses'trim'or'does'dangerous'manoeuvre' emergency'landing'
2.11.3' Control'surface'starts'flapping' Aircraft'possibly'looses'trim'or'does'dangerous'manoeuvre'
Controlled'emergency'landing' B'
2.11.4' Control'surface'looses'effectiveness' Aircraft'possibly'looses'trim'or'does'dangerous'manoeuvre'
Controlled'emergency'landing' B'
2.11.5' Control'surface'behaves'unexpectedly' Aircraft'possibly'looses'trim'or'does'dangerous'manoeuvre'
Controlled'emergency'landing' B'
2.12.1' Motor'stops'rotating' Aircraft'possibly'looses'trim'or'does'dangerous'manoeuvre'
Controlled'emergency'landing' B'
2.12.2' Motor'rotates'with'varied'speed' Aircraft'possibly'looses'trim'or'does'dangerous'manoeuvre'
Controlled'emergency'landing' B'
2.12.3' Motor'behaves'unexpectedly' Aircraft'possibly'looses'trim'or'does'dangerous'manoeuvre'
Controlled'emergency'landing' B'
2.13.1' Motor'stops'rotating' Aircraft'possibly'looses'trim'or'does'dangerous'manoeuvre'
Controlled'emergency'landing' B'
2.13.2' Motor'rotates'with'varied'speed' Aircraft'possibly'looses'trim'or'does'dangerous'manoeuvre'
Controlled'emergency'landing' B'
2.13.3' Motor'behaves'unexpectedly' Aircraft'possibly'looses'trim'or'does'dangerous'manoeuvre'
Controlled'emergency'landing' B'
3.1.1' Microcontroller'looses'sensor'data' Aircraft'switches'to'manual'control' Inaccurate'flight'data' C'3.1.2' Microcontroller'halts'execution'programs' Aircraft'switches'to'manual'control' Inaccurate'flight'data' C'3.1.3' Microcontroller'applies'erroneous'commands' Aircraft'switches'to'manual'control' Inaccurate'flight'data' C'3.2.1' Microcontroller'looses'sensor'data' Communication'with'GPS'and'OBC' Inaccurate'flight'data' C'
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is'lost'3.2.2' Microcontroller'halts'execution'programs' GPS'module'behaves'erratically' Inaccurate'flight'data' C'3.2.3' Microcontroller'applies'erroneous'commands' GPS'module'malfunctions' Inaccurate'flight'data' C'
3.3.1' Control'signals'received'erratically' GS'receives'commands'&'sensor'data'erratically'
Inaccurate'flight'data' C'
3.3.2' Control'signals'not'received' GS'stops'receiving'commands'&'sensor'data' Inaccurate'flight'data' C'3.4.1' Node'doesn’t'receive'message' Node'doesn’t'receive'command' Inaccurate'flight'data' C'3.4.2' All'devices'don’t'receive'message' Data'is'corrupted' Inaccurate'flight'data' C'3.4.3' CAN'bus'halts' AP'fails'and'data'is'corrupted' Inaccurate'flight'data' C'4.1.1' Sensor'data'gets'biased' OBC'receives'distorted'sensor'data' Inaccurate'flight'data' C'4.1.2' Sensor'data'halts'at'value' OBC'receives'distorted'sensor'data' Inaccurate'flight'data' C'4.1.3' Sensor'data'distorted'by'drift' OBC'receives'distorted'sensor'data' Inaccurate'flight'data' C'4.1.4' Sensor'data'gets'scaled' OBC'receives'distorted'sensor'data' Inaccurate'flight'data' C'4.1.5' Sensor'behaves'unexpectedly' OBC'receives'distorted'sensor'data' Inaccurate'flight'data' C'4.2.1' Sensor'data'gets'biased' OBC'receives'distorted'sensor'data' Inaccurate'flight'data' C'4.2.2' Sensor'data'halts'at'value' OBC'receives'distorted'sensor'data' Inaccurate'flight'data' C'4.2.3' Sensor'data'distorted'by'drift' OBC'receives'distorted'sensor'data' Inaccurate'flight'data' C'4.2.4' Sensor'data'gets'scaled' OBC'receives'distorted'sensor'data' Inaccurate'flight'data' C'4.2.5' Sensor'behaves' OBC'receives' Inaccurate'flight' C'
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unexpectedly' distorted'sensor'data' data'4.3.1' Sensor'data'gets'biased' OBC'receives'distorted'sensor'data' Inaccurate'flight'data' C'4.3.2' Sensor'data'halts'at'value' OBC'receives'distorted'sensor'data' Inaccurate'flight'data' C'4.3.3' Sensor'data'distorted'by'drift' OBC'receives'distorted'sensor'data' Inaccurate'flight'data' C'4.3.4' Sensor'data'gets'scaled' OBC'receives'distorted'sensor'data' Inaccurate'flight'data' C'4.3.5' Sensor'behaves'unexpectedly' OBC'receives'distorted'sensor'data' Inaccurate'flight'data' C'4.4.1' Sensor'data'gets'biased' OBC'receives'distorted'sensor'data' Inaccurate'flight'data' C'4.4.2' Sensor'data'halts'at'value' OBC'receives'distorted'sensor'data' Inaccurate'flight'data' C'4.4.3' Sensor'data'distorted'by'drift' OBC'receives'distorted'sensor'data' Inaccurate'flight'data' C'4.4.4' Sensor'data'gets'scaled' OBC'receives'distorted'sensor'data' Inaccurate'flight'data' C'4.4.5' Sensor'behaves'unexpectedly' OBC'receives'distorted'sensor'data' Inaccurate'flight'data' C'4.5.1' Sensor'data'gets'biased' OBC'receives'distorted'sensor'data' Inaccurate'flight'data' C'4.5.2' Sensor'data'halts'at'value' OBC'receives'distorted'sensor'data' Inaccurate'flight'data' C'4.5.3' Sensor'data'distorted'by'drift' OBC'receives'distorted'sensor'data' Inaccurate'flight'data' C'4.5.4' Sensor'data'gets'scaled' OBC'receives'distorted'sensor'data' Inaccurate'flight'data' C'4.5.5' Sensor'behaves'unexpectedly' OBC'receives'distorted'sensor'data' Inaccurate'flight'data' C''' '
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E.1.3 Detection Methods
On the following page is a table containing the detection methods for the failure modes identified
for the Meraka Modular UAV.
Table E.3: Fault Detection Methods
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Failure'Mode'Number' Failure'Detection''Method' Compensation''Action'1.1.1' Battery'precision'voltage'sensor' Monitor'battery'level,'notify'ground'station'operator'
1.1.2' Battery'precision'voltage'sensor' Prevent'start'up'of'on'board'components'then'activate'backup'battery'power'for'select'components'1.1.3' Battery'precision'voltage'sensor' Activate'backup'battery'for'select'components'1.2.1' Battery'precision'voltage'sensor' Monitor'battery'level,'notify'ground'station'operator'1.2.2' Battery'precision'voltage'sensor' Prevent'start'up'of'on'board'components,'flash'indicator'1.2.3' Battery'precision'voltage'sensor' Attempt'to'activate'avionics'battery'1.3.1' Battery'precision'voltage'sensor' Monitor'battery'level,'notify'ground'station'operator'1.3.2' Battery'precision'voltage'sensor' Prevent'start'up'of'ESD'and'flash'indicator'1.3.3' Battery'precision'voltage'sensor' Prevent'start'up'of'ESD'and'flash'indicator'2.1.1' Check'range'level'from'RC'receiver' Halt'actuator'commands'until'communication'resumes'2.1.2' Add'a'watchdog'timer'to'receive'signals'from'RC'receiver' Halt'actuator'commands'and'attempt'to'restart'RC'receiver'2.2.1' Compare'transmitted'and'received'commands' Notify'ground'station'operator,'try'comparison'again'2.2.2' Compare'transmitted'and'received'commands' Notify'ground'station'operator,'try'comparison'again'2.3.1' Measure'battery'voltage' Attempt'to'divert'power,'notify'ground'station'operator'2.3.2' Monitor'actual'and'desired'thrust' Notify'ground'station'operator'2.4.1' Compare'desired'and'actual'actuator'deflection' Notify'ground'station'operator,'send'reconfiguration'commands'to'OBC'2.4.2' Compare'desired'and'actual'actuator'deflection' Notify'ground'station'operator,'send'reconfiguration'commands'to'OBC'2.4.3' Compare'desired'and'actual'actuator'deflection' Notify'ground'station'operator,'send'reconfiguration'commands'to'OBC'2.4.4' Compare'desired'and'actual'actuator'deflection' Notify'ground'station'operator,'send'reconfiguration'commands'to'OBC'2.4.5' Compare'desired'and'actual'actuator'deflection' Notify'ground'station'operator,'send'reconfiguration'commands'to'OBC'
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2.5.1' Compare'desired'and'actual'actuator'deflection' Notify'ground'station'operator,'send'reconfiguration'commands'to'OBC'2.5.2' Compare'desired'and'actual'actuator'deflection' Notify'ground'station'operator,'send'reconfiguration'commands'to'OBC'2.5.3' Compare'desired'and'actual'actuator'deflection' Notify'ground'station'operator,'send'reconfiguration'commands'to'OBC'2.5.4' Compare'desired'and'actual'actuator'deflection' Notify'ground'station'operator,'send'reconfiguration'commands'to'OBC'2.5.5' Compare'desired'and'actual'actuator'deflection' Notify'ground'station'operator,'send'reconfiguration'commands'to'OBC'2.6.1' Compare'desired'and'actual'actuator'deflection' Notify'ground'station'operator,'send'reconfiguration'commands'to'OBC'2.6.2' Compare'desired'and'actual'actuator'deflection' Notify'ground'station'operator,'send'reconfiguration'commands'to'OBC'2.6.3' Compare'desired'and'actual'actuator'deflection' Notify'ground'station'operator,'send'reconfiguration'commands'to'OBC'2.6.4' Compare'desired'and'actual'actuator'deflection' Notify'ground'station'operator,'send'reconfiguration'commands'to'OBC'2.6.5' Compare'desired'and'actual'actuator'deflection' Notify'ground'station'operator,'send'reconfiguration'commands'to'OBC'2.7.1' Compare'desired'and'actual'actuator'deflection' Notify'ground'station'operator,'send'reconfiguration'commands'to'OBC'2.7.2' Compare'desired'and'actual'actuator'deflection' Notify'ground'station'operator,'send'reconfiguration'commands'to'OBC'2.7.3' Compare'desired'and'actual'actuator'deflection' Notify'ground'station'operator,'send'reconfiguration'commands'to'OBC'2.7.4' Compare'desired'and'actual'actuator'deflection' Notify'ground'station'operator,'send'reconfiguration'commands'to'OBC'2.7.5' Compare'desired'and'actual'actuator'deflection' Notify'ground'station'operator,'send'reconfiguration'commands'to'OBC'2.8.1' Compare'desired'and'actual'actuator'deflection' Notify'ground'station'operator,'send'reconfiguration'commands'to'OBC'2.8.2' Compare'desired'and'actual' Notify'ground'station'operator,'
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actuator'deflection' send'reconfiguration'commands'to'OBC'2.8.3' Compare'desired'and'actual'actuator'deflection' Notify'ground'station'operator,'send'reconfiguration'commands'to'OBC'2.8.4' Compare'desired'and'actual'actuator'deflection' Notify'ground'station'operator,'send'reconfiguration'commands'to'OBC'2.8.5' Compare'desired'and'actual'actuator'deflection' Notify'ground'station'operator,'send'reconfiguration'commands'to'OBC'2.9.1' Compare'desired'and'actual'actuator'deflection' Notify'ground'station'operator,'send'reconfiguration'commands'to'OBC'2.9.2' Compare'desired'and'actual'actuator'deflection' Notify'ground'station'operator,'send'reconfiguration'commands'to'OBC'2.9.3' Compare'desired'and'actual'actuator'deflection' Notify'ground'station'operator,'send'reconfiguration'commands'to'OBC'2.9.4' Compare'desired'and'actual'actuator'deflection' Notify'ground'station'operator,'send'reconfiguration'commands'to'OBC'2.9.5' Compare'desired'and'actual'actuator'deflection' Notify'ground'station'operator,'send'reconfiguration'commands'to'OBC'2.10.1' Compare'desired'and'actual'actuator'deflection' Notify'ground'station'operator,'send'reconfiguration'commands'to'OBC'2.10.2' Compare'desired'and'actual'actuator'deflection' Notify'ground'station'operator,'send'reconfiguration'commands'to'OBC'2.10.3' Compare'desired'and'actual'actuator'deflection' Notify'ground'station'operator,'send'reconfiguration'commands'to'OBC'2.10.4' Compare'desired'and'actual'actuator'deflection' Notify'ground'station'operator,'send'reconfiguration'commands'to'OBC'2.10.5' Compare'desired'and'actual'actuator'deflection' Notify'ground'station'operator,'send'reconfiguration'commands'to'OBC'2.11.1' Compare'desired'and'actual'actuator'deflection' Notify'ground'station'operator,'send'reconfiguration'commands'to'OBC'2.11.2' Compare'desired'and'actual'actuator'deflection' Notify'ground'station'operator,'send'reconfiguration'commands'to'OBC'2.11.3' Compare'desired'and'actual'actuator'deflection' Notify'ground'station'operator,'send'reconfiguration'commands'
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to'OBC'2.11.4' Compare'desired'and'actual'actuator'deflection' Notify'ground'station'operator,'send'reconfiguration'commands'to'OBC'2.11.5' Compare'desired'and'actual'actuator'deflection' Notify'ground'station'operator,'send'reconfiguration'commands'to'OBC'2.12.1' Compare'desired'and'actual'rotation,'measure'motor'voltage,'measure'motor'current' Notify'ground'station'operator,'send'reconfiguration'commands'to'OBC'2.12.2' Compare'desired'and'actual'rotation,'measure'motor'voltage,'measure'motor'current' Notify'ground'station'operator,'send'reconfiguration'commands'to'OBC'2.12.3' Compare'desired'and'actual'rotation,'measure'motor'voltage,'measure'motor'current' Notify'ground'station'operator,'send'reconfiguration'commands'to'OBC'2.13.1' Compare'desired'and'actual'rotation,'measure'motor'voltage,'measure'motor'current' Notify'ground'station'operator,'send'reconfiguration'commands'to'OBC'2.13.2' Compare'desired'and'actual'rotation,'measure'motor'voltage,'measure'motor'current' Notify'ground'station'operator,'send'reconfiguration'commands'to'OBC'2.13.3' Compare'desired'and'actual'rotation,'measure'motor'voltage,'measure'motor'current' Notify'ground'station'operator,'send'reconfiguration'commands'to'OBC'3.1.1' Check'message'acknowledge' Retry'communication,'switch'to'manual'control'3.1.2' Send'message'and'check'acknowledge' Have'watchdog'time'reset'OBC'3.1.3' Send'message'and'check'acknowledge' Have'watchdog'timer'reset'OBC'3.2.1' Check'message'acknowledge' Retry'communication,'switch'to'manual'control'3.2.2' Send'message'and'check'acknowledge' Have'watchdog'time'reset'OBC'3.2.3' Send'message'and'check'acknowledge' Have'watchdog'timer'reset'OBC'3.3.1' Check'range'level'from'RC'receiver' Halt'actuator'commands'until'communication'resumes'3.3.2' Add'a'watchdog'timer'to'receive'signals'from'RC'receiver' Halt'actuator'commands'and'attempt'to'restart'RC'receiver'3.4.1' Monitor'message'acknowledge' Attempt'to'reset'CAN'bus,'notify'ground'station'operator'3.4.2' Attempt'to'send'message'and'monitor'acknowledge' Attempt'to'reset'CAN'bus,'notify'ground'station'operator'3.4.3' Check'bus'voltages' Attempt'to'reset'CAN'bus,'notify'ground'station'operator'4.1.1' Compare'expected'and'actual' Notify'OBC'and'ground'station'
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sensor'data,'apply'signal'processing'filters'to'identify'fault' operator'4.1.2' Compare'expected'and'actual'sensor'data,'apply'signal'processing'filters'to'identify'fault' Notify'OBC'and'ground'station'operator'4.1.3' Compare'expected'and'actual'sensor'data,'apply'signal'processing'filters'to'identify'fault' Notify'OBC'and'ground'station'operator'4.1.4' Compare'expected'and'actual'sensor'data,'apply'signal'processing'filters'to'identify'fault' Notify'OBC'and'ground'station'operator'4.1.5' Compare'expected'and'actual'sensor'data,'apply'signal'processing'filters'to'identify'fault' Notify'OBC'and'ground'station'operator'4.2.1' Compare'expected'and'actual'sensor'data,'apply'signal'processing'filters'to'identify'fault' Notify'OBC'and'ground'station'operator'4.2.2' Compare'expected'and'actual'sensor'data,'apply'signal'processing'filters'to'identify'fault' Notify'OBC'and'ground'station'operator'4.2.3' Compare'expected'and'actual'sensor'data,'apply'signal'processing'filters'to'identify'fault' Notify'OBC'and'ground'station'operator'4.2.4' Compare'expected'and'actual'sensor'data,'apply'signal'processing'filters'to'identify'fault' Notify'OBC'and'ground'station'operator'4.2.5' Compare'expected'and'actual'sensor'data,'apply'signal'processing'filters'to'identify'fault' Notify'OBC'and'ground'station'operator'4.3.1' Compare'expected'and'actual'sensor'data,'apply'signal'processing'filters'to'identify'fault' Notify'OBC'and'ground'station'operator'4.3.2' Compare'expected'and'actual'sensor'data,'apply'signal'processing'filters'to'identify'fault' Notify'OBC'and'ground'station'operator'4.3.3' Compare'expected'and'actual'sensor'data,'apply'signal'processing'filters'to'identify'fault' Notify'OBC'and'ground'station'operator'4.3.4' Compare'expected'and'actual'sensor'data,'apply'signal'processing'filters'to'identify'fault' Notify'OBC'and'ground'station'operator'4.3.5' Compare'expected'and'actual'sensor'data,'apply'signal'processing'filters'to'identify'fault' Notify'OBC'and'ground'station'operator'4.4.1' Compare'expected'and'actual'sensor'data,'apply'signal'processing'filters'to'identify'fault' Notify'OBC'and'ground'station'operator'4.4.2' Compare'expected'and'actual'sensor'data,'apply'signal' Notify'OBC'and'ground'station'operator'
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processing'filters'to'identify'fault'4.4.3' Compare'expected'and'actual'sensor'data,'apply'signal'processing'filters'to'identify'fault' Notify'OBC'and'ground'station'operator'4.4.4' Compare'expected'and'actual'sensor'data,'apply'signal'processing'filters'to'identify'fault' Notify'OBC'and'ground'station'operator'4.4.5' Compare'expected'and'actual'sensor'data,'apply'signal'processing'filters'to'identify'fault' Notify'OBC'and'ground'station'operator'4.5.1' Compare'expected'and'actual'sensor'data,'apply'signal'processing'filters'to'identify'fault' Notify'OBC'and'ground'station'operator'4.5.2' Compare'expected'and'actual'sensor'data,'apply'signal'processing'filters'to'identify'fault' Notify'OBC'and'ground'station'operator'4.5.3' Compare'expected'and'actual'sensor'data,'apply'signal'processing'filters'to'identify'fault' Notify'OBC'and'ground'station'operator'4.5.4' Compare'expected'and'actual'sensor'data,'apply'signal'processing'filters'to'identify'fault' Notify'OBC'and'ground'station'operator'4.5.5' Compare'expected'and'actual'sensor'data,'apply'signal'processing'filters'to'identify'fault' Notify'OBC'and'ground'station'operator'' '
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E.2 FTA Documentation
E.2.1 Component Failure Rates
Category' Component' Failure'Rate'Aircraft'B' Avionics'Battery' 1.596eG5'A' Backup'Battery' 1.157eG5'B' Motor'Batteries' 1.596eG5'Actuation'A' RC'Receiver' 69.133eG5'A' Servo'Board' 1.2eG5'B' Speed'Controller' 3.49eG6'A' Left'Rudder' 0.97eG4'A' Right'Rudder' 0.97eG4'A' Left'Elevator' 0.97eG4'A' Right'Elevator' 0.97eG4'B' Left'Aileron' 1.206eG4'B' Right'Aileron' 1.206eG4'B' Left'Flap' 1.206eG4'B' Right'Flap' 1.206eG4'B' Left'Motor' 5eG5'B' Right'Motor' 5eG5'Control'C' PICA' 1.6eG5'C' PICB' 1.6eG5'C' RF'Transmitter' 69.133eG5'C' CAN'Bus' 1.0787eG5'Sensors'C' GPS' 2.5eG5'C' IMU' 1.13eG4'C' Magnetometer' 7.2eG5'C' Dynamic'Pressure' 3.3eG5'C' Static'Pressure' 3.55eG5''Severity'Categories'' 'Table E.4: Component Failure Rates
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E.2.2 Category A
On the following page is the Category A fault tree developed using [47].
Figure E.1: Category A Fault Tree
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